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ABSTRACT
ARCHETYPE OF FREEDOM: THE DIALECTIC OF THE PHANTASTICAL
IMAGINATION
by Joseph David Todd
This dissertation examines a conceptual paradox within the mounting crisis of
imagination in education. I introduce the concept of phantasy (Marcuse, 1955) to, first,
disrupt the dominant definitions of imagination found in educational policies such as
Common Core State Standards and Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
(STEM) initiatives. These documents instrumentalize imagination in order to meet global
economic initiatives (Committee on STEM Education (CoSTEM), 2012; CoSTEM, 2011;
U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012). Against such instrumentalization, I propose to
reunite imagination with phantasy. The result is a philosophical groundwork for what I
call “phantastic imagination” which returns imagination to its radical, disruptive, and
utopian roots. As such, this study has three central goals: to provide an overview of the
current paradoxes and aporias in contemporary educational policy related to imagination;
map a philosophical dialectic that helps to resolve these problems by returning to the
question of phantasy; and posit educational alternatives based on an emerging theory of
phantastic imagination.
The dissertation utilizes a dialectical methodology to map the convergences and
divergences of imagination and phantasy throughout philosophical history. This analysis
serves two primary purposes. First, it reveals the historical origins of the current crisis in
the conception of imagination in educational policy. Second, it emphasizes the
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productive moments in the dialectic where the tension between imagination and phantasy
is not repressed but rather embraced and even heightened. The resulting philosophical
analysis develops criteria for uncovering points within in existing research, educational
theory, and pedagogy where phantasy can return to disrupt the instrumentalization of
imagination. In sum, this dissertation offers insight into understanding the phantastic
imagination and how a hospitality towards phantasy can be made relevant to teachers
who are interested in nurturing dimensions of the imagination beyond economic utility.
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INTRODUCTION

Under the reality principle, the human being develops the function of reason: it
learns to ‘test’ the reality, to distinguish between good and bad, true and false,
useful and harmful. Man acquires the faculties of attention, memory, and
judgment. He becomes a conscious, thinking subject, geared to a rationality,
which is imposed upon him from outside. Only one mode of thought-activity is
‘split off’ from the new organization of the mental apparatus and remains free
from the rule of the reality principle: phantasy is ‘protected from cultural
alterations’ and stays committed to the pleasure principle. (Marcuse, 1955, 14)

This dissertation conceptualizes a dialectical understanding of imagination in the
context of education for the purpose of (a) interrupting the current view of imagination
found in educational policy and (b) forming a philosophical groundwork to develop a
pedagogy of imagination beyond the current limitations. In recent policy documents and
education reform initiatives, the idea of imagination is invoked as a silver bullet meant to
overcome the gulf between education and employment [Committee on Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education (CoSTEM), 2012;
CoSTEM, 2011; U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012; Robinson, 2001]. Within these
documents, however, reductive and/or contradictory conceptions of the imagination
exacerbate confusion surrounding the idea of imagination, which makes it difficult for
educators to bring the concept into practice. When it can be clearly ascertained, the
dominant definition of imagination in most educational discourses reduces the idea to a
purely instrumental and technical method in the contexts of employment and future
information economies (STEM, 21st century skills). Here, I am defining instrumentalism
as any attempt (a) to reduce imagination’s radical potential to disrupt the status quo, and

2

(b) to orient imagination toward predetermined social, political, and economic ends. This
dialectical reframing of imagination will have potential implications for revising policy
and informing educational pedagogical theory that is genuinely concerned with higher
levels of creativity, inventiveness, and procedural knowledge beyond such
instrumentalism. My dialectical analysis will assist with the identification and inclusion
of alternative learning models that are more appropriate for nurturing what I will call the
phantastic imagination. Phantastic imagination highlights the gulf between instrumental
imagination and a more artistic or erotic imagination, and will indicate how each concept
of imagination can be employed in education successfully without the exclusion of the
other.
The Introduction will cover 4 topics. The first section, Imagination in
Educational Policy, will identify a dominant definition of imagination found in policy
documents and indicate how this definition is linked to a pragmatic educational crisis.
The second section, Beyond Instrumental Imagination, will argue that a dialectical
philosophy of the imagination promises to help overcome these problems by reuniting the
concept of phantasy with that of imagination. The third section, Phantasy, Philosophy,
and Education, will explore the educational implications of this analysis for philosophy
of education and pedagogical development. The final section, Chapter Overview: A
Precedent for Phantasy, outlines the philosophical history of the dialectic of imagination
and phantasy that each chapter will analyze.
To signify the two dimensions of the imagination in this dissertation, I use two
terms, imagination and phantasy, both with roots in ancient philosophy and following
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Marcuse’s use in Eros and Civilization. I use the term imagination to denote the
educational instrumental imagination that is prevalent in 21st century skills policy
documents and other similar historical or educational texts, which argue that it is a skill to
be trained (CoSTEM, 2012; CoSTEM, 2011; U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012).
This instrumental version of imagination can be contrasted with that of phantasy. I use
phantasy, as Marcuse defines it, to denote a dimension of the imagination that is missing
at the level of policy and difficult to find in more progressive education discourses since
the term phantasy implies a dimension of imagination beyond intentional thought. I will
be avoiding the term fantasy in order to prevent any confusion with the literary genre,
though there may be overlaps worth exploring. The term phantasy also helps maintain
some distance from the purely psychological and clinical terminology of fantasy that
neglects philosophical/mythological underpinnings. It must be understood that Marcuse
does not use the terms imagination and phantasy distinctly, and as such, we will need to
be especially sensitive to his usage of both terms in order to identify which concept is
being referenced. In analyzing the space between these definitions, I theorize a
complimentary dialectical relationship—implied by Marcuse’s work—that I call the
phantastic imagination, thus establishing a conceptual balance between conscious and
unconscious creativity.
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Imagination in Educational Policy

Moving into education, we see how the dimensions of conscious and unconscious
creativity can overlay two mutually exclusive goals of education, namely the
social/economic objectives and the developmental/academic objectives (Egan, 2010), but
with a key difference: within phantastical imagination the very terms of social/economic
objectives are not predefined, and instead come from radical possibilities of the
phantastical imagination to disrupt and re-envision all values. Since the research on
phantasy within education is slight, we must also be especially sensitive to the way in
which imagination is described, in case these descriptions actually imply phantasy. That
is, some theorists may approach a concept of phantastical imagination but have not
articulated it as such within the dialectical poles of imagination and phantasy. For
instance, within more progressive and radical educational discourses, imagination can be
understood as a dimension that interrupts entrenched educational paradigms, whether
through exposing sociocultural norms (Dewey, 1934; Greene, 1995) or through
individualized learning experiences and personal development (Egan, 2005; Eisner,
2002).
Current cultural, philosophical, and educational theorists consider both
mainstream and alternative concepts of the imagination as pivotal to the attempt to
understand complex issues in our globalized society through novel approaches and
innovative solutions (Csikszentmihalyi; 1997; Deutsch, 1992; Hardt & Negri, 2004;
Johnson, 1993; Kearney, 1998; Mills, 2000). Within education, 21st century skills
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programs and related policy have identified imagination and creativity as forms of human
capital development linked to new information technologies (Armstrong, 1998; Pink,
2006; Robinson, 2001). However, within 21st century skills programs and similar
strategic programs such as STEM, the ways in which imagination is conceptualized and
situated are either (1) generalized and ambiguous, or (2) instrumentalized and narrowed
(CoSTEM, 2012; CoSTEM, 2011; U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012). Because of
such conceptual confusion, it is therefore difficult to understand what exactly is being
addressed. Indeed, throughout such policy, imagination emerges as a pseudo-concept
that can be appropriated and used in potentially contradictory circumstances. This is
evident throughout 21st century skills documents and educational theory where
imagination is used as a catch phrase for everything from cooperation and divergent
thinking to exposure to the arts and innovative uses of technology (Robinson, 2001;
Greene, 1995; CoSTEM, 2012; CoSTEM, 2012; U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012).
While the future seems to hinge on the development of imaginative skills, the very
meaning of imagination remains vague and conceptually opaque.
Furthermore, the multitude of tasks assigned to imagination seem to indicate that
imagination is a catch-all solution for solving a host of problems that may be at political,
economic, and social odds with one another. Both of these problems indicate a larger
issue: the crisis surrounding the conceptualization of imagination and creativity in
education. The vagueness of imagination is precisely what allows it to be
instrumentalized, cultivated, and applied to specific issues and problems in hopes of
discovering novel and innovative solutions. Because imagination can mean anything and
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is denuded of any particular power, it obscures the gap between theory and practice. We
might call this the instrumentalization of imagination and will argue that this definition is
eclipsing a philosophically robust concept of imagination in education. I contrast and
explore alternatives to this concept of imagination with that of phantasy which, through
Marcuse’s articulation, cannot be instrumentalized.
Critical theorists in education are sensitive to such instrumentalization and to the
coupling of imagination with capitalist consumerism. Citing Joel Spring in Math
Education for America?: Policy Networks, Big Business, and Pedagogy Wars, Mark
Wolfmeyer (2013) illustrates how “the Gates Foundation considers education for its
potential in preparing a digital mind ready for a long life of consuming digital products”
(p. 140). In addition to technology, this instrumentalization applies more generally to
education and trends that “prepare” our imagination according to economic principles
(Linn, 2004; Linn, 2008; Singer and Singer, 2005; Kellner, 2003; Kellner and Share,
2005). Again, Wolfmeyer’s (2013) analysis of educational policy focuses on connections
between imaginative, innovative, and creative practices endorsed by STEM education
and future employment (p. 150). By defining imagination as a form of human capital,
general skills such as independent thinking and problem solving become narrowed for
assessment purposes in order to make the assessment creation and administration process
more efficient (i.e., cost effective); we narrow our concept of imagination down to that
which can be quantified (Wolfmeyer, 2013, p. 152). The result is an instrumentalized
form of imagination that confines it to strictly observable outputs already determined as
“valuable” by policy standards.
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For example, in a report prepared by the Department of Commerce titled The
Competitiveness and Innovative Capacity of the United States (2012) a definition of
innovation is put forth that is extremely relevant to understand the overall crisis in
imagination that I describe. First, the document clearly sets up the crisis as economic by
citing a slowing “pace of innovation” in the 21st century United States; as compared to
the 20th century, “various parties have raised alarms about whether this nation’s economy
can continue to be competitive” (p. 1-1). Creativity, particularly in STEM disciplines, is
seen as a solution to quickening the pace of innovation. The alarms raised in this
document fall into six categories: employment and job creation, wages and the middleclass, domestic manufacturing, innovation, education, and infrastructure of all sorts,
especially technological infrastructure. Innovation and education are the most poignant
for the purposes of this argument and are central to how the issue is framed and how
proposed solutions are carried out. The crisis in creativity is correlated with the country’s
failure to make any progress “in its competitiveness since 1999 …[It] now ranks fourth in
innovation-based competitiveness” (p. 1-7). Thus the document connects our global
economic competitiveness, without evidence of a correlation, to our inability to “prepare
U.S. students in math and science” (p. 1-8). This vague correlation is often repeated in
the interpretation of international test scores, as Diane Ravitch illustrates:
American students have never performed well on international tests. When the
first such tests were given in the mid-1960s, our students usually scored at or
below the median, and sometimes at the bottom of the pack. This mediocre
performance is nothing to boast about, but it is not an indicator of future
economic decline.” (2011, para. 2)
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Such an observation is in contradiction with the policy document which claims that the
falling economy is directly associated with a failure of education. In fact, we find that
even during the 20th century, when the report specifies that innovation and economic
stability were at their highest, our international test scores were already low. Such a
correlation, even if “proven” true, is misguided precisely because it limits our
understanding of what “imaginative” or “creative” “innovation” might be. The document
only cites instrumental innovation that solves current problems according to the very
logics that are responsible for the very same problems. Nowhere is there the possibility
that imagination could exceed the scope of status quo logics or quantitative assessment.
Thus there is no possibility of a phantastical imagination.
The report goes on to define innovation, which merely throws into relief how such
terms can be easily instrumentalized. In a 2008 Advisory Committee report to the
Secretary of Commerce titled Innovation Measurement: Tracking the State of Innovation
in the American Economy, “innovation” is defined as “The design, invention,
development and/or implementation of new or altered products, services, processes,
systems, organizational structures, or business models for the purpose of creating new
value for customers and financial returns for the firm” (p. 2-2). This definition is a clear
indicator of how imagination is understood within current policy. Although the potential
exists in the definition above to expand such innovation to realms outside of the
economy, this possibility is reduced by the caveat that the purpose of innovation is
staunchly economic. We measure innovation itself in purely economic terms, further
reinforcing the instrumental forms of imagination and creativity that pervade educational
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policy. Education is stripped of qualities of social justice and politics in these
documents; instead, “education is a key element for promoting economic growth and
increasing the innovative capacity of a firm or a country” (p. 4-1). This innovative
capacity is then correlated directly with STEM and similar disciplines and the need to
educate a workforce accordingly, all in the name of the national economy (p. 4-1).
More concerning perhaps is that STEM can be understood beyond fulfilling
economic capacities. In a report from the Committee on STEM Education (CoSTEM)
titled Coordinating Federal Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)
Education Investments: Progress Report (2012), STEM is understood as fulfilling needs
beyond economic objectives. The report explicitly states, “A robust and capable STEM
workforce is crucial to United States competitiveness. Multiple reports link STEM
education to the future security and economic success of the United States” (p. 2). This
correlation is seemingly as tenuous as that which Ravitch critiques above in relation to
international test scores and global economic competition. As troubling as these trends
are, I am most concerned with the way imagination is shaped because of such
pressures—how imagination is narrowed down to purely instrumental ends
predetermined by economic and security pressures.
There is evidence that the Core Curriculum Content Area standards, although not
directly naming imagination, do not hinder the development of non-instrumentalized
forms of imagination (Baer, 2003; Sheve, 2014). This is partly due to the ways teachers
are implementing the standards, or the ways in which states and districts have
reinterpreted the standards. The example below shows how such work begins to unpack
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hidden dimensions of creativity and imagination that may be present in all content areas
but not yet assembled together in a comprehensive document. Often creativity is present
but not necessarily applicable with performance indicators in the dominant Core subjects
of English Language Art (ELA) and math. Additional examples and representations of
imagination and creativity can be found in other subject areas such as Library
Media/Information Literacy, Art, and Technology Standards. As a researcher and
professor in Montana, I am limiting my analysis to the Montana Office of Public
Instruction Common Core Standards documents.
Within the Montana K-12 Information Literacy/Library Media Content Standards
Framework (2008) we find examples of more robust language that gives educators
opportunities to nurture imagination and creativity beyond economic imperatives. The
work begins with finding ways that imagination can be expressed and the personal
connections one can make to aesthetic objects, both literary and graphic/plastic: “the
student will pursue personal interests through literature and other creative expressions”
(p. 11). Educators will be able to use such standards to open up an aesthetic dimension in
children’s lives. In addition to Library Media standards, Montana K-12 Technology
Content Standards Framework (2010) offers educational objectives where imagination
and creativity are more pronounced. First we see this in problem-solving abilities: “The
student will use digital tools and resources for problem solving and decision making” (p.
7). Proficiency at graduation should approach a fully informed and creative ability to
problem-solve. This would require a great deal of divergent thinking and the
consideration of alternatives (both important facets of the imagination). As well as
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judging the merit of one’s alternative ideas, the standards ask for a cultural dimension,
asking students to “use multiple approaches and diverse perspectives, including Montana
American Indian, to explore alternative solutions” (7). This is partly a regional trend, but
it provides a type of learning that is beyond the intercultural relationships of one’s
backyard and will directly resonate with Maxine Greene’s use of art in education in
expanding our capacity to empathize. Beyond creative problem solving, this document
addresses the personal expressive dimension of creativity and imagination. However,
since they are found within the Technology standards, there are some concerns over the
lingering economic “preparation” of such creative expressions. The rationale in this
sections reads:
Digital tools can support creative and innovative expression, which is increasingly
necessary in our changing world. The use of these tools can also facilitate the
realization and fulfillment of one’s talents and interests. The education
community has the responsibility to provide access to the new avenues for
creation and require nuanced understandings of digital citizenship and ownership.
(p. 9)
This statement addresses the individual experience and value of imagination and
creativity, yet such emphasis is also given credence if and only if imagination is oriented
toward solving instrumental functions within a changing world. Thus predetermined
concepts of “digital citizenship” and “ownership” of digital property put brackets around
disruptive forms of imagination that challenge the roots of such notions (as in digital
hacking, cyber piracy, and so forth).
Finally, I mention the Arts. The College Board prepared an innovative document
in order to address the hidden dimension of imagination and creativity across the
Content-Area Standards in an effort to infuse such concepts and skills with the Arts: The
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Arts and the Common Core: A Review of the Connections Between the Common Core
State Standards and the National Core Arts Standards Conceptual Framework (2012).
This document is in itself innovative because of what it sets out to synthesize,
independent from federal agendas. The document’s intention is to fill a gap between the
Common Core Standards and Art Standards:
While a specifically arts-focused branch of the Common Core does not exist, and
these standards are not meant to replace arts-specific benchmarks, there is
evidence in the standards documents that Common Core goals and objectives are
meant to apply to subjects outside the realm of ELA and math. (p. 4)
As an example of phantastic imagination, this document finds ways to expand
conceptions of imagination beyond ELA and STEM—therefore beyond purely economic
capacities. The report serves two purposes: First, in terms of content, it identifies
“explicit art references already present in the Common Core State Standards [providing]
an inventory of the instances in which the arts are mentioned” (p. 5). Second, in terms of
specific skills, this review identifies “elements of the Common Core State Standards that
reference the same broad goals and thinking skills” (p. 6). These broad goals include:
Arts as Communication, Arts as a Creative Personal Realization, Arts as Culture, History,
and Connectors, Arts as Means to Well-being, and Arts as Community Engagement. The
synthesis in the report serves an incredibly rich purpose by providing teachers with a
much more robust and specific set of guidelines that identify creative content. As stated
above, it is not always true that policy documents are lacking in a robust pedagogy of
imagination; rather, the concept of imagination is not central to the policies and therefore
is likely to be underutilized in relation to ELA, Math, and Science. This is especially the
case given the policy document trends at the federal level, which never mention creativity
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or innovation in the context of well-being or personal realization. Such policies are
nevertheless limited even when presenting non-instrumentalized forms of imagination.
For instance, Common Core still frames imagination in terms of critical and creative
thinking or skill development. Lost here is any notion of imagination that exists below
conscious thought or outside intentionally oriented skill development. In this sense,
certain documents might open up a space wherein imagination can take hold in classroom
practice in ways that interrupt instrumental, economic policy models, yet even here,
imagination is a pseudo-concept lacking philosophical rigor and erotic depth.
We see a similar trend repeated in academic research in that creativity is narrowed
by the questions that are asked about it. A review of two of the most well-known texts on
creativity points to such shortcomings in research and education. Mark Runco’s
Creativity Research Handbook (1997) and Robert Sternberg’s Handbook of Creativity
(1998) serve as excellent resources for understanding the field of creativity, particularly
in research. However, Mumford (2003) argues that there is a tendency for such research
to avoid, ignore, or side-step “the effects of creativity on people and social systems”
(107). These are the same worries I have with the dominant conception of imagination
being controlled by narrow economic objectives. As outlined above, instrumental
imagination might also be able to find creative solutions to economic problems, yet what
is at stake here is total avoidance of the potential for imagination to incite social,
political, and existential change.
Because of this repressed dimension of imagination, there might very well be a
contradiction between the economic justification for imaginative curricula and recent
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findings that draw a strong correlation between imagination/creativity and student
autonomy/independence/freedom (Crocco & Costigan, 2007; Jeffery & Craft, 2004;
Walker & Parker, 2006; Runco, 2006). The same policies that call for imaginative
curricula also create an assessment-driven climate that limits students’ experiences and
limits spaces and opportunities for engaging and educating their imagination (Bracey,
2008; Crocco & Costigan, 2007; Walker & Parker, 2006). Specifically, Thomas
Armstrong’s (1998) Awakening Genius explains that far more important to the awakening
of “genius” than specific resources and experiences are the broader attitudes and overall
atmosphere of the classroom. Armstrong himself advocates for more open-ended
exploratory opportunities than most standardized schooling models currently allow. Such
a correlation requires recognizing how we need to change our thinking about imagination
in the current educational model, as well as how the current educational model must
change to allow for the open-ended, autonomous experiences that Armstrong calls for.
This applies not only to the student but also, as noted in the work of Crocco and Costigan
(2007), the creativity and autonomy of the teacher. In addition to encouraging students to
be creative and imaginative in the learning process, Jeffery and Craft (2004) address the
importance of using these tools to reflect on their own educational experiences in order to
fine-tune curriculum, pedagogy, and discipline within this context. Runco (2006)
explicitly states the need for additional research in this area and makes theoretical
contributions that would help justify such a study. He maintains that:
Independence and autonomy, mentioned earlier, should be explored further. It
makes good theoretical sense that these would be related to creative potential;
originality assumes a kind of independence. It assumes an independence from
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conventional ways of thinking, and independence from norms and sometimes
expectations. (Runco, 2006, p. 125)
In light of this research, it could be argued that to allow for environments that are
conducive to creativity, both for teachers and students, is to allow for nonconformity and
difference. This may in fact oppose the standardizing, economizing, and socializing
functions of public education under large-scale reform like STEM.
The revolutionary potential of the imagination regarding such matters as social
justice, ecological sensibility, and political freedom and autonomy exposes the fallacy of
the education-employment-economy pipeline (Darling-Hammond, 2006; Jenkins, 2009;
Kuenzi, 2008; Trilling & Fadel, 2012). While such pipelines might call for imagination,
they never include an imagination that challenges the very logic of human capital
development itself. In summary, imagination as addressed in educational policy often
finds itself serving differing, if not contradictory goals. Even in the most progressive of
policies (such as the Common Core), there are still conceptual problems that limit
imagination’s scope and critically transformative potentials.
In sum, this overview has provided justification for questioning (a) the nature and
(b) the role(s) of imagination as it is currently articulated in educational policy and
research. I have demonstrated a growing tendency toward instrumentalization,
conceptual ambiguity, and psychological reductionism. In the next section, I will begin
with a phenomenological example of how imagination is often experienced which will
lead toward a new possibility for re-imagining imagination beyond instrumentalism.
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Beyond Instrumental Imagination

To move toward a conceptually rich definition of imagination, we need to
recognize an important distinction between imagination and phantasy. In Eros and
Civilization, Herbert Marcuse (1955) goes into detail about the redeeming qualities of
phantasy for human consciousness, since it acts from a space that, he argues, originates
from a utopian freedom. Although he speaks about traversing this space a great deal, he
never settles on a concrete definition of phantasy; that will be part of the task of this
dissertation. He does, however, provide clues as to how phantasy might differ from
imagination, the mental domains each inhabits, and the ways they interact. Specifically,
we find that:
Phantasy plays a most decisive function in the total mental structure: it links the
deepest layers of the unconscious with the highest products of consciousness (art),
the dream with the reality; it preserves the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual
but repressed ideas of the collective and individual memory, the tabooed images
of freedom. (Marcuse, 1955, p. 141)
In this passage we find that phantasy has something to do with finding knowledge
unhinged from the culturally conditioned conscious thought processes. But, as we will
see, it is imagination that helps to bring this vision from the unconscious into conscious
understanding through art. Furthermore, Marcuse makes a justification for this
dimension by claiming that phantasy provides the initial visceral experience of freedom
from the existential angst of reality, but imagination is the mediator that would help to
bring such experiences into the realm of the reality principle through changing our
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perception of reality and altering the nature of the relationship with the physical and
cultural world. Marcuse argues that:
As a fundamental, independent mental process, phantasy has a truth-value of its
own, which corresponds to an experience of its own – namely, the surmounting of
the antagonistic human reality. Imagination envisions the reconciliation of the
individual with the whole, of desire with realization, of happiness with reason.
While this harmony has been removed into utopia by the established reality
principle, phantasy insists that it must and can become real, that behind the
illusion lies knowledge. The truths of imagination are first realized when
phantasy itself takes form, when it creates a universe of perception and
comprehension – a subjective and at the same time objective universe. This
occurs in art. (Marcuse, 1955, pp. 143-144)
From this we learn that the experience of phantasy is a unique mental state, but
simultaneously operates consciously within the dimension of imagination and art.
However, imagination that is not tempered or informed by phantasy does not and cannot
reconcile the dichotomy, since, by separating phantasy, the dichotomy is hidden or
ignored. Since Marcuse provides no hard definition, we can begin to understand this
distinction by matching dichotomous concepts along the poles of phantasy and
imagination. This distinction between phantasy and imagination recurs throughout
history and has been articulated in a variety of contexts and disciplines which all allude to
a fundamental aspect of human experience which history has shown to have been
systematically repressed. For Marcuse, this divide “corresponds largely (but not entirely)
to the distinction between unconscious and conscious processes” and from there we can
speculate as to which concepts are aligned with phantasy and imagination (1955, p. 12).
Further, Marcuse (1966) later illustrates how “Freud singles out phantasy as one mental
activity that retains a high degree of freedom from the reality principle even in the sphere
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of the developed conscious” (p. 140). This degree of freedom is what interested
Marcuse, and why I seek to trace education back to through phantasy.
Summarizing the analysis developed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, Marcuse’s
critique of civilization contrasts the reality principle (understood through sociocultural
contexts as well as instinctual contexts) and the pleasure-principle (understood as lying
outside of the reality principle and at home within the instincts) and shows how, at the
expense of the pleasure-principle and all that is situated in this form of consciousness, the
reality principle influences imagination and conforms it to the purposes of production,
thus inserting itself into the equation of economic and informational production. The
pleasure principle, on the other hand, is not interested in the collective devices that allow
for the progress of civilization. Instead, pleasure is derived from the uninhibited desire
for freedom, but is just as threatening to civilization precisely because it is situated
beyond the collective civilizing function of the reality principle. For this reason, I
question whether imagination is indeed a space of freedom as it seems to be colonized by
industrial civilization, whether it is be able to meet the expectations placed upon it by 21st
century skill discourses, and whether the dimension of phantasy might better initiate the
ambition to reconstruct current educational politics.
To more fully understand the difference between imagination and phantasy along
phenomenological lines, I turn to a classical philosophical thought experiment concerning
the origins of phantastic images such as those of mythological creatures. Within this
model, the origin of the idea/imagining is vital to understanding the distinction between
imagination and phantasy. I begin with the image of a Pegasus. By combining the image
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of a horse and the image of an eagle, placing the wings of the eagle onto the body of the
horse, and creating the phantastic image of the winged-horse, the intentional dimension
of imagination creates the mental image of a Pegasus. Here the conscious mind directs
the production of a representation of a winged horse internal to the mind itself. The
content used to generate the representation is drawn from the stock of internalized images
of horses and birds found within the culture. However, on a phenomenological level, this
experience will be entirely different, as if the image of the Pegasus came as a vision.
In some way the vision arises externally to the conscious mind and varies
drastically from intentional cognition. The fact that the vision being is received rather
than created offers a new challenge in the way phantasy and imagination can be
distinguished. It seems to come from without, and is therefore beyond the control of the
intentional subject. It is presented before the mind’s eye of the subject rather than
represented by this subject. For this reason phantasy is utopian because it emerges from
a space that is not produced exclusively by an intentional subject reproducing cultural
norms and values through the context of the reality principle (Marcuse, 1944, p. 140). In
other words, the vision of the phantasy may have the capacity for escaping ideological
distortions, especially as we consider the dialectic of imagination. Phantasy, coupled
with a utopian impulse, surpasses the playful conceptualization of utopian forms such as
Plato’s Timeaus or Moore’s Utopia, and offers a real, felt experience of freedom in these
nonexistent spaces (Jameson, 2005). The experience of these new forms of freedom help
to guide, along with the theorization of new forms of political organization, projects
which might offer unfolding freedoms. For education this dimension alerts us to the
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chance for new possibilities beyond the mere training of imagination for instrumental
ends defined in advance, and beyond the discipline and educational management of
subjective powers (creativity, for example).

Phantasy, Philosophy, and Education

Unless educators begin recoupling phantasy with imagination, it is likely that
schools will continue to close themselves off from the possibility of authentic innovation
or reform that can escape today’s exclusive economic edicts. Placing imagination in
relation to the pre-conscious powers of phantasy will not only impact the current
conceptualization of imagination but also honor the experience of imagination outside of
market principles and the exploiting of imagined ideas. Part of this work will include an
analysis of schools themselves and how unsuitable the current paradigm is for
authentically educating the phantastic dimension of imagination as well as arguing for the
pedagogical potential of phantasy itself. In sum, to accept the instrumental form of
imagination as intentional representation means rejecting phantasy as pre-conscious
presentation that is either dangerous or irrelevant in the aims of global capitalism. We
are faced with a radical either-or split that does not seem to be able to reconcile the
divide, for which we turn to the dialectic to better understand this relationship. The
dialectical analysis will move us beyond the either-or and instead put forth a
complimentary state of both-and where imagination and phantasy can be seen as
complimentary in the name of a civilization that does not isolate itself to stagnation and
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collapse (imagination at the service of the reality principle) or free itself from socialcultural accountability (phantasy in the realm of the pleasure-principle). Rather than
regarding the dualism formally as mutually exclusive domains or collapsing them into a
single entity, the dialectic focuses on both simultaneously striving for a transcendence of
the opposites which (1) justify the rejection of the perceived dualism, and (2) reintroduce
phantasy within the conception of imagination and clarify the integral relationship that
the aforementioned dualism perpetually kept veiled. Such a transcendence of opposites
reveals that imagination and phantasy share something in common and understanding
both parts involves understanding their relationship in the whole system, specifically
education. Revealing existing and ascertaining new definitions of phantastical
imagination will provide a new starting point, from which this dissertation will ask
several questions:
1.

Why has phantasy fallen out of our conceptualization of imagination?

2.

How can philosophy help us return to a richer notion of the relation
between phantasy and imagination?

3.

What are the implications of phantastical imagination on curriculum
development and pedagogy?

4.

How does a turn to the phantastic imagination interrupt the current
emphasis on creativity and imagination in policy like 21st century skills?

5.

What are possible models/resources we can draw upon to reconnect
phantasy and imagination?
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Imagination has received a great deal of attention in the history of philosophy and
psychology (Socrates, Plato, Aquinas, Kant, Piaget, Vygotsky, Freud, Jung, Sartre,
Foucault, Brann, Kearny). However, few of these tomes do justice to the dimension of
phantasy. This trend appears even more so as we move into contemporary sources and
blatantly when we explore education, which seeks to employ imagination in the strictest
sense. Yet in all cases, the dialectic between imagination and phantasy, which Marcuse
alludes to, is lost on many of these theories. More comprehensive philosophical
dictionaries cover phantasy as part of imagination’s history as a concept, rooted in the
ancient Greek concept of phantasia, but few offer a definition that is useful for us today
(Audi, 1999; Craig, 1998; Edwards, 1967; Honderich, 2005). Aside from philosophical
dictionaries, which first lead the reader from Phantasy to “see Imagination,” where an
entire discussion of the history and current interpretation of imagination is laid out, we
find concrete definitions of phantasy in psychological dictionaries, but these definitions
often lack the ancient and aesthetic dimensions of phantasy and often interpret it through
childhood trauma and ongoing psychosis (Corsini & Auerbach, 1996). There are aspects
in these more clinical definitions of fantasy, which, although not entirely synonymous
with our use of phantasy, can be useful for education and finding clarity. We find,
fantasy can be understood as “a) the fantasizing ability as well as b) the product of that
function” (Wick, p. 342). In addition, “In its primary form a fantasy appears
spontaneously from the unconscious to the receptive subject. Secondary fantasies are
initiated and pursued from the conscious level, being evoked intentionally for a specific
purpose” (Psychology, p. 342). Dialectically, phantasy can be both spontaneous and
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unconscious or can be guided/manipulated consciously, but with its contents and its
experiential effects drastically different. This dialectic will help us move into the forth
category of a utopian imagination mentioned above and illustrate how phantasy, unlike
imagination, necessarily partakes of this dialectic space due to its very nature:
Fantasy holds a position between thinking and sensing or perceiving. When the
mind actually produces fantasies, the fantasizer experiences that inflow on a
receptive level. Although the output of fantasies can be elicited and their
direction and content influenced by conscious intentions, usually fantasies emerge
unconsciously, determined by memories, by past and primarily current emotional
states, and by hopes and expectations for the future. Fantasy produces what is
not, what someday may or may not be, and what never has been. Fantasy also can
merely distort reality. The production of the unreal generally takes place in the
service of the ego. Whether fantasy as a creative function can produce anything
authentically new that is not merely a new combination or a formulation of
contents or content fragments already available to knowledge and experiences has
remained a philosophical question ever since Aristotle’s De anima. (Wick, p. 342)
Phantasy mediates between states of conscious and unconscious thought and experience
as it moves between sensing and thinking. This space between thinking and perceiving is
the fourth category for which we search. Freud is guilty of this too when he uses the term
primarily in the context of psychosis as in Dora: A Case Study in Hysteria (1963), but at
times does pull back and use it more casually as in The Creative Writer and Daydreams
(2003). Although these collections and studies are informative, they lack a more
dynamic and dialectical model that would be able to account for imagination and
phantasy, including their distinction and their interplay. In order to address 1) how the
relationship between imagination and phantasy has shifted over time, and 2) how the two
can synthetically be reconnected, I will use dialectics as a methodology, to understand the
entirety of this relationship so we can first move back into the dichotomy before
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understanding how each part is found within its opposite and the distinction washes away
as illusory.

Philosophical Methodology: A Dialectic of Imagination and Phantasy

To describe the method of dialectical critique would initially require a deliberate
simplification of the process, reducing it to a series of steps or practices that one can
apply in order to understand the full story and the history of a dichotomy. In short,
dialectics, as a method, unveils how each conception of the imagination arises out of the
tensions and contradictions of the previous historical reality (Jameson, 1971). As a
starting hypothesis based on my current research on imagination in philosophy, I
speculate that there has been a gradual elimination of phantasy from imagination
throughout history, interrupted occasionally by a philosophy or theory that emerges from
and puts forth a phantastic dimension of the imagination, but as is so often the case, this
rupture is identified and overcome either by reincorporating it back into imagination or
labeling it as taboo and having no relation with the imagination but instead with madness.
As these moments arise, so too does the consequential management or, in a Foucaultian
sense, the increasingly sophisticated forms of discipline that curtail the potential
interruption phantasy introduces, both at the individual and the social level, and further
reinforce the logic of imagination. These interruptions and the resulting discipline will be
explored in the following chapters.
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I have chosen dialectics because this method is in a unique position to critique and
contribute insights into the three problems identified earlier, to resolve the dichotomous
thinking hampering educational reform, and to furnish a genuine understanding of the
benefits of supporting phantasy in schools:
1.

Dialectics historicizes the problem by providing an outline of the
evolution of the concepts of imagination and how they were applied to
society, politics, and education.

2.

Dialectics also enables us to find the connections between seemingly
unrelated elements such as education, economics, and politics in order that
we might begin a critique of the totality of these relationships, at least
through the topic at hand.

3.

Dialectics can provide a more dynamic and useful understanding of the
scope of imagination, which can then be applied to designing and
identifying tools and strategies to reintroduce imaginative phantasy in
education, curriculum, and ultimately politics.

4.

Lastly, the moment of the dialectic emerges from the precise historical
moment that calls forth the critique. For this reason, turning our attention
to phantasy is not merely speculative, but grounded in the current
educational crisis with real-world consequences.

This work will be a dialectic in the lineage and spirit of other educational
philosophers who have employed the methodology, such as Dewey in his theories of
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school and society, Maxine Greene with her work in the arts and social justice, and Henry
Giroux with his critique of popular culture in the context of youth, education, and
society—all with an overarching concern for democracy. On a more technical note, this
dialectic analysis will be guided both by direct insight from theorists such as Erich
Fromm and Fredric Jameson and by Herbert Marcuse, whose work factors heavily into
the analysis of the content of imagination and phantasy. So far, dialectics has not been
applied to the question of imagination, phantasy, and education in any substantive way.
Generally speaking, this dialectic will begin with situating the content of the
phantastic imagination in the present, acknowledging and exploring the lineage of the
imagination and phantasy in diachronic historical realities, and then advancing into the
future by projecting and anticipating the phantastic imagination as a logical next step in
the evolution of culture and education in the name of freedom. Specifically, tracing the
dialectical reversal is a first step to understanding how every concept contains its
opposite and how this internal tension leads to dynamism where concepts evolve over
time (Jameson, 1971). This tension is noticeable in the movement from the mythical era
of the Eleusinian mysteries, through the Classical era with Plato, understanding the loss
initiated in our own era through Nietzsche, and arriving at Marcuse to bring the cycle of
phantasy back to its origin as a space for alternative forms of resistance mounted against
reality. Using dialectics to situate this evolution, these movements have three dominant
phases. They:
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1.

Isolate the key factors that are covered by the concept of phantasy in order
to track these factors throughout the history of imagination. These involve
but are not limited to: attention, memory, play, pretend, day-dreams, etc.

2.

Initiate a diachronic analysis to uncover the changes in the language that
are used to describe imagination in successive historical moments, thus
tracing the formal concept within historical reality.

3.

Complete the cycle by revealing the whole of the history of phantasy and
imagination in its totality, if only for a brief moment when we can glimpse
something more at work than the accumulation of a sequence of changes.
A temporal flash of the space beyond either-or thinking, this moment
comes when we find Marcuse defining phantasy in ways that point back to
ideas Plato may have been trying to articulate philosophically and
poetically.

Overall, as we move through the widening gulf between imagination and phantasy,
dialectics can act to replace either-or logic with a more dynamic both-and logic. This
dialectical analysis is part of that ongoing conversation, and the current contradictions we
are observing are not only that phantasy is threatened, but that now imagination, too, is
losing the robust multi-dimensionality which is dependent upon phantasy. Phantasy has
been so thoroughly severed from imagination that the hope for it to break through and
find a voice is further suppressed as the instrumental conception of the imagination
becomes generally understood and widely accepted as the only meaning of the term.
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The chapters that follow will be situated along the dichotomous extremes of
instrumental imagination and phantasy. This dissertation, as a dialectical analysis, will
focus on how the extremes conflict but also converge, especially in relation to education.
Summarizing the structure of the analysis will also reveal the moment of dialectical
reversal that Marcuse presents and which recontextualizes the relationship of
imagination/ phantasy, freedom/democracy, and education today.
The two moments and philosophers that will be placed in diachronic opposition
are Plato and Frederick Nietzsche, precisely because of how the concept of phantasy
figures into each person’s thought. These philosophers figure centrally in the evolution
of imagination and phantasy, and my analysis will lead directly into the thought of
Herbert Marcuse, who articulates the concept of phantastic imagination in his Eros and
Civilization. Where Plato might be representative of the material imagination which is
useful for exploring the form of freedom, Nietzsche would sit at the other extreme—the
Dionysian extreme—where phantasy prevails, providing the immediate experience of
freedom. In order to more fully understand this trajectory, the first chapter of the analysis
will be a description of imagination and phantasy in key mythic, religious, and Socratic
texts and practices. This is the origin from which Nietzsche draws inspiration for his
Dionysian extremism, but which, as we learn from Marcuse, can lead to dangerous
consequences if unchecked Eros denies reality for the sake of pleasure. With each phase
in the dialectic, I will also look specifically at the educational implications, providing
tentative descriptions of particular practices that emerge as phantasy and imagination are
split apart and then ultimately reunited in the work of Marcuse. These descriptions will
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also be helpful to draw from as we move through the chapter analyzing Marcuse’s call
for phantasy and into the chapter on education, which will offer practical advice on how
phantasy can actively and effectively be embedded into school models and curriculum
(Dewey, 1934; Egan, 200; Greene, 1995; Robinson, 2001)

Chapter Overview: A Precedent for Phantasy

The point of the first chapter is to identify a moment and to set a cultural
precedent for a time where imagination and phantasy were not removed from one
another, conceptually or experientially. In the writings of the pre-Socratics, we can
glimpse a time when phantasy and imagination were fully integrated. Whether through
lifestyle practices, rituals and ceremonies designed to rekindle the phantastic (mystery
traditions), and even the cultural acceptance of consulting those who were experts in
receiving the phantasm (Socrates’ daemon, Oracle of Delphi, etc.), accessing and
drawing from these experiences featured prevalently in the ancient world. This point of
time is not only a glimpse of what once was, but is also a remembrance to reclaim this
state as what might still be in a utopian future. Infusing multiple conceptions of the
imagination into education will likely require a different type, or multiple types, of
learning communities that place less emphasis on the instrumental imagination at the
expense of other spaces of creativity.
The mystery traditions’ use of tragedy was designed specifically to educate the
mythical dimension of human experience, give life to the material world, and celebrate
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the frailty of existence. These mystery celebrations are important because they were
deliberately educative at the societal level, as many of them involved thousands of
initiates on an annual basis. The various mystery traditions (Grecian and Egyptian), and
specifically the Eleusinian Mysteries in the Greek tradition, will be helpful in
understanding how phantasy once was and still might be educated. These mysteries will
be of significant importance since they might also provide mythical archetypes that
oppose the Promethean imagination in Western culture, something that troubled
Nietzsche and Dewey.
Finally, Socrates himself provides insight into the shape of phantasia prior to
Plato, where it is first named in his dialogues and The Republic. First, Socrates, as
interpreted through Plato, claimed to have received the impetus that began his
philosophical interrogation of generals, politicians, artists, aristocrats, etc., from the
Oracle of Delphi. The fact that he was visiting and seeking guidance from the Oracle at
all illustrates the accepted reverence associated with knowledge that was arrived
unintentionally or phantastically from the channeling by oracles and seers. Instances
such as these will provide historical and cultural artifacts that will help with interpretation
and analyses when the conception of imagination was robust and expansive enough to
include the phenomenon of phantasy. In addition to establishing a general cultural
approval of phantasy, this chapter will also compile examples of Socrates mentioning his
own daemon that compels him to interrogate the respected citizens of Athens. Since the
term phantasia emerges in Plato’s Republic, the historical parts of this analysis will have
to rely on artifacts that provide evidence of the accepted cultural paradigms. Such
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daemons reveal troublesome qualities of experience that must be carefully worked into
the Platonic model, but are entirely at home in the pre-Socratic world, which it can be
argued, Socrates fits into because Plato had not yet severed phantasia from meaningmaking, truth, and experience, and which Socrates himself may have questioned upon
reflecting on his quest.
This section is going to be the most speculative, since there has been very little by
way of philosophical or historical research into the imagination prior to Plato’s
articulation of phantasia in the dialogues and The Republic. The most comprehensive
texts in the field (Brann, Kearny), shy away from this epoch, and in Brann’s case
explicitly makes attempts to justify its exclusion. Often, in these early passages,
phantasia is spoken of in a narrative rather than a descriptive context, meaning that it is
difficult to discern between phantasy and imagination. Because of this blurring of
boundaries I will discuss examples of both the concept of imagination (form) and the
phenomenon of imagination (experience) while being sensitive to the fact that we might
be speaking of imagination or phantasy, or in fact the conception of a previous era that
did not draw a distinction. It may also benefit the analysis to extend to ancient
mythological and literary texts because philosophical primary sources reference such
phantasy experience as being visited or in a possessed/maddened state.
It is here, in the move from the pre-Socratics, through Socrates, and into Plato that
we find familiar territory, at least in terms of the language we are used to in education.
Socrates is representative of the transition from phantasy to imagination. Most of the
research and reviews of the philosophy of imagination begin with its explicit inception in
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Plato’s work (Beardsley, 1966; Brann, 1991; Kearny, 1988; Rugg, 1963; Warnock,
1976). However, this immediately misrepresents and narrows the concept of phantasy to
within the dominant definitions of imagination that have been mostly stagnant since and
merely rearticulating the same poles of the dichotomy, i.e. body/mind,
objective/subjective, truth/opinion, rational/irrational, conscious/unconscious, etc.
(Beardsley, 1966; Brann, 1991; Kearny, 1988; Marcuse, 1955). Although he may have
been the first to articulate the term and delineate the mental qualities assigned to it, his
heirarchization of knowledge and placement of phantasia (imagination) on the bottom has
determined its fate in modern civilization. Within Plato’s hierarchy of cognitive levels,
art belongs at the bottom (eikasia).
I find resonance with Plato because his understanding of phantasia is akin to the
current concept of imagination, which sees it as a cognitive faculty. This is
complimentary to the current objectives of education to reinvigorate the imagination for
use in STEM disciplines and 21st century skills discourses. As I explore more deeply
several of Plato’s dialogues and The Republic, the overlap with current education will
become more obvious, as will the need to offer alternatives that complicate these trends.
However, as is the case in the dialectic, I am not arguing for a removal of imagination
and a reckless embracing of phantasy; Nietzsche will provide an example of the opposite
extreme which will necessitate a unification or partnership.
Plato attacks the arts and artists, with poets and painters alike facing the barrage
of his critiques, but it is in these passages where descriptions of the imagination that more
closely resemble/approximate phantasy are found. When the poet is described as “out of
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his senses” and that “he works in a mad state with the irrational part of his soul”
(Beardsley, 1975, p. 38), Plato is separating out productive imagination and the excesses
of phantasy, which must be censored if not banned from the republic. Plato offers two
ways to reconcile the ecstatic poet and the calculating architect. The poet and the
architect are representative of the two dimensions, imagination and phantasy, but for
Plato the distinction falls along the lines of seekers of beauty and those who are mad or
possessed. This is helpful for overcoming the dualism because we now see even Plato
was aware that imagination and phantasy applied to a range of arts and could not be
easily described as either/or; in fact, in this model, they can be complimentary because
they have different aims. Here are the two ways to overcome the dualism:
The more radical one would be to say that implicit in all of Plato’s writings about
the arts there may be a fundamental distinction between two types of art. Beauty
and measure are generally discussed in connection with visual arts; when he talks
about poetry, he introduces madness and inspiration. […] Perhaps the second, and
less far-reaching, suggestion is more plausible: though different arts (from, say,
the architect’s to the rhapsode’s) may require more or less deliberate calculation,
and though to analyze the beauties of a work once it is completed may require
rational thought, still, wherever beauty is captured in sensuous form, some
abandonment to the creative eros, some inspired access to ideal beauty, is
involved. (Beardsley, 1975, p. 45)
Plato’s work is heavily situated within the central civilizing ideas of government,
education, and society. Nietzsche, on the other hand, distinguishes this moment as the
death of tragedy (which we can interpret as a dimension of phantasy in the Ancient
Grecian sense) and throws himself behind Eros, and as we move through The Birth of
Tragedy, we can witness this movement away from the equilibrium in an altogether
different direction. From this dialectical vantage point we can support Marcuse’s theory
that when phantasy and imagination are unbalanced culture implodes, whether by losing
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its access to the phantastic or privileging phantasy over reality at the expense of
sustaining a culture altogether.
Nietzsche too works within these dichotomies, framing everything within the
concepts of Apollonian and Dionysian impulses. Never wholly escaping the
dichotomies, he aligned himself with the Dionysian, the impulse that is antagonistic to
modern civilization. In The Birth of Tragedy (1956) he describes the dichotomy of
aesthetic and political life:
“The Apollonian spirit is cool—a love of order and measure, expressing itself in
an art of formal beauty and proportion. The Dionysian spirit is wild—glorifying
in a state of elation or intoxication (Rausch) that accepts fully and joyfully the
excitement and pain of existence. Dionysian man, the worshipper of life, the
taster of all its ecstasies, comes face to face with ‘the terror or the absurdity of
existence. (7)

While Nietzsche describes the perils of modernity as Apollonian, he glorifies the opposite
force of the Dionysian spirit. He mainly does so because he recognized, most likely
through his critique of Plato, that the impulse to create art could not be found in the
education, culture, and civilization of the kallipolis in The Republic.
He was aware of the cultural stagnation that civilization begot and “wanted to
probe more deeply than had ever been done the deep sources of artistic creation, the
nature of the impulse to make works of art” (Beardsley, 1975, p. 276). Even in his
understanding of Socrates, Nietzsche finds the movement back to phantasy; Socrates asks
if art might be a correlative form of knowledge, not the hierarchized notion that Plato
would have been forced to recognize as nonsense:
And though there can be no doubt that the most immediate effect of the Socratic
impulse tended to the dissolution of Dionysian tragedy, yet a profound experience
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in Socrates’ own life impels us to ask where there is necessarily only an
antagonistic relation between Socratism and art, and whether the birth of an
‘artistic Socrates’ is in general a contradiction in terms...As he tells his friends in
prison, there often came to him one and the same dream-apparition, which kept
constantly repeating to him: ‘Socrates, practice music.’…The voice of the
Socratic dream-vision is the only sign of doubt as to the limits of logic. ‘Perhaps’
– thus he must have asked himself – ‘what is not intelligible to me is not therefore
unintelligible? Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from which the logician is shut
out? Perhaps art is even a necessary correlative of, and supplement to, science?’
(Nietzsche, 1956, p. 55)
As I’ve mentioned Socrates’ vision in the outline of the first chapter, I will not go
into detail about it here. Socrates saw a value in these visions and revealed that the
phantasm of a dream-vision specifically impelled him to rediscover art counter to the
Platonic ideal of forms, something at odds with the Apollonian spirit. Nietzsche not only
returns to the artistic impulse but describes it with the narrative vigor of the pre-Socratics:
Art, that sorceress expert in healing, approaches him; only she can turn his fits of
nausea into imaginations with which it is possible to live. These are on the other
hand the spirit of the sublime, which subjugates terror by means of art; on the
other hand the comic spirit, which releases us, through art, from the tedium of
absurdity. The satyr chorus of the dithyramb was the salvation of Greek art; the
threatening paroxysms I have mentioned were contained by the intermediary of
those Dionysiac attendants. (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 52)
We see here a return to the status of art in the Eleusinian Mysteries: that of finding
meaning within the meaninglessness of existences. The reenactment and interpretation of
the Demeter myth as these festivals helped provide a similar message offered by art, that
of hope in the cycle of death/life: “Though he had been in danger of craving a Buddhistic
denial of the will, he was saved by art, and through art life reclaimed him” (Nietzsche,
1956, 51). We approach the moment of the dialectic, where the experience of reconciling
the dualism can be dreamed; and not just dreamed, but created through cultural play in
the interest of a new form of reality. As a metaphor this is similar to the way Plato
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describes the technical ability of architects and craftsmen to make large marble columns
appear the same size from the bottom to the top with the use of forced perspective. In the
same way the marble columns play with one’s perception, phantasy and art have the
ability to change the form of reality, to manipulate sensual perception with the purpose of
amplifying the sight. We also find from the passage above that irrational truths are
useful; we need the lies brought to us through aesthetics so that we might, in a similar
way through phantasy, amplify hope within the discontent of civilization. Nietzsche
describes this through his fascination with the impulse to make art (Belshaw, 2012;
Binderman, 1998; Hadaegh & Shams, 2014; Moschella, 2012). Educationally this is
where imagination is being charged to extend beyond art and be used for innovation and
invention in technological (21st century skills) and scientific research (STEM). From the
above summary, I have shown how, within Nietzsche’s philosophy, we find resonance
with Marcuse who states that phantasy, understood as the impulse to create art, could not
be manipulated or conditioned, which has been the case with imagination. The
dimension of phantasy (though never articulated with the exact terminology) can be
found in the ideas offered by Nietzsche. The relationship between phantasy and
imagination, according to Nietzsche, could compliment education and life by shaping
how we experience reality. In addition to the artistic or what might be called a phantastic
impulse, we can include Nietzsche's own comments on and secondary literature on
childhood and creativity or play (Byrum, 1974; DelCaro, 1989; Kretchmar, 2007; Sharp,
1975; Spariosu, 1989).
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The final movement of the dialectic brings it back to society, culture, and
education, moving back into the fundamental nature of experience and its role in
understanding and shaping reality. Marcuse, and his interpretation of Freud, provides a
new way to understand our own access to this relationship and to reposition phantasy in a
favorable position to both reality and the experience of reality.
In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse puts forward the concept of phantasy as
somehow distinct yet inseparable from imagination, as a dimension of human thought
whose products are not defined by culture. In this way phantasy is a force to move us to
utopia because it is not and cannot be disciplined in the same way that imagination can
and has been. For education, and 21st century skillsets specifically, phantasy shows us
that not all ideas, insights, innovation, and revolutions are the product of intentional,
imaginative, or creative abilities; ideas, at times, do seem to have a point of origin outside
conscious thought, outside ourselves and societal conventions even. Marcuse analyzes
the space between the two extremes of phantasy and imagination. Politically,
Imagination envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of
desire with realization, of happiness with reason. While this harmony has been
removed into utopia by the established reality principle, phantasy insists that it
must and can become real, that behind the illusions lies knowledge. (Marcuse,
1955, p. 143)
Marcuse isn’t so much making a concerted move back into phantasy, but instead wants to
rehabilitate phantasy in the realm of imagination and ultimately in culture and
civilization. Rather than making a judgment placing phantasy above imagination, in a
move opposite to Plato’s, he sees them working together, maybe not synchronistically,
but in a partnership. From the above passage we can also see how Marcuse did not
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articulate the ideas completely separately and does sometimes use the terms
interchangeably. In spite of this, two clear concepts of imagination emerge and are clear
even if not specifically named. Imagination (instrumental) can offer ideas to inform
models of utopia, even in the face of the irrationality of such possibilities, but regardless
of such irrationality, phantasy can offer images and visions with the accompanying
experience of utopia.
Beyond the definition and conception of imagination at the cultural level,
Marcuse describes how changing the conception of imagination would alter the
experience of imagination. For instance, he states, “the basic experience in this
dimension is sensuous rather than conceptual; the aesthetic perception is essentially
intuition, not notion. The nature of sensuousness is ‘receptivity,’ cognition through being
affected by given objects” (Marcuse, 1955, p. 176). We find it is receptivity, not
creativity, which compliments and informs phantasy in a similar fashion to the coupling
of creativity with imagination. This coupling can be traced back to Plato, who speaks of
the inspiration of the poet and artist, often in disparaging tones, but yet not entirely
willing to condemn the message or vision they bring forth. Instead he maintains his
distance and takes solace in his desire for rationality, by criticizing how the poet does not
understand the messages they proclaim, even if those visions of pure beauty do originate
from the gods divine.
In this sense, phantasy, as a dimension of imagination, can be encouraged as a
form of receptivity, better understood as inspiration or intuition, but it is important to
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make clear its point of origin as beyond conscious intellect. It is not a perception of ideas
or concepts but a perception of a specific type of experience. Socrates states in Ion,
A poet is a light and winged thing, and holy, and never able to compose until he
has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him. So
long as he has this in his possession, no man is able to make poetry or to chant in
prophecy. (Plato, Ion, p. 534b-c)
This definition, although potentially dripping with sarcasm, finds resonance in the
descriptions offered by Marcuse. In this way, if phantasy is a form of perception, it is
one that receives sensuous experience without the backdrop of the cultural/conceptual
world. Phantasy then seems to be relegated to times and spaces when one is “out of his
senses, and the mind [society’s civilized mind] is no longer in him.” The perception and
experience of phantasy is not of the material world, but an immaterial world where
possibility can not only be posited but also experienced.
We find that all that has been written is after the fact, and it is not about the
ambitious Promethean drive to create new models of imagination, infusing technology
and innovation in ways that are revolutionary and design oriented. Social, political, and
economic organization “affect the very content of the reality principle. For every form of
the reality principle must be embodied in a system of societal institutions and relations,
laws and values, which transmit and enforce the required ‘modification’ of the instincts”
(Marcuse, 1955, p. 37). In order to find, not an escape, but a point beyond this cycle, we
need not create; we need to relearn how to receive these insights beyond those bound by
the reality principle, with the understanding of the importance of and how to access the
dimension of phantasy. It is appropriate that the dialectical reversal is here because it
takes us back to Plato, with a new lens to find phantasy lurking in his philosophy all
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along, and which he was unwilling to remove from culture altogether, even if it did invite
a sense of fear because it always carried with it a dimension of political freedom possibly
beyond societal control. As we have seen, there are some redeeming moments in Plato,
heavy-handedly dismissing the mumblings of the inspired rhapsode, but often
backtracking and claiming the source of “the nonrationality of the poet may not be
beneath, but above, reason itself” (Beardsley 1975, p. 38). This irrationality of the poet
described as above resonates with Marcuse’s attempt to move consciousness beyond the
reality principle. We find traces of this, peppered with irony, throughout Ion, the
Apology, and Phaedrus, where irrationality is described as divine inspiration, genius, or
madness (possessed by the Muses.) Again we find this in the Republic:
It may be difficult at times to distinguish the real craziness of the insane, and
perhaps of the rhapsode, from the apparent wildness of one who is really inspired
– like the philosopher who only seems mad because he is transported and reels at
the sight of true beauty. (p. 249d)
Although Plato might be suggesting that the insights from phantasy could be valuable, he
shares with Marcuse the fear of an unchecked phantasy. Instead, phantasy must operate
in conjunction with imagination if it is to have any effect on the reality principle at the
level of civilization itself. Marcuse unites imagination and phantasy in a way that seems
more of a reunification, or dialectical sublation, into a new category that transcends the
boundaries of each. Marcuse seems to posit phantasy as outside the subject/object
dichotomy, which can then be used to reconstruct the reality principle according to
different economies of instinctual pleasure, in a way that preserves freedom and identifies
phantasy and imagination as tools to be used in political critique, action, and social
revolution. He recognizes the potential of phantasy to overwhelm the subject-object
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dichotomy and overcome the dominance of what he calls the performance principle. It is
this dimension that seems most promising and also that which education has done little
with. New models and methods will be required for phantasy to find a home in schools
and education to value phantasy.
Now that we can begin to see how the concepts of imagination and phantasy
relate to each other and the consequences their relationship has for the individual and
society, we can see how far off the mark current educational reform movements truly are.
The infusion of phantasy could catalyze current efforts to reintroduce imagination in
schools, as well as entirely new efforts that might be found beyond 21st century skills and
the economic promise of STEM.
In the first several chapters of the dissertation, I will provide a dialectical analysis
of the divergences and convergences of imagination and phantasy. We can learn from
the historical moments that an alliance is central to the new theory I am articulating. The
result of the preceding dialectic will be a robust theory of imaginative phantasy that
equally emphasizes receptivity to the mystery of inspiration and the creativity of
imaginative skills. In the final chapter, I will use this theory to critique standing models
of imagination in educational philosophy, including those offered by John Dewey,
Maxine Greene, Kieran Egan, and Ken Robinson.
A reading of these four authors in the context of the dialectic and a refining of the
language of phantasy allows for a more comprehensive and reflexive understanding of
how phantasy can and does affect education. Dewey gives us an understanding of the
aesthetic experience that can be nurtured in learning environments. Maxine Greene
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builds on this by applying the education of the imagination to social justice mandates
within the larger context of democracy, freedom, and society. Egan constructs an
understanding of how important educational tools (media, technology, curriculum,
pedadgogy) are to shaping the foundations of cognition, knowledge, and civilization.
And lastly, I return to Robinson, who at first seems entirely in the realm of the economic
instrumental imagination, but upon closer analysis we find traces of phantasy, the
uninhibited rapture of the aesthetic moment, in his description of the creative (aesthetic)
experience. This turn both redeems Robinson from how his ideas have been capitalized
and exploited and highlights the importance of creativity in the dialectics of phantasy.
Included in this chapter will be a practical side that seeks to inform education
explicitly. I will move from educational philosophy to practice and look for pedagogical
practices that bring phantastical imagination into the classroom. Educational practice has
already seen the inclusion of the instrumental imagination, particularly within early
childhood education, but will need further theorizing to create more robust methods
accounting for the phantastical imagination within art education, theater/dance, storytelling, and play (Rodari,1996; Greene, 1995; Dewey, 1934; Marcuse, 1955; Piaget,
1962; Vygotsky, 1967). In addition to restoring phantasy, this effort will also mediate
between the states of phantasy and imagination and the role of each and their respective
importance in the cycle of bringing forth experiences and ideas not bound in or by the
reality principle. For example, the vision of the Pegasus would still require some
technical art or poetically descriptive skills to make such a vision understandable to the
community. Plato still valued the technical abilities of architects, but feared crossing the
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boundary of aesthetic freedom, and therefore sought to censor and limit the political
dimension of phantasy and freedom. Reintroducing phantasy into the curriculum will
likely face similar fears, misunderstandings, and censorship. It will be important, but not
difficult, to align phantasy with imagination. Although the research and theory have not
distinguished these concepts quite the way we have here, they do not necessarily separate
so artificially. The two must be valued in unison, so they complement each other’s
qualities.
For pedagogical practice, it is important to remember the contribution of Marcuse:
phantasy is receptivity. Since it is not an active state but a passive state, we can find a
theoretical thread with some amount of empirical research to support curriculum and
established practices to nurture and leave students open to an experience called phantasy.
Aside from accessing this dimension, it will be just as important to find methods that
allow individuals to bring insights back into the reality principle from the dimension of
phantasy. This movement from receiver/dreamer to creator/doer, a creativity tempered
by receptivity, is one that Marcuse anticipates but does not fully flesh out. He provides
some preliminary vocabulary and concepts that will be useful to describe this movement
between dimensions, and possibly articulates why the civilized consciousness may be
more prepared to bring artifacts back from phantastic experiences. Educational practices
involving day-dreaming, pretend/make-believe, play, dreaming, somatic imagination, and
story-telling can facilitate an education of phantasy (Baker, 2006; Balinisteanu, 2008;
Bateson, 2006; Boske, 2011; Fettes, 2011; Gold & Cundiff, 1980[Jan]; Gold & Cundiff,
1980[Oct]; Haldrman, Zelhart & Jackson, 1985; Leafgren, 2011; Smith & Mathur, 2009;
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Teague & Gold, 1981; Trotman, 2006; Wiebe & Snowber, 2011; Wood & Latham,
2011).
The epilogue of the dissertation will move back into philosophy and engage
phantasy at the level of myth. Since, as we learn in Plato, knowledge of the divine is, for
the philosopher, a matter of interpretation, then reinterpreting myth, in the lineage of
Freud and Marcuse, can be an essential first step to track the loss of phantasy, understand
its consequences, and, most important, offer ways to reclaim it as a human dimension of
mental activity. By revisiting the Pandora myth, which antagonizes the Promethean ethos
that drives civilization in general and 21st century skills and STEM discourses, we can
reclaim hope—a hope to return to phantasy, and find ways, through myth, to make this
partnership a possibility that can be tested and new ways created to entice phantasy to
reappear.
In summary, this dissertation will seek to accomplish three tasks: to provide an
overview of the current paradoxes and aporias in contemporary educational policy related
to imagination; to map a philosophical dialectic that helps to resolve these problems by
returning to the question of phantasy; and to posit educational alternatives based on an
emergent theory of imaginative phantasy. The challenge to the dissertation will be to
first create a theoretical groundwork for understanding the phantastical imagination and
then make this relevant for teachers. In this way, a pedagogy of the phantastical
imagination might at least expose the conservative underpinnings of much of the current
market-driven rhetoric steering the educational policies that appropriate a notion of
imagination circumscribed by economic utility and instrumentality.
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Chapter 1: Daemonion in Ancient Greece

This chapter introduces the concept of phantasy in the practical contexts of
ancient mythology, religious mystery celebrations, and the concept of the daemon. This
analysis will make it clear that phantasy factored heavily into the ancient mind. This era
illustrates clearly a time when not only were the two forces of phantasy and imagination
compatible, but complementary. The tension between the two seems to arise after we
break the concepts into a dichotomy. For this reason the complementarity of phantasy
and imagination came to a dead-end, and we will need dialectics to re-situate the
extremes rather than cancel them out.
Before proceeding into examples, it will first be helpful to introduce the concept
of the liminal space of the eschatia. An understanding of this space and how it was
understood in ancient Greece, specifically Athens, will prepare us for a deeper
understanding of phantasy and uncover a dimension of the current crisis of imagination
and the difficulty in returning to phantasy, both in terms of the educational crisis and,
more important, a broader cultural crisis that has relegated phantasy to the margins so
thoroughly that we don’t even consciously perceive its absence. This framing will offer a
contemporary clarification of ancient practices and art forms as we rebuild an
understanding of the overall experience of phantasy, all the while reconceptualizing
imagination.
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Liminality and the Eschatia

The eschatia is defined as:
“[A space not only] betwixt and between the land of the dead and polis as the land
of the living, but also between an Olympian and a chthonic divine sphere, the
uncultivated geographical periphery represented an ambiguous and primordial
landscape, where men had still not been distinguished from the realm of the gods,
the animals, and the dead. (Endsjo, 2000, p. 351)
This space represents a truly unique dimension for human thought, for not only can one
encounter nonhumans in this space, but possibly become one. It can be further
understood through the concept of liminality – residing between the modes of (being)
fully human and (non being) animal/god/dead (Endsjo, 2000, p. 354). This paradox lies,
at least in part, in this space conceptualized as “an [area] defined by what it is not […]
something like a spatial remain, a non-structuralised [sic] border area that appears only as
other” (Endsjo, 2000, p. 356). This space of the other is the source of both the artistic
creation that we will see in Neitzsche, as well as the urge to censor the poet that will be
prevalent in Plato’s Republic. In fact, where Plato moves further and further away from
this space, denouncing its productive capacities, Nietzsche can be seen tracing the path
backwards, following a line of decensoring poetry to revitalize myth, in an effort to alter
both the individual and cultural experiences of phantasy. The difference lies in the space
that Plato fears and Nietzsche revels in: man coming to know the gods through
intelligence, or man becoming god through desubjectification. Desubjectification can be
understood as moving beyond the boundaries of the ego into new states of consciousness
where subject-object dichotomies dissolve.
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We can see why Plato would seek to censor such a confounding space, since it
can cloud and misdirect the intellect through sheer sensual overstimulation. It is in this
dimension of the eschatia where:
Every element of existence may be found severed from its usual context,
juxtaposed by its usually mutually exclusive opposite, and assembled into new,
totally nonsensical combinations. Thus, all the usual social states of gender, age,
hierarchy, as well as even more basic opposites such as human versus divine,
human versus animal, and dead versus alive, may be negated and reverted in the
liminal space. (Endsjo, 2000, p. 354)
Here we have a space, if only a momentary one, where the perception and organization of
knowledge along polarities or dualities was suspended; a crack in this fabricated veil of
reality revealed itself with a dialectic completeness/totality. This will also be important
as we move into the Eleusinian mysteries where the initiates came from a wide variety of
cultures and social stations. And it is precisely because of this “continuous confusion of
human, divine and all other elements of the Greek cosmos, the space of the eschatia and
everything that it enclosed had apparently escaped the primeval separation of the
elements into proper categories” (Endsjo, 2000, p. 378). Escaping the civilizing
tendencies of other human dimensions, the eschatia is released from maintaining civilized
behavior as a constant referent. In short, the eschatia may be both uncontrollable yet
productive.
This space was to be found not only in the mental dimensions of phantasy, but in
the very real, physical, material space beyond the walls of the polis. It was both a
conceptual realm of the gods, and the space beyond the reach of the civilizing forces of
the polis:
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“all the areas not under the cultivation of the Greek polis may, in fact, be summed
up by the term ta eschatia, the furthest part […], the landscapes that the ancient
Greeks repeatedly related to the experience of the rites of passage, stretched
accordingly from the hinterland just outside the polis to the uttermost periphery at
the end of the world” (Endsjo, 2000, p. 359).
It is the space conceptualized as the end of the world where the boundaries blur, and the
borderline between myth and reality fades. The eschatia is both the underworld that can
be experienced through death or initiation in a mystery festival, as well as the land in
myth that lies beyond the end of the world. The eschatia is contrasted with the polis,
which:
not only defined the eschatia as its geographical periphery, but was also the area
that represented the only place of true humanity. Without polis, man was ‘either a
beast or a god,’ as Aristotle pointed out. The city defined a space that in itself
was humanizing. The space of the polis constituted a stable and culturally
recognized geographical condition representing a certain cultural pattern that
pertained to all aspects of the proper human existence. (Endsjo, 2000, p. 359)
Pushing deeper into the dialectic between Plato and Nietzsche, we find that the polis is
the space of the Apollonian, which is fueled, informed, and given a dimension beyond the
static plastic arts, by the Dionysian impulse that has its origins in the eschatia. This
movement is the dialectic between imagination and phantasy. There exists a perpetual
dialectical tension between the eschatia and the polis which, in a similar way as we see in
Neitzsche, kept each from collapsing into themselves, and in fact, such opposition
provided a rupture in the interstitial space between, where the boundaries of each could
be superseded; new forms of existence emerged from this space in between (Endsjo,
2000, p. 362).
It was in this space that the burdensome aspects of consciousness as a
consequence of civilization could be shed, both conceptually and physically. In fact it
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was recognized that by living on the fringe, “on the very margins of the human world, the
eschatoi andron, or the peoples of the periphery, were repeatedly said to be closer to the
gods,” where foreign and exotic lands such as Egypt and the Near East were said to still
be inhabited by gods (Endsjo, 2000, p. 372). Aside from gods, the eschatia housed
“zoomorphic hybrids like centaurs, satyrs, sirens, and sphinxes” (Endsjo, 2000, p. 373).
Experienced through myth and lyrical poetry at the cultural level, phantasy was
institutionalized in the Eleusinian mysteries. However, the ritual introduces a primary
feature of phantasy that can be seen as an inherent limitation but may in fact be a failsafe:
the experience is only temporary, and the understandings gleaned are equally fleeting and
impermanent. More specifically, the “liminality of the rites of passage […] was in spite
of its primordial aspects only a passing moment when the structures of human civilization
were reversed” (Endsjo, 2000, p. 381). Again, the dialectic emerges in the experience,
and although it touches a dimension of human mental activity not situated in civilized and
conscious thought, it cannot—and, I will argue as I move from Nietzsche into Marcuse,
should not—be sustained at the individual level. It would remove a person too far from
the polis to be recognizable as human, but on the other hand, it seems the experience can
be institutionalized in a set of practices designed for the very purpose of rekindling that
primordial state of existence, in order to inform, educate, and temper civilized states of
existence, as evident from the Eleusinian rituals.
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The Eleusinian Mysteries

We find commentary on the Eleusinian mysteries in ancient texts, even though the
rites were sacred and initiates took a vow of secrecy. First:
Euripides indicates that there was a close relation between the experience of the
[Eleusinian] mysteries and that of traveling in the uncivilized landscapes. […]
Going through the mysteries would in some way prepare the traveler for the
extreme journey not only to the land of dead, but also to the uncultivated
landscapes of the periphery. (Endsjo, 2000, p. 353).
The journey into the eschatia that the Eleusinian Mysteries necessarily involved
was preparation for life after death. This preparation was phantastic because it removed
the individual from themselves so that they might discover alternative knowledge in the
liminal space of these experiences.
These mysteries, as opposed to others, begin with a ritual that centered on a
cultivated, but still phantastic experience. We have some general and ambiguous
descriptions concerning the ritual and the final vision of the hierophant. Despite the
psychedelic nature of the descriptions and what anthropologists have reassembled about
the Eleusinian Mysteries, “some of the formative minds of Western civilization, the ones
that helped bring Democracy, Reason, Mathematics, Science, Philosophy, and Theater
into the world, thought these entheogen-inspired Eleusinian Mysteries were the greatest
experience of their lives” (Wasson, Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008, p. 6). What was it that the
initiates beheld that distinguished it from theater? Surely it could not be reduced to a
cultural mythos. The experience at these festivals was one that held significance for
nearly 1,500 years. And they received much prominence, as the poet Pindar describes:
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“They saw something which validated the continuity of existence beyond the grave, the
‘end of life as well as its divinely granted beginning’” (Wasson, Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008,
p. 87). Aristotle, too, mentions the revelation of the mysteries, which gives us insight
into what transpired compared to theater, as “an experience rather than something
learned” (Wasson, Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008, p. 94). This experience was decidedly
visual in nature, both in terms of setup (the initiates were blindfolded during part of the
procession) and in terms of experience (there was likely a performance which took on
otherworldly qualities because of the preparation). These otherworldly visions Plato
referred to explicitly as phasmata, ghostly apparitions, or holy objects depending on the
translation (Wasson, Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008, p. 90; Plato, 1961, p. 496). It was
primarily an observed visual experience stimulated both by the kykeon and preparation
the initiates took to learn and understand the Demeter myth; on the one hand, the study,
fasting, journey, and ablution in the night in a material sense (Wasson, Hofmann, &
Ruck, 2008), and on the other an experience that was also mythically mediated (Petridou,
2013).
Regarding the visual aspect, the “Greek language did not distinguish between
madness and inebriation because Dionysus was the god of all inebriants and not of wine
alone” (Wasson, Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008, 99). This indicates a misrepresentation in
Plato’s overall disregard for the Orphic mystery traditions, describing their states of
drunkenness as a mistaken virtue, but also a flaw in the Republic because the vision of
madness describes both the poet and the philosopher who is visited by the Muse, and it is
in this dialectic where Plato stumbles, as we will see in the next chapter.
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Now that we have some basic idea of how the Eleusinian mysteries were
experienced and described, let us move onto what actually occurred during the event.
The event was open to anyone. That fact above all else is exemplary of the nature of the
final revelation--that it expanded beyond sociopolitical, cultural, and even gender
differences and directly into universally human experiences of joy of rebirth and fear of
death. The inclusive and egalitarian policies of the Eleusinian mysteries allowed radical
diversity among the initiates, including women, children, noncitizens, travelers, and even
slaves, which was unprecedented in other mystery traditions (Evans, 2006; Petridou,
2013; Wasson, Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008). Even more amazing is that despite such radical
diversity the Eleusinian mysteries were able to convey a shared experience among the
initiates, allowing them each “to see the same things” (Petridou, 2013, p. 313). That the
experience was able to find a common fabric to project the vision onto is in itself quite
mystical.
Upon closer inspection however, we find that the preparation required the study
of the Demeter myth—its language, imagery, and symbolism—in order to prepare the
initiate to read the symbols during the event and experience the vision collectively. The
event itself was divided into separate categories or levels of initiation. The Lesser
Mysteries took place in Athens temple at Eleusis and consisted of learning the mythical
backdrop to the final revelation. The preparation for the Eleusinian mysteries was
extensive and would include the Lesser Mysteries and the Greater Mysteries, and would
often take a month or more of learning and ritual before the final initiation (Wasson,
Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008). The final initiation began with a procession to the temple in
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Eleusis from Athens, a journey of about 14 miles. Initiates were blindfolded for part of
this walk, so as to symbolize the transitioning of worlds into the underworld—a
metaphorical death in order to set the mental stage before the final event (Wasson,
Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008, p. 85). Besides the performance that likely took place inside
the temple at Eleusis, the prior knowledge of the Persephone/Demeter myth facilitated
the revelatory experience. This educational primer before phantasy is important for us to
remember for contemporary learning: phantasy must be nurtured, and myth might be a
way to invite phantasy back into experience.
Embedded in the story of Demeter and Persephone, aside from the violence and
brutality of death, is the knowledge that life is cyclical and that there will be a rebirth.
For the initiates, “In this communion [with the divine], life was reclaimed from its
chthonic captivity and they all shared in the joy of a rebirth that reconfirmed the
metaphysical compact with the sources of life in the dark realm of death” (Wasson,
Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008, p. 127). But it was not just in the cathartic sense that Aristotle
talks of theater as purging one of false desires. This experience was one that was
“intensely visual, [where initiates] saw something that took the terror out of human
mortality” (Evans, 2006, p. 19).
This knowledge that was bestowed was the result of an experience that had been
ritualized at Eleusis and persisted for more than two millennia (Wasson, Hofmann, &
Ruck, 2008). Plato (1961) describes clearly the experience in a passage in Phaedrus,
with the tone of one who has had the mystery revealed:
Beauty it was ours to see in all its brightness in those days when, amidst that
happy company, we beheld with our eyes that blessed vision, ourselves in the
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train of Zeus, others following some other god; then were we all initiated into that
mystery which is rightly accounted blessed beyond all others; whole and
unblemished were we that did celebrate it, untouched by the evils that awaited us
in the days to come; whole and unblemished likewise, free from all alloy,
steadfast and blissful were the spectacles on which we gazed in the moment of
final revelation; pure was the light that shone around us, and pure were we,
without taint of that prison house which now we are encompassed withal, and call
a body, fast bound therein as an oyster in its shell. (p. 497)
The language that is used to describe both the communion and the journey to this space
that the divine inhabits is powerfully visual and spatial in its metaphors. The body, as a
metaphor of the prison for the soul or spirit, prevents the soul from escaping into the
world of Forms and also bounds the experiences of the soul by introducing sensual
experience and bodily appetites and the corruption of the soul. This illusion of the body
can be understood by experiencing the space in-between where gods are both visible and
can see you in return (Evans, 2006, p. 9). This in-between signifies a spatial movement
or possibly a world between the world of human ordeals and the world of divine affairs
and decisions. Also it is described as a communion, “the essential event in those [preGrecian, agrarian, feminine-centered] religions was the Sacred Marriage, in which the
priestess periodically communed with the realm of spirits within the earth to renew the
agricultural year and the civilized life that grew upon the earth” (Wasson, Hofmann, &
Ruck, 2006, p. 438). The communion again represents a meeting space where such a
meeting between human and nonhuman subjectivities could occur in the first place, even
in a conceptual way.
Again, the movements between spaces can be seen in the ritual of the Eleusinian
mysteries. The guided procession was “mimetic of a journey to the other world to claim
back from death the daughter of the grain mother Demeter, whose sorrow for her lost
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maiden could be assuaged only through the mystery of rebirth” (Wasson, Hofmann, &
Ruck, 2008, p. 85). In ancient pottery depicting the Eleusinian mysteries, we find a clear
distinction between the world of human affairs and the world of the gods. In this
description we begin to see the clarity of phantasy and imagination as dichotomized
concepts, and in doing so, recognize the tendency to depict these world as separate. On
an ancient urn depicting the rites at Eleusis, “the Eleusinian grain and the poured libation
interrupt the line that separates the two figures [of a human and Demeter] into different
realms [Dream/Reality]” (Wasson, Hofmann, & Ruck, 2008, p. 119). The line is the veil
that keeps the worlds separate. The libation is the mediating between those worlds,
which allowed for, if only momentarily, access to a space where one is “allowed to look
upon and be looked upon by the divine” (Petridou, 2013, p. 311).
The ritualized visual nature of the experience facilitates the temporal
(desubjectification) whose aim is to undermine a culturally engendered secular visuality,
and to prepare, usually through a process of physical and meta purification, the self for
the possibility of meeting with the divine (Petridou, 2013, p. 315). Most important is the
connection here between the entering the liminal space to encounter the divine and the
centrality of desubjectification to get there. This will be the primary issue at stake for
Plato’s intelligible world of Forms, that the philosopher does not loss oneself to the
divine, and in fact reaches it through knowledge and understanding, rather than madness.
But the fault we will explore continues to be the notion of visuality that creeps into
Plato’s work, which we can see most specifically in the Symposium.
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To summarize, the eschatia is the educational time and space of phantasy. Indeed,
we might describe it as an “exo-pedagogy” (Lewis & Kahn, 2012) wherein the human,
the polis, and the binaries defining worlds are suspended, opening up the self to that
which is neither fully self nor other, material nor immaterial. In such a space, we are
educated to be “otherwise than” what we are—and this process is decisively mystical and
utopian in nature. Through this suspension of the human world, the self achieves a kind
of maximal openness and receptivity to receive the gods and others. Also, it is important
to note that while certain constraints are placed upon the participants (in terms of culture,
language, and symbolic education), the mysteries are owned by no one in particular—it is
an experience held in common. These are important “lessons” to be learned from
“mysterious” exopedagogy.

Phantasy and Daemonion

Aside from the ancient mystery traditions at Eleusis, the general concept of the
daemon will be helpful to describe phantasy that is not associated with ritual or
mythology, and which points to everyday phantasy instead. The examples to follow
represent a nearly exhaustive collection of Socrates’ specific mentions of his own
daemon. This clarifies phantasy in a context that can be applied to education in less
dramatic ways. Here we find some of the traces that may help us find our way back to
phantasy through experiences in the contemporary world. Before merely listing these
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daemonic experiences of Socrates we can frame each experience by first understanding
Plato’s conception of a daemon.
In the Symposium, Socrates “gives a speech in praise of Eros” which culminates
in an understanding of how Eros mediates the “relationship between human and divine”
(Evans, 2006, p. 2). This concept of Eros as a mediating agent is virtually synonymous
with how Socrates describes his daemon; it will however, diverge from the way Marcuse
frames Eros and how Eros operates with respect to imagination and phantasy. Socrates
references Diotima, a woman priestess who was in charge of a form of mystery ritual,
when he describes Eros as “one of the daemons that mediates between bad and good, and
between human and divine” (Evans, 2006, p. 11). This mediating nature defines the
daemon as he transfers understanding between the earthy world of the civilized reality
principle and phantasy. It may be that Plato is disguising the phantastic nature of this
reception by distancing the experience of the divine through the mediating forces of the
daemon, without which one has entered the uncivilized space of the eschatia and
potentially has already lost his or her intellect. This concept of mediation is one that may
not work once we move from Marcuse back into education. The experience of phantasy,
although present in the notion of the daemon, is not fully released since the daemon
mediates the experience, thus preventing direct interaction of the dimensions which
phantasy allows access. This conceptualization of the daemon can be seen as a way in
which Plato attempted to appropriate both the language on the one hand, and the
ritualized experience of the mystery on the other, while still denying that such
experiences could bestow knowledge.
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Evans (2006) lays out a convincing argument that “the singular experience of the
goddess Demeter and of her rites celebrated yearly in Eleusis helped lead Plato to
imagine anew the possibilities for a mutual encounter of the self and the larger cosmos”
(p. 23). It was this experience that Plato attempted to recreate in philosophy, which
sought to understand human’s place in and comprehension of the world. Greek
mysticism allows us to reconsider “the reasons why what is now known as a
‘philosophical’ text by Plato contains the imagery and language of the Eleusinian
Mysteries” (Evans, 2006, p. 6). For example, in the description of Eros:
[The] higher grades of rites of Diotima’s lesson in erotics are given the same
name as the most advanced stage of initiation into Demeter’s mystery rites at
Eleusis: the epoptika […] derived from the verb that means ‘look upon,’ has no
other meaning in classical Greek outside of the meanings uniquely attached to the
Eleusinian Mysteries. (Evans, 2006, p. 18)
Situating this in the larger context of Greek culture, outside of mysticism, Dodds (1951)
depicts how the “Greeks never spoke as we do of having a dream, but always of seeing a
dream” (p. 105). The nature of the visuality of the dream is important for phantasy
because it is not a metaphorical seeing as Plato is attempting to argue, but a sensuous
seeing, a direct experience of phantasy, rather than an experience mediated through a
daemon. The distinction lies in the idea that understanding comes directly from sensuous
experience in phantasy versus understanding coming from intellect (creativity), after an
experience that approaches the divine but never fully crosses from the polis into the
eschatia. In terms of the divinity of the intelligible that Plato seeks to establish and
teach, I examine his appropriation of the language of Eleusis in the dialogue Alcibiades I:
And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do
with wisdom and knowledge?
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There is none.
Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine, and he who looks at
this and at the whole of things divine, will be most likely to know himself. (1875,
p. 505)
But we see the problem arising, and will see it again and again in the Republic: The
intelligible world does not account nor allow for the desubjectification that is necessary
to see the divine, a transcendent experience associated with the experience of the
Mysteries. Perhaps this is exactly the state Plato wishes to avoid entirely, but, as will be
shown, there will be consequences at the level of civilization. Not only does the
experience of phantasy reach into the human dimension in how we experience the world,
but beyond the human dimension and immediate experience of the world. In addition to
being the same instinctual drive of sexuality found in animals, “Eros also supplies the
dynamic impulse which drives the soul forward in its quest of a satisfaction transcending
earthly experience” (Dodds, 1951, p. 218). Eros seeks to find meaning and delight
beyond the human world in an effort to bring such meaning and delight into it. However,
although Plato disavows the logic of desubjectification, he does, at times, seem to touch
the psychological concepts that we will find when we arrive at Marcuse, especially in the
context of recognizing and reshaping the forces at work on the psyche. Evans (2006)
locates in Plato’s speech on Eros “a different conception of human experience and its
relative distance to and difference from the divine” (p. 7). It is in this space of
reconceptualizing this distance and difference that we seek to engage and play so as to
find phantasy and rekindle an archaic relationship. In this sense, Eros is the dialectic, and
although a mediating agent, it can begin the process of reawakening phantasy, and
hopefully restore the immediate experience of the beyond—the mystery.
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Before I move onto the Republic, a more thorough review of the concept of the
daemon found within the Socratic dialogues may help to uncover the way Plato
understands the experience of the divine as mediated, not direct. In the same passage
above where Socrates is praising Eros, Diotima “proceeds to teach Socrates that between
mortal and immortal is to diamonion [sic], a term that has no proper analogue in English,
but which may be rendered ‘god-like’ [and] the noun daemon [which could] indicate a
god or goddess, a supernatural power, a spirit, or a semidivine entity” (Evans, 2006, p. 9).
What is clear is that while the individual experiences the eschatia in terms of an
interaction with a daemon, they themselves never quite enter the eschatia, but instead
communicate through it. In the Symposium, daemons are described as “between god and
man” (Plato, 1961, p. 555)--messengers that communicate and offer understanding
through interpretation. In The Apology, the daemon is described further, but still firmly
situated both in and in-between mythology (eschatia) and the material, civilized world
(polis). The daemons are either “gods or the children of gods?” or “bastard children of
the gods by nymphs or other mothers, as they are reputed to be?” (Plato, 1961, pp.13-14).
This is again addressed in The Apology when Socrates describes how he has received his
vocation:
This duty [of examining those who think that they are wise when they are not] I
have accepted, as I said, in obedience to God’s commands given in oracles and
dreams and in every other way that any other divine dispensation has ever
impressed a duty upon man. (Plato,1961, 19)
Not only is the daemon experienced in a phantastic dimension, but for Socrates it holds
some level of authority--he allows the voice to compel him to wait for his friends so that
a dialogue may commence in the beginning of Euthydemus (Plato, 1961).
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It is difficult to make the distinction between the daemonic possession of a poetic
Muse and that of the philosophic Muse, but this distinction is one that delineates madness
or beauty, respectively, in the case of the poet and philosopher. The dialectic emerges as
we understand that the eschatia, for Plato, is not to be directly experienced by an
individual, but understood through the mediation of the daemon. There seems to be a
danger that threatens civilization, knowledge, and the polis in direct experience of the
eschatia on the periphery of human culture. The essential rupture comes from how the
daemon informs: “Diotima proposes that because humans are mortal (and lack beauty,
goodness, and wisdom), they experience the communicative and hermeneutical aspects of
divinity when the daemonion relays to them divine orders, precepts, and commands”
(Evans, 2006, p. 12). This is the dialectic of the daemon. The experience of the daemon
is the closet humans can get to experiencing the divine—at least, I will argue, without
any corresponding desubjectification. The daemon as a mediating agent does not allow
for the direct experience of the divine, but communicates it through interpretation; the
intellect remains intact, but the understanding must be worked through with reason rather
than immediate experience of the divine. In this way, the daemon allows one to keep his
distance from madness, and the divine is not to be immediately experienced by humans,
but made intelligible with knowledge, reason, and methodology, not sight or any form of
sensuous experience.
It is most likely in this distancing from madness that Plato sought to rework the
language of the Eleusinian mysteries and the concept of the daemon. In Phaedrus we
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begin to see the distinguishing of madness, and therefore the dichotomy of imagination
and phantasy to surface:
The unreasoning desire that overpowers a person’s considered impulse to do right
and is driven to take pleasure in beauty, its force reinforced by its kindred desires
for beauty in human bodies – this desire, all-conquering in its forceful drive, takes
its name from the word for force and it is called Eros. (Plato, 1955, p. 18)
Eros, situated in purely human/animal contexts, is isolated to sexuality and pleasures of
the body. However, situated in the realm of the divine and the intellect as described by
Diotima through Socrates in The Symposium, Eros is an agent that can transcend the
human/animal dimension in order to find higher, more fulfilling states of pleasure. As I
move into Marcuse this process will be called, after Freud, sublimation, and is a hallmark
of imagination. Additionally, without such a reading Eros remains connected to
phantasy, Socrates elaborates in Phaedrus:
We said, did we not, that love is a sort of madness?
Yes.
And that there are two kinds of madness, one resulting from human ailments, the
other from a divine disturbance of our conventions of conduct.
Quite so.
And in the divine kind we distinguished four types, ascribing them to four god:
the inspiration of the prophet to Apollo, that of the mystic to Dionysus, that of the
poet to the Muses, and a fourth type which we declared to be the highest, the
madness of the lover, to Aphrodite and Eros. (Plato, 1961, p. 510-511).
This divine madness makes this path murky to travel since Plato is introducing
contradictions into his concept of imagination and knowledge. In the next chapter I will
explore how Plato seemingly attempts to reconcile this inconsistency with Socrates’
heirarchization of the muses regarding music, poetry, and philosophy in the Republic.
However, this introduces additional flaws since Socrates places philosophy with muses
associated more with music than poetry.
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This is explicitly evident in Phaedo where Socrates reveals his doubt about how
he has thus far interpreted his daemon. Devoting his life to philosophy may have at best
been a misunderstanding on Socrates’ part, and at worst a blatant and conscious effort to
ignore the message of the daemon, thus subverting the pretext of the divine. Upon being
asked about the prose he has been composing to Apollo and putting into verse stories by
Aesop, Socrates responds:
I was trying to get at the meaning of certain dreams which I had had, and
discharging a sacred obligation, thinking that it was this sort of music they were
bidding me to compose. I must tell what the dreams were like. Often in the
course of my life the same dream-figure has visited me. Differing in its visible
form but always saying the same words, ‘Socrates, be diligent and make music.’
In the past I had supposed that it was urging and encouraging me to go on with
what I was doing, just as people urge on runners to run; I was to ‘make music’ in
the sense in which I was already doing so: the highest music was philosophy, and
philosophy was my business. […] It occurred to me that possibly the injunction of
the dream might be to compose music in the commonly accepted sense, and I
thought I ought to obey by doing so; it was safer, I felt, not to depart until I had
fulfilled my sacred obligation by composing what the dream enjoined. (Plato,
1955, p. 34)
This passage is extremely revealing as to how phantasy is both experienced and how it is
approached. We find here that the approach—the cultural conceptualization through
which one meets phantasy—dictates to a large degree how phantasy is experienced. As I
will argue in Chapter 6, there is an obligation to phantasy in education with how it is
approached with a certain degree of hospitality, receptivity, and passivity. Socrates does
not seem to oblige himself with such conditions regarding phantasy, and instead attempts
the exact effort I have highlighted in education, that of controlling and exploiting the
imagination and phantasy for the material/conceptual benefits (in his case, exceedingly
selfish) that could be brought over, and which I are arguing vehemently against, and may
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in fact be insulated from such exploitation due to its position in the psyche. Without
desubjectification, an individual can at best approach phantasy, but never fully
experience and reside in the dimension of the eschatia.
At the end, perhaps, Socrates had fears that at best, his life had been imbalanced
because he did not compose music which would have been the erotic balance to his life of
intellect, and at worst, his life was misinformed—misinterpreted since we exist at the
level of communication and hermeneutic regarding the experience for the divine without
direct understanding and comprehension. However, besides this singular brief moment,
Socrates makes little attempt to transcend subjectivity, and in fact is firmly rooted is his
own subjectivity, that of the persona of a philosophical sage that seeks to re-envision
society in the form of Beauty and Perfection. Even in his death Socrates reinforces this
quality, rather than turn away: “If you doubt whether I am really the sort of person who
would have been sent tot this city as a gift from God, you can convince yourselves by
looking at it this way” (Plato, 1961, p. 17). Such trajectory, which is only continued in
The Republic, puts us further and further off the trail of a hospitality for phantasy, both in
education and culture at large. Self-effacement begins the process of inviting phantasy,
but we will have to wait until Nietzsche to understand what this looks like and why it
should be avoided to some extent.
The mysteries and consultation with daemons are representative of an
exopedagogy that stands in opposition to the civilizing functions of society. Perhaps
even more descriptive than an exopedagogy is a pedagogy beyond the dichotomies of
imagination and phantasy, and one that nurtures the productive tension between the two.
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In this sense, phantasy emerges as a commons that can be accessed by all, except those
who cannot break the dichotomous barriers that civilization erects and reinforces. The
eschatia where phantasy can be found places new emphasis on the hospitality and the
receptivity of the mysteries and daemons, even though they are unpredictable and
possibly dangerous. Without such spaces and the invitational hospitality required,
phantasy is lost to the West after Plato. In light of this, we will not be able to revisit these
themes until Marcuse’s dialectical reconstruction of Eros and Reason and continue the
work of identifying a set of practices capable of informing teaching that nurtures
phantasy.
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Chapter 2: Plato

As we move from a mythical pre-Socratic disposition to that of more familiar
educational terrain in the Republic, it is important to take note that Socrates himself is a
Platonized figure (Hackforth, 1972; Grube, 1992). In Plato’s later writing we see more of
his own philosophy, his ontology, his increasing conviction in the Pythagoreans,
mathematics, and the Forms coming through. Moving into The Republic provides
deepening insight into Plato and the consequential direction western education has
followed. This moment seems to be the inception of the dichotomy of imagination and
phantasy (though articulated with different language) with the additional infusion of
power relationships into the equation—forces of power seeking to contain and censor the
Dionysian impulse.
Whereas the mysteries located education in the exopedagogy of the liminal space
of the eschatia, Plato firmly roots education in the pedagogy of the polis, thus severing
any possibility for a dialectical understanding of phantasy and imagination, outside and
inside, self and other. Plato sought to remove this tension, convinced that dissonance was
troublesome for the education of youth in the imagined city of the Republic, the
kallipolis. This chapter will first introduce Plato’s schema of a hierarchy of knowledge
where he places phantasy at the bottom of knowledge. This has implications for our
research but also has consequences for the way Plato’s work developed and has
subsequently been used in culture and education. There are direct educational
implications for those who are to become the Philosopher Kings of the kallipolis.
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Finally, I discus Plato’s concept of censorship, which is a logical conclusion to a
philosophical system based on the Forms (one that denies all other alternative forms of
knowledge) and also introduces Nietzsche’s immediate and visceral rejection of such
censorship.
Plato still receives a great deal of attention and respect in education. For our
purposes, we look to research that has critiqued Plato’s concept of imagination as well as
his ascension to his foundational role in education. First, there exists a recognition of the
severely limiting dimensions to Plato’s philosophy despite his own conviction in his
writing as to the certainty of philosophy as opposed to poetry, virtue or savagery, and
knowledge or experience (Lines, 2009). Going a step further, Kieran Egan, who will be
explore more thoroughly in Chapter 6, speaks of the incompatibility of Plato’s
educational model with more progressive educational models that can be found in Dewey
and Rousseau (Egan, 1992, 1997). The hierarchy of knowledge that Plato created is the
same model many critical and utopian educators are working against, trying to get radical
dimensions of the imagination embedded in the world. Plato is representative of the
standardizing forces at work in education that seeks quality control and order rather than
space that allows for poets. In this respect, Plato is often contrasted with Aristotle, who
found a medicinal, health-related aspect in tragedy and theater in that such experiences
could be cathartic (Penwell, 2009). Plato’s abhorrence for poets and poetry leads him to
deny any social value to epic or lyrical poetry precisely because of the non-instrumental
experiences they could induce. Lastly, this dimension of phantasy is associated with
unreality, as the opposite of reason. By encourages children to transcend their
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immaturity through denying phantasy, traditional schooling suppresses the imagination
except in cases where it can exploit it for economic purposes instead educational or selffulfilling purposes (Bleazby, 2012). With imagination securely at the bottom of the
hierarchy, Plato can attend to moral responsibility, virtue, and why the imagination, as a
site of the eschatia, is an impulse to be purged from the polis. It is these didactic
elements that threaten phantasy and seek to devalue its educational dimensions, thus
leaving us with a model of imagination that forms the crux of our current
instrumentalized and institutionalized forms.

The Republic and Imagination

There exists an internal tension that is immediately worth exploring in the
teachings of the Republic but also in its form and structure. This tension is reinforced by
something that I think is indicative of the strength of imagination and phantasy. Those in
dialogue with Socrates—as well as his readers themselves—must begin to visualize the
concepts that Plato is asking us to think of, which is true of many of the Socratic
dialogues but especially The Republic, which asks us to imagine fictitious cities, despite
chastising the imagination as the lowest form of understanding. Perhaps Plato is
humoring his audience by using strategies they will find familiar; just as a master artist
uses his tools to create art objects, Plato can employ the imagination in the virtuous
teaching of non-philosophers. The more likely scenario is that imagination itself, as a
fundamental human mental activity, cannot be escaped. Plato asks us to imagine because

69

of the effectiveness of our internal ability to create mental representations in the absence
of the object. About halfway through The Republic we begin to see the glimmer of the
imagination, like light, peeking through the holes in Plato’s narrative. From this moment
the dialectical relationship between imagination and knowledge (as Plato employs the
terms) is reintroduced, though it is implied and must be teased out as I have done—
otherwise it appears to have nicely tucked away and forgotten, as Plato wants it to seem.
The experience of sight in the imagination is central and problematizes the experience of
the poet and the philosopher. Even Plato sees similarities, though argues out of it by
drawing a line of intelligibility between the two:
Are we to say that these people [those who attend and sing to the chorus in the
Dionysian mystery festivals]—and those who learn similar things or petty
crafts—are philosophers?
No, but they are like philosophers.
And who are the true philosophers?
Those who love the sight of truth. (Plato, 1992, p. 150)
From the previous chapter, Plato is speaking about different accounts and experiences of
knowledge with corresponding truth-value. The difference that Plato may be able to
argue is that the philosopher is able to recollect the experience and make it
understandable to other through reason and language, while the poet tries to makes his
truth-value understandable through music, art, and language. The point I would like to
further draw out for the remainder of this chapter is the heavy reliance of imagination
itself on making the language understandable and intelligible. The final words of the
above quote make it quite clear: Truth is something that can be “seen.” not just
understood metaphorically, but also experienced in a sensuous, dare I say phantastic,
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way. The experience of truth might be the difference between the philosopher and the
poet.
The following examples illustrate this point: Understanding or making language
into truth must utilize the imagination, the lowest form of thought. The individuals that
Socrates is dialoguing with and the reader must clearly conceive and visualize, picture in
their mind, or imagine the analogies or allegories of the Line, the Sun, and the Cave.
However we begin with this image, the phantastic creature, the
multicolored beast with a ring of many heads that it can grow and change at will –
some from gentle, some from savage animals […] then fashion one other kind,
that of a lion, and another of a human being. But make the first much the largest
and the other second to it in size. […] Now join the three of them into one […]
then, fashion around them the image of one of them, that of a human being so that
anyone who see the outer covering and not what’s inside will think it is a single
creature, a human being. (Plato, 1992, p. 260)
The Line analogy places knowledge (noesis) and thought at the top of a vertical line
representing intelligible thought, with belief and imagination (phantasia) at the bottom
representing the visible world (sense perception). Plato’s engagement of the imagination
is an invitation for deeper understanding and truth, but it also implies a certain ability for
imagination to bypass the world of opinion and be used as a tool to increase
understanding and knowledge. In fact, if we combine Plato’s passage with Diotima from
the previous chapter with the Line analogy, we find a relationship between imagination
and Reason that is representative of the phantastic imagination. For Plato, noesis is an
“intellectual vision,” a seeing of the Forms brought about through high levels of
education and conceptual understanding, but which seems to transcend mere rationality
and reasoning. Noesis is a culmination of intellect that goes beyond reason and the
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mediating forces approach the daemonic. If we take the Line analogy and bend it,
without breaking the poles, we can find a new interpretation that allows for a relationship
between the bottom of the line and the top of the line. By bending the two poles of the
line and stretching them to infinity, in a way similar to an artist drawing in perspective
and tracing two parallel lines, which never meet in theory, to the vanishing point, we can
create a figure that is nearly a circle. Rather than bend the two ends of the line into a
circle, which would be all too easy, the illusion that the ends meet in the vanishing point
is more appropriate for my argument. Instead of finding a space where the ends of the
line meet, we anticipate this three-dimensional space in the way our perspective sees a
road receding into the horizon infinitely, rather than meeting and creating the twodimension shape of a cone. This space on the horizon line is the liminal space of the
eschatia and where the experience of phantasy, daemonic vision, can be visited from
multiple access points; the key is a moving beyond, a desubjectification that allows for
unbridled experience of a world or concept saturated with felt-meaning.
Within the world of The Republic, imagination can be used in education as long
as it is controlled and used for instances where knowledge will be gained. Indeed,
imagination needs constant management on the part of the Philosopher King, which
might lend weight to philosopher’s suspicions because they recognize a lack of intrinsic
authority within this dimension. In this way, the imagination can become a powerful
teaching tool with very specific purposes that prevent the seeping in of uncontrollable
phantastic possession. Imagination is productive in this case for the purposes of the
intellect that twists and shapes it to convey abstract, allegorical ideas.
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First I focus on some of the basic language and metaphors that Plato uses when
trying to make abstract thoughts more clear through the use of descriptive imagery and
story-telling devices, which may be traced to his youth as a poet and writer of prose
before he devoted himself and his writing to philosophy. Plato, through his use of
images, does seem to backtrack and allow for images to bring truth; the difference is that
the truth is not in the image, but in the knowledge the image brings, just as in poetry the
image is an imitation of truth, as a reflection or shadow. Nietzsche and Marcuse will
both have more to say about imagination and the image of shadows that will lend itself to
the nature of the darker Dionysian forces, which Nietzsche seeks to resurrect.
Expounding upon the Line analogy, Plato first describes the use of images themselves:
“These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows and reflections in water are
images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves that one
cannot see except by means of thought” (Plato, 1992, p. 184). He even adds that although
the image does have its origins in the world of opinion, imagination, and sense
perception, when it is seen properly—that is, with the eyes of intelligible thought—the
images take on a deeper meaning and a truth can be revealed, “but using as images those
very things of which images were made in the section below [the world of opinion and
imagination], and which, by comparison to their images, were thought to be clear and
valued as such” (Plato, 1992, p. 184).
And finally, we ask how the truth reveals itself. Is it something seen and may be
understood by all? The difference between the poet and the philosopher can be found in
the diversity of their approach to the unknown; phantasy or intellect. But we do find it is
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something that is just beyond reach and must be enticed to come closer, out of the
shadows, and in this light use of an image can be a tempting device. We find the truth is
“that which reason itself grasps by the power of the dialectic” (Plato, 1992, p. 185).
The understanding emerges from the tension of the image (an object from the
imagination) and the use of the image to uncover knowledge; how imagination itself
shares knowledge is not always reasoned, but grasped, as if it is trying to get away
immediately after we catch a glimpse of it. Immediately upon perceiving a truth initiated
through imagination, the understanding slips through our fingertips. The very nature of
phantasy illustrates that to grasp this understanding is phenomenologically related to
sensuous experience rather than being illuminated exclusively through the intellect. Just
a sense of perception is fleeting without the stimuli; phantasy too quickly fades to a
shadow of what was experienced. It is in the dialectic of the experience and reflection
upon the memory of the shadow where truth can be found in the space of phantasy. The
ability to use images in the process of abstracting as key to building knowledge, using
images that arise from the lowest form of thought, can be a tool of the philosopher (and
maybe the poet) to grasp ideas through their dialectic tension. This tension may in fact
be part of the immediate experience of the direct divine or daemonic inspiration, and will
be taken up by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy. Plato continues with the images that
reinforces the darkness of imagination and the sensual world as well as the light and truth
of the intelligible world. In the Allegory of the Cave sequence, Plato describes the truth
of the cave-dweller as “nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts” (Plato, 1992, p.
187).
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I would like to ask, then: Who is the true master of the images? Regarding the
construction of the best instrument, those suited for the kallipolis, not those too
emotionally evocative, Plato tells us it is bound in the relationship between the maker and
the user.
It’s wholly necessary, therefore, that a user of each thing has most experience of it
and that he tell a maker which of his products performs well or badly in actual
use. […] a maker—through associating with and having to listen to the one who
knows—has right opinion about whether something he makes is fine or bad, but
the one who knows is the user. (Plato, 1992, p. 272)
Regarding images and the use of imagination, how is the philosopher in a position of
authority over the poet? Both use and manipulate images to convey truth. In this sense,
both are shadows or imitations of the truth they seek to capture. We may grant that
philosophers use images, and their truth-value is certainly more discernable to them, but
regarding phantasy and the use of epic or lyric tragic poetry, the philosopher is not the
most experienced user because he has already made his value claims against it and does
not use such images, so the images of phantasy are best understood by those who use
them—which, as is often the case, is the same as one who revealed them. The
philosopher uses the imagination in an exploitive way so as to make his ideas
understandable. The poet, on the other hand, does not exploit, but rather engages in an
erotic relationship with phantasy, a partnership where insights can emerge and be brought
forth into reality. The difference again falls to the intentional aspects of imagination.
There may find more to say on this matter when we get to Marcuse and speaking of the
difference between creation and reception, which might be helpful to think about the
philosopher and the poet. But regarding phantasy, the poet or the artist is the most
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experienced user, since he or she partakes in the process of communicating an
incommunicable understanding of an irrational image of truth.

The Republic and Education

Plato seems to have difficultly grasping the distinction between the philosophic
Muse and the poetic Muse, when in fact they were the one and the same, sisters Calliope
and Urania, whose domain was philosophy and music (Plato, 1961, p. 504-505). He
sought to sever the poetic impulse, inspired through bodily erotic desires, from the
philosophic impulse—and likewise sever the inspiration through reason and the Forms or
Ideas of the intelligible world from phantasy. The primary pedagogical assumption in
The Republic concerns the type of imitating children engage in which has been
predetermined, “namely, people who are courageous, self-controlled, pious, and free”
(Plato, 1992, p. 71). In addition, any imitating must also be “law-abiding” in order to
nurture justice and obedience that will be required in adulthood in the kallipolis, while
imitation of lawlessness and irrationality will introduce corruption into the beautiful city
(Plato, 1992, p. 100).
Interestingly, one dimension that Plato does seem to recognize as advantageous is
that of play. The dimension of play, for Plato, is one that introduces a deep form of
learning that precedes any formal education. He advises, “don’t use force to train the
children in these subjects; use play instead” (Plato, 1992, p. 208). The philosopher kings,
not average citizens of the kallipolis, were to receive this exclusive education, but this is
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not to say that the play was the type we will be watching for (that which also entails a
playing with freedom). This will be important as we move from Marcuse into current
educational paradigms and spaces where phantasy can be invited. However, a primary
difference will be that Plato seeks to censor this space of play and dimension of
imagination or phantasy above all else, by first censoring the poets and forms of poetry
that anyone, children included, can possibly be exposed to (Plato, 1992, p. 50). This
censored play and even more rigid education would create “courageous, pious, free”
guardians and citizens (Plato, 1992, p. 71). Paradoxically, however, this productive play
will not include the experience of freedom. Regarding education, Plato writes: “It’s also
our aim in ruling our children, we don’t allow them to be free until we establish a
constitution in them, just as in a city, and – by fostering their best part with our own –
equip them with a guardian and ruler similar to our own to take our place. Then, and
only then, we set them free” (Plato, 1992, p. 262). The previous concepts of justice,
fairness, piety, self-control, and courageousness were all to be imitated in play, and
freedom, too, was to be imitated (Plato, 1992, p. 71). How will citizens move from
childhood, where they lack freedom, to adulthood, where they are supposed to gain
freedom through education and understanding of the intelligible world? This is never
explicitly stated, but from the above, we can infer that the freedom that children would
experience and introduce into their play was an imitation of freedom—censored freedom
that was to mature into a self-controlled freedom, tempered by reason and intelligence,
never sensual appetites and experiences of pleasure and pain. After poetry, education
was to be equally censored and fortified:
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Those in charge must cling to education and see that it isn’t corrupted without
their noticing it, guarding it against everything. Above all, they must guard as
carefully as they can against any innovation in music and poetry or in physical
training that is counter to the established order. (Plato, 1992, p. 99)
Plato uses the term phantasia to describe the inspiration of the poets, the artist,
and the philosopher, but the philosopher sees truths of an intelligible kind, and for this
intellect is placed at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge. It seems this is the moment
where the dichotomy is revealed completely, even if not articulated completely. The use
of imagination, in the sense similar to that of the Eleusinian mysteries, is far different
from that of the poet, who would be described more as in a state of phantasy. For Plato,
there are three problems with poetry that make it incompatible with philosophy. First, as
I have shown, poets might not have knowledge of that which they describe, which
produces false-impressions. Second, poetry as the product of phantasy encourages
imitations of what individuals are not (which can act as a model for impressionable
children). Third, poetry can overstimulate the senses and cloud reason, turning people
from the intelligible world. Plato’s treatment of art in Ion describes the breaking apart of
phantasy and imagination, and privileging imagination at the expense of phantasy:
Heretofore in all the arts in Athens the emotions and the intellect had worked
together. There was a balance of power. That is the uniqueness of Greek art; it is
an intellectual art. In the Ion Socrates disputes the possibility of such a balance.
(Plato, 1961, p. 215)
Art is a form of knowledge since it partakes in an act of creation, but poetry, as a process
of possession that does not create but receives, is not knowledge. Plato denies any truthvalue of the poet since he does not know that which he says. But, in doing do, Plato
denies alternative truth-values which cannot be established through philosophy. He
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denies that phantasy has an exopedagogical force that is disruptive but also highly
educative.
For instance, the education of the youth, especially those who would hold power
(the Guardians), was to be precisely managed in the Republic. This management begins
and focuses almost entirely on the censoring of poetry. Socrates explains that “the more
poet they are, the less they should be heard by children or by men who are supposed to be
free and to fear slavery more than death” (Plato, 1992, p. 62). The enslavement of the
body or psychological bondage due to deliberate or cultivated ignorance would disrupt
the harmony that he envisioned for human life in the Republic. This enslavement of the
body was akin to the way poetry and tragic myth held captive folk knowledge and,
therefore, the conceptions of right, wrong, justice, freedom, or love that were based on
the experiences of the sensual world.
Knowledge obtained or received through the sensual realm is opposed to that
which was revealed with science, math, and reason form the intelligible world. Unless
one had reason and knowledge from the intelligible world, he would be susceptible to the
rhapsodic utterances of the tragic poet. Poetry itself is categorized as an enticing enemy
that will distort intelligent thought, “unless he has the knowledge of what it is really like,
as a drug to counteract it” (Plato, 1992, p. 265). Plato explicitly denies any truth-value to
poetry and labels its knowledge as misguided and for the weak-minded, and instead finds
truth-value in the world of reason alone. Plato acknowledges that
hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people are the only poetry we can admit
into our city. If you admit the pleasure-giving Muse, whether in lyric or epic
poetry, pleasure and pain will be kings in you city instead of law or the thing that
everyone has always believed to be best, namely, reason. (Plato, 1992, p. 278).
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Revisiting the hierarchy of Muses established in Phaedrus we find the pleasure-giving
Muse, although censored here, was acknowledged as the highest form of divine
disturbance and with a certain degree of truth (Plato, 1955). But perhaps for this exact
reason it is being censored, since it is the most removed from reason and rational thought:
It is entirely detached from reality, and therefore the most dangerous. However, the
truth-value, too, seems to have diminished between Phaedrus and The Republic. Plato
calls all poets “beginning with Homer” imitators, with nothing more than an imitation, a
shadow of truth, and for this reason the poetic Muse is not worth consulting or
encouraging (Plato , 1992, p. 271). Removing the truth-value from poetry is a first step
in distancing the cultural experience of phantasy from reality. The value cast upon
phantasy and the ability to remove it from experience sought to censor the most
dangerous qualities, those opposed to reason and rationality, but in doing so, it also
removes its most innocuous qualities, like finding ideas and even truth in daydreams and
dreams. Plato describes how a traveling poet, made to look like a fool, would be received
at the kallipolis. He states:
if a man, who through clever training can become anything and imitate anything,
should arrive in our city, wanting to give a performance of his poems, we would
bow down before him as someone holy, wonderful, and pleasing, [mockingly] but
we should tell him that there is no one like him in our city and that it isn’t lawful
for there to be. We should pour myrrh on his head, crown him with wreaths, and
send him away to another city. But, for our own good, we ourselves should
employ a more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller, one who
would imitate the speech of a decent person and who would tell his stories in
accordance with the patterns we laid down when we first undertook the education
of our soldiers. (Plato, 1992, p. 74)
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The pattern of education above was to suppress the bodily appetites while still honing the
physical body so as to balance harmoniously with the cultivation of the intellect. The
type of poets and poetry that would be permissible and created for such purposes would
be “austere and less pleasure-giving” and would not stoke the phantastic impulses but
would reinforce the qualities desired in The Republic. These poets would be the focal
point of censorship because as a consequence, all individuals and all institutions would be
equally censored from images of injustice and dissonance (Plato, 1992, p. 77).
In addition to the content of poetry and eliminating the tragic and epic lineage,
Plato describes the censoring of the form of poetry and verse. Specifically Plato is
determined that the form and content be balanced and always in precise harmony so no
dissonance is ever tolerated. He affirms:
Further, the mode and rhythm must fit the words.
Of course.
And we said, that we no longer needed dirges or lamentations among our words.
We did, indeed.
What are the lamenting modes, then? You tell me, since you’re musical.
The mixo-Lydian, the suntono-Lydian, and some other of that sort.
Aren’t they to be excluded, then? They’re useless even to decent women, let
alone to men.
Certainly.
Drunkenness, softness, and idleness are also most inappropriate for our guardians.
How could they not be?
What, then, are the soft modes suitable for drinking-parties?
The Ionian and those Lydian modes that are said to be relaxed.
Could you ever use these to make people warriors?
Never. And now all you have left is the Dorian and Phrygian modes. (Plato,
1992, p. 75)
Again, the form as well as the content will be controlled and manipulated in the education
in the city, especially that of the guardians. In the same way that Plato seeks to eliminate
musical dissonance through controlling the modes one is allowed to play as well as the
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instruments one is allowed to make, the kallipolis, too, will eliminate all forms of
dissonance—i.e., social, political, educational, and ecological. However, as was
somewhat implied in the previous chapter, and as we shall see more clearly in the
following chapters, removing dissonance signifies an incomplete knowledge, for to
understand harmony and a balanced tension or complementary pairing, one must also
have experienced and come to know dissonance—both in the literal sense of music
instruction, experience, and performance, as well as the metaphorical/dialectical sense of
the dimensions of pain and pleasure. This will have implications for education that we
will see much clearer in Chapter 6, where I discuss Maxine Greene, who specifically
mentions the experience of others as informing our moral education. Without the
dissonance introduced by the other, we reinforce a shallow and selfish understanding of
the world. In a sense the level of maturity offered without dissonance is lacking because
it does not get beyond one’s subjectivity. Dissonance, as an educational tool, can
interrupt the space of the performance-principle and expose places where imagination
and phantasy can return. For Plato, dissonance breeds imbalance:
Haven’t you noticed the effect that lifelong physical training, unaccompanied by
any training in music or poetry, has on the mind, or the effect of the opposite,
music and poetry without physical training.
What effects are you talking about?
Savagery and toughness in the one case and softness and overcultivation in the
other. (Plato, 1992, p. 87)
Those results—savagery and toughness, or softness and overcultivation—are the
consequences of an imbalanced, dissonant education in The Republic.
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Plato and the Censorship of Poetry

Last, and perhaps most telling of all, is the dichotomy between poetry and
philosophy that Plato is trying to remove by excising one of the poles entirely, rather than
balancing them. He writes, “Let’s also tell poetry that there is an ancient quarrel between
it and philosophy, which is evidenced by such expressions as ‘the dog yelping and
shrieking at its master,’ ‘great in the empty eloquence of fools,’ ‘the mob of wise men
that has mastered Zeus,’ and ‘the subtle thinkers, beggars all’” (Plato, 1992, p. 278). In
this passage, he treats poetry and any truth-value it may have with contemptuous
authority, thus reproducing the dichotomy and placing value judgments on imagination
and phantasy and inserting a sociocultural power dynamic into the tension. Plato goes so
far as to describe phantasy and falsehood as such: “though of no use to the gods, is useful
to people as a form of drug, clearly we must allow only doctors to use it, not private
citizens” (Plato, 1992, p. 64). This passage presents a problematic situation for the
kallipolis in that the falsehood is to be managed, in a similar way that poetry is censored,
and prescribed by doctors when falsehood will get one to health and is not made available
or relevant to the masses.
Countering this logic, we might ask what “falsehood” private citizens, women and
children will be prescribed in the name of truth. The guardians will be masters of truth,
as well as falsehood. But again we find a problem: To be a master of falsehood, one
would have to experience it, but the education will be devoid of all falsehood thanks to
the previously censored poets. In this case, phantasy prevails through the imagined world
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they live “as a form of drug” and ruptures the experience of the censored world while
pointing to an alternative truth value of phantasy or falsehood. In practice the guardians
ought to have no experience of phantasy or falsehood, which have been censored out of
their education and the governing of the city. While the mature Plato might write “The
daemonic and the divine are in every way free from falsehood,” as we have seen in the
previous chapter, the daemonic can be understood as an experience with phantasy (Plato,
1992, p. 59). In this case, phantasy, understood as originating with the divine or the
daemonic, is not deceitful and in fact has a truth-value of its own.
Plato’s legacy in education is nearly insurmountable. The ideas of censorship are
still prevalent in education both at the level of books allowed in school libraries and those
on the banned books lists and the topical coverage of material in textbooks, specifically
history textbooks and their framing or erasure of certain moments in American history.
This ongoing censorship is the same impulse that seeks to reallocate the instrumental
imagination to that of the market. In the same way that the philosopher king can use
imagination, so too can students learn to manipulate their mental representations without
consequentially experiencing higher degrees of freedom. In these 21st century skill
discourses, the philosopher king is supplanted by the expert bureaucrat who knows how
to train the imagination, so that everyone can find employment and an economic harmony
may be achieved. In both cases, the educational possibilities of liminality are denied
relevance. Education is precisely within and for the flourishing of the polis. Whatever
dangers are to be found in the exopedagogical blurring of boundaries between self and
other are mitigated by an instrumentalized view of imagination that is always subservient
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to reason. Marcuse will clearly illustrate the fallacious nature of such logic and expose
that such educational programs will have little effect on the economy or politics without
also exploring the dimension of phantasy alongside imagination.
The urgency for this project to revisit phantasy in education will become more
and more apparent as policy keeps asserting the merits of imagination at the expense of
phantasy. The dialectical analysis to follow is a counter to this trajectory and establishes
an alternative genealogy where the logic of phantasy can in fact be seen as one of the
only forces capable of disrupting the trend begun with Plato and reaching its full,
bureaucratic heights with today’s 21st century skills initiatives.
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Chapter 3: Nietzsche

Socrates “is the great exemplar of the theoretical man” who,
like the artist […] takes infinite pleasure in all that exists and is this saved from
the practical ethic of pessimism with its lynx eyes that shine only in the dark. But
while the artist, having unveiled the truth garment by garment, remains with his
gaze fixed on what is still hidden, theoretical man takes delight in the cast
garments and finds his highest satisfaction in the unveiling process itself, which
proves to him his own power. (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 92).

Nietzsche seeks first and foremost to reawaken the spirit that Plato sought to
censor, to rekindle the Dionysian impulse stirring under the skin, and release the orgiastic
truth of the phantastic image as well as the imagined image. Where Nietzsche begins in
content—the mystical nature of imagination and phantasy—sits in firm opposition to
Plato’s Form, which was at most, according to Aristotle, “between poetry and prose” for
Plato was a “philosopher and poet, but not a mystic” (Plato, 1961, xxv). Nietzsche does
not follow the lineage of the philosophic tradition of ancient Greece, but instead the
language that this philosophy sought to isolate and contain, that of the epic poet and
tragic drama, the voice of Dionysus. Nietzsche picks up his project at precisely the point
where the ancient Greek philosophers (and ancient Greek culture in general) left it,
casting away the primordial power of phantasy and instead elevating, inharmoniously, the
Apollonian dimensions of the intelligible world. These images might have given truth to
reality, but a reality that is censored from the dimension of phantasy instead of being
tempered by it. Nietzsche very clearly describes the dynamic tension between Dionysian
and Apollonian impulses—phantasy and imagination—but seems to lose sight of this
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tension and falls victim to the Dionysian embodiment of pleasure. In the same way Plato
consciously tosses out phantasy and employs the instrumental imagination, Nietzsche
unconsciously embraces phantasy and perhaps instrumentalizes reason. In both cases, an
equality between the two is lost, and one force is submitted to the other.
This chapter will first explore the dynamic tension between the Dionysian and
Apollonian polarity as an example of the dialectic I am exploring. While repeatedly
recognizing the importance of retaining the tension between the Dionysian and the
Apollonian, Nietzsche increasingly abandons the Apollonian and returns to phantasy in a
way the Marcuse would recognize as dangerous and at odds with civilization. An
example of this abandonment is found in his interpretation of Raphael’s Transformation.
His reading performs a dialectical reversal of the heirarchization of the Muses and the
arts that Plato described. In the end, he appears to be deeply suspicious of the redemption
of the Apollonian, even in the name of the Dionysian, and the dialectic falters; the
Apollonian imaginary is buried next to where Plato discarded the poetic Muses. Here I
will use a dialectical method of analysis to outline Nietzsche’s insights but also point out
his limitations. In the end, we must attempt to resurrect Nietzsche beyond Nietzsche in
an effort to honor that which he argued for: the dynamism between imagination and
phantasy.
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The Dialectic of Dionysus and Apollo

Directly and unapologetically, Nietzsche (1956) declares:
I have borrowed my adjectives from the Greeks, who developed their mystical
doctrines of art through plausible embodiments, not through purely conceptual
means. It is by those two-art sponsoring deities, Apollo and Dionysos [sic], that
we are made to recognize the tremendous split, as regards both origins and
objectives, between the plastic Apollonian arts and the non-visual art of music
inspired by Dionysos [sic]. (p. 19)
This quote is important to begin with for two crucial points in this dissertation. First, we
find a modern description of phantasy, which will become more useful as we transition
through Marcuse and into education. Second, it will be important further along when I
talk about education and phantasy in terms of a dialectic regarding the origin and subject
of an object of artistic creation. It also points out that the experience of phantasy may be
one that is embodied, while the experience of imagination in the Apollonian sense is
conceptual. Nietzsche helps to expose the dialectical relationship of imagination and
phantasy, not merely the dichotomous either-or that Plato sought to rationalize the
problem away. Although faltering at a crucial moment, Nietzsche’s dialectic does offer a
more productive path for phantasy’s appearance, if we are looking for it. But the looking
also involves a looking beyond—a looking into a different consciousness, where subjectobject dichotomies, momentarily, fall way. Nietzsche describes how:
The sculptor, as well as his brother, the epic poet, is committed to the pure
contemplation of images. The Dionysiac musician, himself imageless, is nothing
but original pain and reverberation of the image. Out of this mystical process of
un-selving, the poet’s spirit feels a whole world of image and similitudes arise,
which are quite different in hue, causality, and pace from the images of the
sculptor or narrative poet. (1956, p. 39)
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The difference between the narrative poet and the lyrical poet is that the narrative
poet maintains an awareness of the illusion of the poem (“his mirror of appearance
protects him from complete fusion with his characters”) while the lyrical poet loses this
awareness and “becomes his images” (p. 39). In the state of phantasy there is a certain
sense of losing oneself, a moving beyond oneself—an abandonment of the self to
phantastical powers that break the continuity of the self with any given identity, interest,
or social role. This suspension of subjectivity denotes the risk involved with phantasy as
it involves transformation of consciousness or the body. Plato too speaks of (and in fact
places value constraints on) those forms of poetry that he’s determined to censor. His
description mentions that “One kind of story-telling employs only imagination—tragedy
and comedy, as you say. Another kind employs only narration by the poet himself—you
find this most of all in dithyrambs. A third kind uses both—as in epic poetry” (Plato,
1992, p. 70). But again, for Plato this reduces down to poetry and philosophy in the
context of imitation. Plato is unwavering in his dismissal of poetry, going so far as to
claim “that all the tragic poets, whether they write in iambics or hexameters, are as
imitative as they could possibly be” and therefore “not to be taken seriously” (Plato, p.
273). Plato feared the corruption of the intellect that the poet could introduce through
his claims against reason:
An imitative poet isn’t by nature related to the part of the soul that rules [the
rational and quiet] character […] for he arouses, nourishes, and strengthens [the
irrational] part of the soul and so destroys the rational one […and] puts a bad
constitution in the soul of each individual by making images that are far removed
from the truth and by gratifying the irrational part. (Plato, p. 276).
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This will have further implications with Marcuse, since the instincts of pleasure are not
governed by rationality and instead will engage in the realm of irrationality. For
Nietzsche, however, this means a turn to the dithyrambic chorus, the creation of music or
poetry, which Socrates had admitted and even composed in Phaedrus. Although I did
review this quote in the pre-Socratic chapter, it is interesting to review Nietzsche’s
retelling of the quote with his own commentary throughout:
It appears that this despotic logician had from time to time a sense of void, loss,
unfulfilled duty with regard to art. In prison he told his friends how, on several
occasions, a voice had spoken to him in a dream, saying ‘Practice music,
Socrates!’ Almost to the end he remained confident that his philosophy
represented the highest art of the muses, and would not fully believe that a
divinity meant to remind him of ‘common, popular music.’ Yet in order to
unburden his conscience he finally agreed, in prison, to undertake that music
which hitherto he held in low esteem. In this frame of mind he composed a poem
on Apollo and rendered several Aesopian fables in verse. What prompted him to
these exercises was something very similar to that warning voice of his diamonion
[sic]: an Apollonian perception that, like a barbarian king, he had failed to
comprehend the nature of a divine effigy, and was in danger of offending his own
god through ignorance. These words heard by Socrates in his dream are the only
indication that he ever experienced any uneasiness about the limits of his logical
universe. He may have asked himself: ‘Have I been too ready to view what was
unintelligible to me as being devoid of meaning? Perhaps there is a realm of
wisdom, after all, from which the logical is excluded? Perhaps art must be seen as
the necessary compliment of rational discourse?’ (1954, p. 90)
What is interesting here is how long it says Socrates was able to ignore or defy the dream
instructing him to take up music…until the end, when he is about to meet death. Is it
phantasy, is it clearing his conscience? Either way, he turns to music for solace even
though he held it in such low regard for his entire life. Phantasy intrudes—it overwhelms
and forces its experience upon us, and its truth value is not always immediately available,
but the reality of the experience cannot be denied or easily forgotten. A Dionysiac
perception ruptures experience and rationality, and for that reason made Socrates

90

suspicious and dismissive, but returns as a possible source of truth against that very state
of rationality. The final section of this quote throws into question the very nature of the
hierarchy of knowledge Plato conceptualizes in the Republic. The hierarchy of Muses
mentioned in Phaedrus might shed some light on how the dialectic of philosophy and
poetry relies on the internal tension between the two (Jameson, 1971). In concluding a
story about the season of cicadas, Socrates finishes:
…after which they go and report to the Muses how they severally are paid honor
among mankind, and by whom. So for those whom they report as having honored
Terpsichore in the dance to win a Muse’s favor, for those that have worshipped in
the rites of love the favor of Erato, and worth all the other, according to the nature
of the worship paid to each. To the eldest, Calliope, and to her next sister, Urania,
they tell of those who live a life of philosophy and so do honor to the music of
those twain whose theme is the heavens and all the story of gods and men, and
whose song is the noblest of them all. (Phaedrus, 1961, pp. 504-505)
Traditionally, Calliope is associated with heroic poetry, which Nietzsche has
categorized as that of the dithyramb and the narrative poet. Plato avoids the dialectic of
pain and pleasure, Dionysian and Apollonian, and phantasy and imagination by
rationalizing “the notion of philosophy as the highest music” (Hackforth, 1972, p. 38).
By stating so, Plato puts philosophy above poetry, not next to it within a dialectical
tension, but in a position of power and authority. Nietzsche, however, shows how
dialectical tensions, even at the individual level, can return. For Nietzsche states the
exact opposite as Plato and values Calliope’s more humble offering of tragic poetry. He
announces to the reader, to those still living in the failed Apollonian take-over, that
another pathway can be found, if one can invite the dimension of phantasy to break
through: “I beg to inform of my conviction that art is the highest human task, the true
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metaphysical activity” (1956, p. 17). Nietzsche begins precisely with the moment of
Plato’s rejection of art (phantasy) but is still intrigued by Socrates’ doubts.

Apollo and Imagination

Nietzsche (1956) regards Doric art as “perpetual military encampment of the
Apollonian forces” (p. 35). Only an art so defiantly austere, so ringed about with
fortifications—an education so military and exacting—a polity so ruthlessly cruel—could
endure in a continual state of resistance against the titanic and barbaric menace of
Dionysos [sic]” (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 35). This is interesting because it implies an
ongoing and ever-present threat against the Apollonian imaginary from the Dionysian
source, phantasy. This will become more important as we move into Marcuse for we find
that this threat has all but been eradicated and has fled to the confines of the spaces of the
unconscious hidden from culture and reality. This Dionysiac source, for Nietzsche, was
recognized as “a triumph over subjectivity, deliverance from the self” (1956, p. 37). In
these moments beyond the Apollonian dream-state, the conscious individual is
temporarily lost, allowing another dimension of human awareness to force itself through.
Nietzsche elaborates further:
The artist had abrogated his subjectivity earlier, during the Dionysiac phase: the
image which now reveals to him his oneness with the heart of the world is a
dream scene showing forth vividly, together with original pain, the original
delight of illusion. (1956, p. 38)
This calls to mind not only the cultivated state of consciousness and the revelation of an
image so profound as to defy interpretation or articulation associated with the Eleusinian
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mysteries, but also the separation that Plato attempts to make by casting off the
experience of pain, and even more important, the simultaneous dialectic experience of
tragic pain and earthly pleasure. Within this dialectical space that sits beyond reason, the
initiates at Eleusis faced the very experience of a simulated death—the truth of human
mortality—and found hope, not despair; found celebration, not defeat; found the very
opposite of that which Plato argued would result from experience of pain and pleasure:
corruption. Without phantasy, we are lost in the Apollonian dream-world that sought to
soften the brutal truths and experiences brought on through phantasy—and without
phantasy to remind us otherwise, the Apollonian is sustained as the only reality, as a
projected realm of knowledge onto the nature of reality. Phantasy is the force that can
momentarily destroy the illusion of the Apollonian imaginary, and the only force that
balances dialectically with (and even gives deepened meaning to) the nature of
Apollonian myth. This dialectical tension prevents a harmonious balance or
equilibrium—the dynamic tension can only change and wrestle in a process of becoming,
which is inherently destabilizing. Perhaps this is the reason Nietzsche fails to sustain the
dialectic, because the equilibrium he seeks to achieve is not a static one but a dynamic
momentary suspension of the illusion that conceals the dialectic. Nietzsche sought to
move beyond the momentary suspension of the dialectic and instead tried to overturn it
altogether. When trying to trace back to the loss of the phantasy, Nietzsche’s eyes “come
to rest on the sublime and much lauded achievement of the dramatic dithyramb and Attic
tragedy” (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 36). Only here do we find the creations informed by

93

phantasy, in a dimension that is situated beyond individual subjectivity and therefore
seems to speak with a foreign/alien voice that is at the same time chaotic and profound.

Dionysus and Phantasy

In this moment beyond reason, beyond subjectivity, Nietzsche describes how:
Dionysiac excitation is capable of communicating to a whole multitude this
artistic power to feel itself surrounded by, and one with, a host of spirits. What
happens in the dramatic chorus is the primary dramatic phenomenon: projecting
oneself outside oneself and acting as though one had really entered another body,
another character. This constitutes the first step in the evolution of drama. This
art is no longer that of the rhapsodist, who does not merge with his images but,
like the painter, contemplates them as something outside of himself; what we
have here is the individual effacing himself through entering a strange being.
(Nietzsche, 1956, pp. 55-56)
Here Nietzsche seems to be elevating the experience of the painter and not
acknowledging the desubjectification of the rhapsodist that Plato is direly concerned with
and seeks to censor and depreciate. It seems from the progression of the dialectic that the
rhapsodes—at least as portrayed in ancient Greece culture and theater—were tragic and
epic poets who often would leave themselves as they sang through a Dionysiac chorus.
The focus of this quote is the description of the painter as “outside of himself” and
“effacing himself through entering a strange being” as similar to that of the Eleusinian
mysteries and the experience of phantasy for which I am searching. Moving from the
conscious awareness of our thought processes to the surrendering of the faculties and the
abandoning the body for the sake of the sensuous or the divine/daemonic is a hallmark of
phantasy. This is a space where Plato sought to control/suppress the appetites, and in
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doing so ensured the space of phantasy maintained as an equally safe distance. Dodds
recognizes that Dionysus is “the god who by very simple mean, or by means not so
simple, enables you for a short time to stop being yourself, and thereby sets you free”
(1951, p. 76). However, Dodds also problematizes the notion of phantastic possession.
He argues that the epic tradition represented the poet as deriving supernormal knowledge
from the Muses, but not falling into ecstasy or being possessed by them: “The notion of
the ‘frenzied’ poet composing in a state of ecstasy appears not to be traceable further
back than the fifth century” (Dodds, 1951, 82) For this reason, the concept of frenzied
creation may be misguided and may actually serve to strengthen and ally resistance to
phantasy. The shift in subjectivity is present in each of the conceptions of phantasy I
have thus far explored. Nietzsche illustrates as such:
Being the active center of that world he may boldly speak in the first person, only
his ‘I’ is not that of the actual waking man, but the ‘I’ dwelling, truly and
eternally, in the ground of being. It is through the reflections of that ‘I’ that the
lyrical poet beholds the ground of being. (1956, p. 39)
In this sense, and using this argument in the context of phantasy, the “I” of phantasy is a
transcendent “I” that is moved beyond the conscious Apollonian imaginary. Nietzsche
directly references Plato and how he also:
speaks of the creative power of the poet for the most part ironically and as being
on a level with the gifts of a soothsayer and interpreter of dreams, since according
to the traditional conceptions the poet is unable to write until reason and
conscious control have deserted him. (1956, p. 81).
Irony aside, the latter portion of Nietzsche’s comment does in fact seem to be a hallmark
of phantasy, that of losing conscious thought or even physical control to this dimension,
and only being able after returning to describe or record the experience. The words we
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seem to be using suggest a spatial change in some sense; whether it’s solely metaphorical
or possibly literal implies the concept of the eschatia and liminal relations between
nonhuman others. In addition to the spatial metaphors are the visual metaphors.
Plato already expounded on the concept of light as analogous to philosophic
understanding, but which I problematized by confirming a knowledge of poets that could
be equally illuminating. Nietzsche describes the experience of the poet’s abilities as
“nothing more nor less than the luminous afterimage which kind nature provides our eyes
after a look into the abyss” (1956, p. 61). This glimpse of something beyond conscious
comprehension is the offering of phantasy. But, as I will argue in the following chapter,
the contemporary intellect or psyche needs to, and already may, be in a position to
acknowledge allow for the full experience of phantasy.
There will be aspects of this psychic organization, such as memory, attention, and
metacognition, that will lend themselves to finding and familiarizing ourselves as
individuals and a culture/species with the experience of phantasy (Marcuse, 1955). The
dialectical experiences of tragedy—where pain and pleasure are united in the moment
beyond rational thought—are more at home in the truth of the deception. For Nietzsche,
“the delight created by tragic myth has the same origin as the delight dissonance in music
creates. That primal Dionysiac delight experienced even in the presence of pain, is the
source common to both music and tragic myth” (1956, p. 143). The experience is a
dialectical one precisely because of the opposites playing together in the moment. We
even see some of this dialectic emerging in Phaedo, where Socrates mentions the firm
relationship between pleasure and pain, but he does not quite reach the dialectic where

96

knowledge is obtained in the tension. He speaks instead about how the appetite for
pleasure will ultimately lead to more intense experiences of both pleasure and pain. This
understanding reinforces, for Plato, a model of self-control when it comes to all appetites,
even the philosophic must be balanced with the athletic/physical. Socrates remarks:
What a queer thing this pleasure, as they call it, seems to be, my friends! How
remarkable is its relation to what we regard as its opposite, pain! Think of it: they
won’t both come to us at the same time, but if we run after one of them and grasp
it, we are practically compelled to grasp the other too; they are like two creatures
attached to a single head. I fancy that if Aesop had thought of it, he would have
composed a fable telling how God wanted to put an end to their hostility, but
found he could not, and so fastened their heads together, with the result that
anybody who is visited by one of them finds the other following it up afterwards.
(Phaedo, 33)
In Socrates’ case one cannot experience pleasure and pain as experienced in tragic
drama or music. We also find that with The Republic the appetites were to be controlled
through a rigid education and in doing so this tension between pleasure and pain was to
be overcome entirely. The mind of the philosopher was to be above the pain- or
pleasure-inducing qualities of the body, and he should balance pleasures of the mind with
the cultivation of the body. The tension was to be managed with a delicate balance, a
harmony that strove to keep the phantastic element of the poetic from breaking through.
Plato reproduces the hostility against tragic poetry by trying to negate the tension rather
than accept it as inevitable.
So what exactly happens in this moment where the Apollonian/Dionysian
equilibrium is imbalanced and phantasy sneaks in, if only for a moment? Nietzsche’s
description of the Dionysiac experience of creating art gives us an insight into the nature
of the dialectical relationship of phantasy and imagination, Dionysus and Apollo: “Both
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[music and tragic myth] have their origin in a realm of art which lies beyond the
Apollonian; both shed their transfiguring light on a region in whose rapt dissonance and
the horror of existence fade away in enchantment” (1956, p. 145).

Phantasy, Tragedy, and Myth

Music and tragic myth, informed by and seeking to awaken in the spectators the
experience of phantasy, have the ability to enchant and give meaning to the Apollonian
dream world, the world of the gods depicted through myth. Without such, the illusory
nature of myth would be revealed, and the truth or horror beyond the deception would be
experienced. It is phantasy that first gives life to saving ourselves from an existential
reality. Meaning in this liminal space is both experienced and created in the dialectic
interplay and gives life to the stories we tell. Meaning of a phantastic nature is what
seems to propel stories to the level of myth; otherwise we know that they are just stories.
But thinking beyond Nietzsche, what happens when not only the stories lose truth, but
even truth itself loses its relevance? Then we may find the replacement with individual
truth and a strengthening of the individual subject where the forces of phantasy are kept
at bay by the complete lack of balance of phantasy and imagination; not only have the
Dionysian forces long gone dormant in some respects, but also the Apollonian veil grew
entirely too delicate and simply blew away in tatters against the onrush of the individual.
A rebirth of tragic myth would also mean first and foremost a reawakening of phantasy,
through the very force that kept it in check: subjectivity. We begin to see why the
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mysteries were so essential in the tragic world-view, because they were able to simulate a
death of the individual experience in order to glimpse the phantastic dimension beyond
rationale thought. It is even more remarkable that this was dome collectively for two
millennia. We find:
Every hope of the Eleusinian initiates pointed to a rebirth of Dionysius, which we
can now interpret as meaning the end of individuation; the thundering paean of
the adepts addressed itself to the coming of the third Dionysius. This hope alone
sheds a beam of joy on a ravaged and fragmented world—as is shown by the
myth of sorrowing Demeter, who rejoiced only when she was told she might once
again bear Dionysius. In these notions we already find all the component of a
profound mystic philosophy and, by the same token, of the mystery doctrine of
tragedy; a recognition that whatever exists is of a piece, and that individuation is
the root of all evil; a conception of art as the sanguine hope that the spell of
individuation may yet be broken, as an augury of eventual reintegration.
(Nietzsche, 1956, p. 67)
The experience gave the community hope in the dramatic participation of art as a
constant reminder that the dichotomy of self and other, of pain and pleasure, can be
reintegrated or reconceptualized in both productive and negative tensions, and the
knowledge of this comes directly from the experience of phantasy. However, it is in the
tension between phantasy and imagination that we find a productive aspect to both, for
lack of temperance might lead to the death of civilization. Dionysiac forces are equally
detrimental because they would lead to the eventual death of civilization and culture
itself. Apollonian forces, without the Dionysiac rupture, would eventually exhaust all
creativity, reappropriate other cultures’ creativity, and exhaust those too. The death
would be more symbolic of the end of the dream of reintegration. It would be driven by
a fleeting hope that continuously escapes us even as we try to grasp at shadows of longforgotten dreams of unconscious desires satisfied by false needs. Nietzsche saw the need
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for the tension and a moving between the two dimensions as necessary for the
sustainability of tragic myth. Imagination without phantasy will eventually “[entirely
destroy] the meaning of tragedy—which can be interpreted only as a concrete
manifestation of Dionysiac conditions, music made visible, an ecstatic dream world”
(Nietzsche, 1956, p. 89). The Apollonian is lost on civilization without the Dionysiac to
stir the unconscious occasionally:
Imagination is what breathes life into the phantastic visions, but without the
phantastic inspiration, the imagination replicates eternally, “let us consider
abstract man stripped of myth; a culture without any fixed and consecrated place
of origin, condemned to exhaust all possibilities and feed miserably and
parasitically on every culture under the sun. (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 137)
In The Republic Plato tried to design a city where the Apollonian had triumphed over the
Dionysian—a city where the lurid temptations of the chorus were controlled and held in
contrast to the esteemed philosophical knowledge. Nietzsche notes, “Socrates’ tragic art
failed to even ‘convey the truth,’ although it did address itself to those who were ‘a bit
backward,’ which is to say non-philosophers: a double reason for leaving it alone” (1956,
p. 86). But as we have seen, it is the type of truth a philosopher can access through
intellect or a daemon, and in doing so, he closes himself off from the nature of the
dialectic by firmly seating himself to one side of the dichotomy while rejecting the other.
If imagination needs phantastic supplement then so too does phantasy need
imagination. Without imagination, or the Apollonian imaginary, we are lost as to how to
regain the clarity of the original phantasy. The music or the drama is a memory of that
experience. The dialectic describes the relationship where
Apollo must incorporate that thin line which the dream image may not cross,
under penalty of becoming pathological, of imposing itself on us as crass reality: a
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discreet limitation, a freedom from all extravagant urges, the sapient tranquility of
the plastic god.” (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 21)
As we will see with Marcuse, the uninhibited lure of phantasy, the passion of Eros, is
lethal to the individual and civilization, and the Apollonian prevents this inevitable death
by reclaiming the truth of the Dionysian phantasy in the world of culture and civilization.
As we have seen the likely sterilization of creativity in the kallipolis, Nietzsche returns to
music and the type of music which would have absolutely been denied in The Republic
that can invite the Dionysian: “the lyrical poet must employ the whole register of
emotions, from the whisper of love to the roar of frenzy; moved by the urge to talk of
music in Apollonian similitudes” (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 45). But this contemplation of
images is still firmly rooted in the Apollonian, so it does acknowledge the importance of
the interplay of imagination and phantasy. As we have shown with The Republic, the use
of imagination, and our reinserting Plato’s use of imagination in his Line analogy,
illustrates the conceptual value of the imagination in articulating and understanding
abstract concepts, and whether they are arrived at through the controlled use of
philosophical reason or the chaotic outburst of poetic inspiration, the Apollonian
provides the “redemption through illusion” (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 78). Plato sought
redemption through reason, but doing so drastically imbalance the dialectic that he
investigates.
The dialectic is the space where Nietzsche’s insights are most helpful. Though it
must be said that as The Birth of Tragedy progresses, Nietzsche himself seems to more
and more embrace the Dionysian both in his writing and in his overall attention; he even
goes as far as to state, “Believe me in this Dionysiac life and in the rebirth of tragedy!
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Socratic man has run his course” (1956, p. 124). It is clear that Nietzsche’s embrace of
Dionysius and the casting off of Apollo is antagonistic to Plato’s removal of poetry and
music from the kallipolis, but unlike Plato, Nietzsche redeems himself repeatedly by
backtracking and declaring the importance of the Apollonian imaginary in the dialectical
tension. It must also be said that in spite of his own tendency toward the Dionysian, he
does add important components of the Apollonian imaginary along the way, even if these
are more in passing. It is almost against his own interpretation how Nietzsche fixates on
the Dionysian, even though he seems to be aware of the dangers of phantasy, without the
tension of imagination. Nietzsche asks, “What esthetic effect is produced when the
Apollonian and Dionysiac forces of art, usually separate, are made to work alongside
each other?” (1956, p. 98). The aesthetic effect is the chorus, the rhapsodic poet, and the
tragic drama. Within drama, “we may recognize a drastic stylistic opposition: language,
color, pace, dynamic of speech are polarized into the Dionysiac poetry of the chorus, on
the one hand, and the Apollonian dream world of the scene on the other” (Nietzsche,
1956, p. 58). The aesthetic exists in the dialectic tension of the Apollonian and the
Dionysian. In addition to drama we see how “the chorus is a living wall against the onset
of reality because it depicts reality more truthfully and more completely than does
civilized man, who ordinarily considers himself the only reality” (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 53).
The truth of the chorus and the poet sits beyond individual subjectivity, and therefore
beyond rational thought; for this reason, it touches a truth that supplants the hierarchy of
reason.
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In the dialectic experience of the tragic drama, the union of plastic arts and poetic
music, “archetypal man was cleansed of the illusion of culture and what revealed itself
was authentic man, the bearded satyr jubilantly greeting his god. Before him cultured
man dwindled to a false cartoon” (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 53). This is the nature of the more
truthful depiction of reality, one that places our own frailties and mortality before us as a
caricature, one that subtly makes us aware, as if were being brought in on a secret, of the
Apollonian as illusion, as if we begin to see the stitching on the veil that depicts the
dream made manifest. Nietzsche also suggests a fault line of imagination and phantasy
by speaking of archetype or authentic man and cultured man. This foreshadows some of
the language Marcuse will use as the dialectic is bound up in the cultured or civilized side
of the psyche. This description might prove useful as we are try to move beyond the
dichotomy of “cultured or authentic” and instead reclaim a culture that remembers and
revisits the authentic, one where phantasy undergoes a revaluation.
Nietzsche speaks of the dialectic of phantasy and imagination, of Dionysus and
Apollo as such:
Understanding kills action, for in order to act we require the veil of illusion; such
is Hamlet’s doctrine, not to be confounded with the cheap wisdom of John-aDreams, who through too much reflection, as it were a surplus of possibilities,
never arrives at action. What, both in the case of Hamlet and Dionysiac man,
overbalances any motive leading to action, is not reflection but understanding, the
apprehension of truth and its terror. Now no comfort any longer avails, desire
reaches beyond the transcendental world, beyond the god themselves, and
existence, together with its gulling reflection in the gods and an immortal Beyond,
is denied. The truth once seen, man is aware everywhere of the ghastly absurdity
of existence, comprehends the symbolism of Ophelia’s fate and the wisdom of the
wood sprite Silenus: nausea invades him.
Then, in this supreme jeopardy of the will, art, that sorceress expert in healing,
approaches him; only she can turn his fits of nausea into imaginations with which
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it is possible to live. These are on the one hand the spirit of the sublime, which
subjugates terror by means of art; on the other hand the comic spirit, which
releases us, through art, from the tedium of absurdity. The satyr chorus of the
dithyramb was the salvation of Greek art; the threatening paroxysms I have
mentioned were contained by the intermediary of those Dionysiac attendants.
(1956, pp. 51-52)
Art, the aesthetic impulse of imagination, tempers the overwhelming experience
of phantasy. But we also see here a balance that is reminiscent of how Plato sought to
train the body and the mind through a harmony of physical exercise and mathematical,
political, and philosophical training. However, we do see here the danger made obvious
with Marcuse that “only so much of the Dionysiac substratum of the universe may enter
an individual consciousness as can be dealt with by that Apollonian transfiguration; so
that these two prime agencies must develop in strict proportion” (Nietzsche, 1956, p.
145). This, in terms of this research, defines the nature of the dialectic of phantasy and
imagination. Imagination, the cultured side of intellect, makes phantasy intelligible,
without which, it is lost to a world of logical comprehension, and only can be observed in
the Dionysiac state, otherwise it is as Socrates describes as a poet as out of ones senses.
Too much phantasy is overwhelming and dangerous to the survival of the individual and
civilization. Marcuse introduces the possibility that the modern mind has features that do
many other things, but those features don’t necessarily make phantasy more accessible.
If the relationship that Nietzsche describes is achieved, the modern psyche may find the
space of phantasy more fertile. However, technology will have consequences in this
relationship, and the point of access will still be a crucial one for education.
Nietzsche recognizes the truth-value of phantasy and locates this value in tragic
myth. Which in order to “understand the tragic myth we must see it as Dionysiac
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wisdom made concrete through Apollonian artifice […] the world of appearance is
pushed to its limits, where it denies itself and seeks to escape back into the world of
primordial reality” (Nietzsche, 1956, 132). The veil is lifted at the moment it is
recognized for what it is, a shroud over reality, and wool over our eyes. Nietzsche adds:
The Dionysiac element, as against the Apollonian, proves itself to be the eternal
and original power of art, […] if we could imagine an incarnation of dissonance –
and what is man if not that? – that dissonance, in order to endure life, would need
a marvelous illusion to cover it with a veil of beauty. This is the proper artistic
intention of Apollo, in whose name are gathered together all those countless
illusions of fair semblance which at any moment make life worth living and whet
our appetite for the next moment. (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 145)
We see here a complete description of the complementary tension that could result in the
dialectic. The relevance of both phantasy and imagination to each other becomes more
dialectic in the making of meaning. This tension is sometimes difficult to locate in The
Birth of Tragedy but, when found, can serve to clarify dense passages that may be
difficult to interpret. We find one here:
We interpret music as the immediate language of the will, and our imaginations
are stimulated to embody that material world, which speaks to us with lively
motion and yet remains invisible. Image and concept, on the other hand, gain a
heightened significance under the influence of truly appropriate music. Dionysiac
art, then, affects the Apollonian talent in a twofold manner: first, music incites us
to a symbolic intuition of the Dionysiac universality; second, it endows that
symbolic image with supreme significance. From these facts, perfectly plausible
once we have pondered them well, we deduce that music is capable of giving
birth to myth, the most significant of similitudes; and above all, to the tragic
myth, which is a parable of Dionysiac knowledge. (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 101)
It is important here to recognize the way “image and concept”—the tools of the
philosophes, as exemplified in the structure and devices of the Republic—are made more
significant and meaningful through the exchange of phantasy, a productive aspect of
phantasy that Plato failed to recognize entirely, and he only half-heartedly atoned for his
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blatant dismissal in Phaedrus. In the final act of phantasy, which was lost on Plato since
art too was for the most part thoroughly censored, Apollo and Dionysus complement each
other’s dimensions and experience:
In the final effect of tragedy the Dionysiac element triumphs once again: its
closing sounds are such as were never heard in the Apollonian realm. The
Apollonian illusion reveals its identity as the veil thrown over Dionysiac
meanings for the duration of the play, and yet the illusion is so potent that at its
close the Apollonian drama is projected into a sphere where it begins to speak
with Dionysiac wisdom, thereby denying itself and its Apollonian concreteness.
The difficult relations between the two elements in tragedy may be symbolized by
a fraternal union between two deities: Dionysos [sic] speaks the language of
Apollo, but Apollo, finally, the language of Dionysos [sic]; thereby the highest
goal of tragedy and of art in general is reached. (Nietzsche, 1956, 131)
We see the movement (again, in a spatial analogy) beyond the Apollonian imagination
and into the irrational experience of Dionysian frenzy/phantasy, but it still firmly situated
in the Apollonian veil of myth. This dialectic uses the productive tension. The tension is
maintained with different social devices than those in ancient Greece: “All that is now
called culture, education, civilization will one day have to appear before the incorruptible
judge, Dionysos” (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 120).
Overall, Neitzsche presents us with a dialectical tension between imagination and
phantasy that is missing in Plato. He thus attempts to rekindle some of the pre-Socratic
mystery of phantasy. Yet at a crucial moment in his analysis, Neitzsche loses touch with
the delicate tension which he otherwise endorses, overly emphasizing the phantastical.
This is most apparent in Nietzsche’s interpretation of Raphael’s painting
“Transfiguration.” First, through his reading of Raphael’s final work, we find a clear
distinction between the form of phantasy and imagination and also a simultaneous
conflation of both. The possessed boy and other figures in the lower half represent the
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ecstatic Dionysian spirit while Christ emerging after his resurrection in the upper portion
represents the Apollonian imaginary. The figures in the lower half gesturing between the
possessed boy and the figure of Christ in heaven conflate the cultural forms of the ancient
and the modern and, in doing so, eliminate Dionysian phantasy by equating it with
Apollonian imagination. Second, it is in the moment of this interpretation of Raphael that
Nietzsche further rejects the Apollonian spirit from his analysis—in much the same way
Plato removed Pan from the Academy—and alternatively embraces the Dionysian
impulse, which we can observe as his work becomes increasingly frenzied. This
interpretation describes the reductionist point of view that conflates conceptions of
phantasy/illusion. Therefore Nietzsche, at a crucial moment, opts to discard the
dialectic, reverse the power dynamic, embraces phantasy, and discards the Apollonian.
Evident of this is Nietzsche’s insistence that phantasy, or the Dionysian experience of the
tragic poet, ought to reduce the subjectivity to:
“becoming wholly identified with the original Oneness, its pain and contradiction,
and producing a replica of that Oneness as music, if music may legitimately be
seen as a repetition of the world; however, this music becomes visible to him
again, as in a dream similitude, through the Apollonian dream influence”
(Nietzsche, 1956, p. 38).
The Apollonian reinterprets the experience of phantasy so that it may be revisited.
Without the original material of the phantasy, the content of the Apollonian will be less
than a dream-world and more of an illusion that cannot be escaped. The tragedy here is
that the dialectical synergy and tension is cut, leading Nietzsche toward an increasingly
phantastical point of view.
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This is precisely the point of view that I wish to avoid. Nietzsche, at least in his
earlier writings, reduces the dialectic and returns (in a similar fashion as Plato) to
dichotomous, hierarchical thinking. Although he does repent in Attempt at a SelfCriticism and recognizes his own rapturous embracing of tragedy, Nietzsche, at least in
Birth of Tragedy, destabilizes the dichotomy by identifying with phantasy (read:
Dionysus) over and against imagination (Apollo). Educationally, I seek to reclaim the
space of the dialectic, the space of productive tension, in order to avoid both the entropic
effects of imagination and the destructive forces of phantasy. I seek to eliminate the
hierarchy that has existed since Plato, and which Nietzsche attempted to turn on its head.
Marcuse will offer a way to reclaim the dialectic and the liminal space of the eschatia in
order to incite a rebirth of phantasy that will be used to guide my final analysis of
educational theory.
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Chapter 4: Marcuse

This chapter is primarily focused on the antagonistic relationship between the
reality principle and the pleasure-principle. This will introduce an argument for phantasy
as a force or impulse that could bring us back into a dialectical relationship with the
world and ourselves. It will also cover criticisms against Eros and Civilization,
specifically the ideas of optimism and repressive-sublimation, including Marcuse’s own
as he reflects on the limitations and false-promises of Eros and Civilization. It will end
with an articulated model of phantasy as a tool to rekindle the dialectic and inform
education in a new reality. Marcuse helps to return us to the dialectic between phantasy
and imagination that Plato and Nietzsche tried so desperately to overcome. The space of
the dialectic, with its dynamic tension, is in a way a liminal space itself since it contains
contradictory categories simultaneously. Marcuse provides a way for this tension to be
used productively in education and society. There is a distinction between current
“training” of the imagination for capitalist productivity (reproduction) in education versus
“inviting” phantasy for radical interruption. Inviting something means that you do not
necessarily have control over it, nor do you know what is likely to happen. Further,
invitation has a connotation of receptivity and passivity and entails an educational
hospitality toward phantasy.
I will proceed with two precautions. First—and this is inherent in Eros and
Civilization itself—the distinction Marcuse draws between imagination and phantasy.
There are times when a distinction is not always clear as Marcuse seems to use them
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interchangeably, and there are also times when both are used in the same sentence to
highlight diverging aspects of a shared impulse or instinct. Second, stemming from
Marcuse’s reflection after Eros and Civilization (chiefly in his later work of OneDimensional Man), there is an optimism that runs through Eros and Civilization that is
tempered with the disgust from repeated social failures leading to more sophisticated
forms of desublimation.
Marcuse himself recognized the possibly naive optimism of Eros and Civilization
when it was first published. The basic thesis—that hope lies in the fruits an industrial
society and the satisfaction of basic needs—might be utopian in the worst sense:
This optimism was based on the assumption that the rationale for the continued
acceptance of domination no longer prevailed, that scarcity and the need for toil
were only “artificially” perpetuated—in the interest of preserving the system of
domination. I neglected or minimized the fact that this “obsolescent” rationale
had been vastly strengthened (if not replaced) by even more efficient forms of
social control. (Marcuse, 1955, p. xi)
Here Marcuse begins to unravel the thread of repressive desublimation that he will trace
in One-Dimensional Man and critique further the degree to which civilization has
contained the dialectic impulses of pleasure and performance. Concerning imagination,
Marcuse warns that within the advancing technological society,
the ‘other dimension’ is absorbed into the prevailing state of affairs. The works
of alienation are themselves incorporated into this society and circulate as part
and parcel of the equipment which adorns and psychoanalyzes the prevailing state
of affairs. Thus they become commercials – they sell, comfort, or excite.
(Marcuse, 1964, p. 64).
Aesthetics and pleasure are manipulated to such an extent that a libidinal release of the
instincts is possible without posing a threat to the system or civilization. Phantasy could
be the only dimension able to remain rooted in the instincts, but, due to the very
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constraints that allowed for the instinctual release of energy in the first place, it remains
shielded from the realm of possibilities in the reality principle.

Marcuse and Education

In education, Marcuse is applied to a wide variety of projects, but few theorists
focus on imagination as it relates to education. Most theorists instead latch onto
Marcuse’s optimistic transformative or emancipatory theories, or his pessimistic critique
against advanced-industrial society (Bourassa, 2011). In this vein, philosophers outside
of education critique Marcuse’s notion of repressive desublimation in the context of
consumer culture (Bowring, 2012; Renaud, 2013; Huffer, 2012). In education,
Marcusian applications run the gamut from oppression through technology to the
transformative potential of imagination in the classroom focusing in the physical
classroom environment and the nurturing of a classroom community (Wakefield, 2001).
There is a significant amount of research that looks specifically at Marcuse’s ideas as
they might inform higher education, especially student protest groups and collective
resistance, but there is virtually nothing applying his radical ideas to children in the early
childhood or elementary education classroom (Brookfield, 2007; Cunningham, 2013;
James, 2006). An outlier here is David Kennedy’s work concerning the elementary
classroom as a site to reconstruct the relationship between children and adults in an effort
to establish space of a new reality principle (Kennedy, 2014). This is the type of work
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(and nontraditional use of Marcuse) I seek to carry out so that his ideas can reach a wider
audience in order to facilitate an education of phantasy and imagination.
Educational theorists interested in critical theory, emancipation, or imagination
have not addressed the importance of the distinction between phantasy and imagination in
Marcuse’s work. Such a gap in the research illustrates a fear that Marcuse himself was
aware of: that there was a focus on the pessimism in his work, particularly OneDimensional Man. In relation to this book, Marcuse argued, “I think the Freud book was
much better” (Marcuse, 2011, p. 229). Marcuse was wary of the role One-Dimensional
Man played in the cultures of resistance he sought to analyze, and he advocated reading
Eros and Civilization instead. Avoidance of Eros and Civilization is indicative of a trend
in educational research that avoids the murky space of not only distinguishing between
phantasy and imagination, but also devising educational, social, and political programs in
its image.

Phantasy and Freud

In order to better understand the concept of phantasy in his work and why this is
important for education, an analysis of Marcuse’s main argument in Eros and Civilization
is in order. My analysis will look for moments when the dialectic is emerging and we are
able see the hope of phantasy through the cracks of repressed desires. It is in these cracks
that we find not only phantasy but also the tools to coax it out of hiding. Building on
Freud, Marcuse traces two movements in the history of man concerning the control of
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pleasure. The first, and that which is simultaneously the source of all artistic, social,
political creations, is instinctual pleasure. Marcuse reminds us that Freud understood that
“the history of man [the history of civilization] is the history of his repression” (Marcuse,
1955, p. 11). This initial repression Marcuse calls repressive sublimation of instinctual
pleasure, and it is important to note the productive capability of this form of repression.
As we saw earlier in chapters 2 and 3, Western civilization’s movement sought the
conditioning of thought and action through censorship (Plato) while Nietzsche argued
that we had severed the Apollonian and the Dionysian so completely that the dialectic no
longer held any power or mystery over human life. Repressive sublimation created a
dimension beyond the instincts that complemented and empowered the Dionysian
impulse with what I have called the Apollonian spirit. However, as we have seen
repeatedly, this dimension severed from phantasy cripples itself, and even more so when
parts of the pleasure instincts become desublimated. Marcuse infers that “If absence from
repression is the archetype of freedom, then civilization is the struggle against this
freedom” (1955, p. 15). This freedom was nearly lost after the death of tragic poetry—in
a literal sense because we can no longer inhabit that mythical landscape of the eschatia.
As we will see later in this chapter, Marcuse’s notion of phantasy may be a way
backwards into that landscape, a nonrepressive sublimation; an imagination freed from
the stronghold of economic forces and allowed to freely seek pleasure in sublimated
forms. Before we get into that, however, we need also to understand repressive
desublimation, because this makes it increasingly difficult to locate phantasy within the

113

pleasure since the pleasures have been reintroduced within the framework of the reality
principle as a tool of reinforcement rather than one of revolt.
Within the concept of repressive desublimation, there is first a concentration of
the reality principle within the context of aggressiveness and pleasure within and across
human relationships, both at the individual and societal levels. The reality principle can
be understood as the Apollonian imaginary. It is the civilized world that is overlaid onto
the natural world with its expectations, beliefs, and assumptions present and fully intact.
This more specific and distilled reality principle Marcuse calls the performanceprinciple, and it is representative of a shift in power from sovereign power (as Foucault
would call it) to disciplinary and finally biopower, with the underlying pretext that it is
“organized by the competitive economic performances of its members” (Marcuse, 1955,
p. 44). This movement of civilization through stages of repressive sublimation and into
repressive desublimation was, in some way, more clearly articulated in One-Dimensional
Man. However, where Eros can be said to have a rampant optimism for the future, that
future is far more bleak and distant in One-Dimensional Man, where a thread of
pessimism taints everything, with a similar taste as Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, at
least on this reading. The one-dimensionalizing effect of contemporary, advanced
industrial/technological cultures leaves even fewer and narrower interstices for which
phantasy may creep back through.
The process of desublimation takes the form (at least in the context of art and
aesthetics) of imagination and phantasy, and additionally sexuality. We find that
imagination is opened at the level of the instincts but still conceptualized, and therefore
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limited, at the level of consciousness and subjectivity. Through desublimation,
imagination is released for economic/entertainment purposes, while phantasy, seemingly
impervious, remains firmly rooted in the unconscious. In One-Dimensional Man
Marcuse makes this clear:
The traditional images of artistic alienation are indeed romantic in as much as
they are in aesthetic incompatibility with the developing society. This
incompatibility is the token of their truth. What they recall and preserve in
memory pertains to the future: images of a gratification which would dissolve the
society that suppresses it. (1964, p. 60)
The original function of art was to bring about an awareness (if only a momentary one) of
the dialectic—of the contradiction between the reality principle we simultaneously
inhabit and recreate and the pleasure-principle which we dutifully delay in order for more
fulfilling gratification later—and of the antagonistic relationship that left us to have with
our own self. The incompatibility of tragic poetry seen in the previous chapter was what
gives it its transcendental quality. Without such a tension, and when a perceived
harmony is achieved, the Apollonian prevails and then too dies. However, in this last
movement, rather than a death, Nietzsche too foresaw the commercial aspect of the
Apollonian industrial society that had lost it instinctual connection with the Dionysian.
In this state, culture is left to exhaust its symbols and memes until it must cannibalize
other cultural symbols for the purpose of a shadow of Apollonian art turned commodity.
Because of this, perhaps as a direct consequence and realization of the inevitability of
cultural entropy, there is a desublimation of imagination. This is the moment of
desublimation, when art itself can be released. Art loses the Dionysian, and in so,
becomes a shadow:
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Artistic alienation is sublimation. It creates the images of conditions which are
irreconcilable with the established Reality Principle but which, as cultural images
become tolerable, even edifying and useful. Now this imagery is invalidated. Its
incorporation into the kitchen, the office, the shop; its commercial release for
business and fun is, in a sense, desublimation – replacing mediated by immediate
gratification. (Marcuse, 1964, p. 72)
Art is appropriated for the commercial; aesthetics is redefined as advertisement. This
release of the censorship Plato described allows for art to flourish, but it is art that seems
incapable of becoming art, at least in the tragic sense. But the dialectic returns in the
understanding that the sublimated forms of art and aesthetics have given way to the
desublimated forms of the commodity. Desublimation is a betrayal of the promises of
sublimation; it “has also betrayed the hope and destroyed the truth which were preserved
in the sublimations of higher culture” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 56)—a hope that had been close
to destruction since, as Nietzsche has illustrated, the time when Dionysian tragedy was
first subverted. We find that desublimation, more thoroughly than ever, strengthens the
reality principle as in fact the only or actual reality. And in doing so, “the reality
principle ‘safeguards’ rather than ‘dethrones,’ ‘modifies’ rather than denies, the pleasure
principle” (Marcuse, 1955, p. 12). Only in the space of the tension, in the frustration of
the dialectic, will phantasy have any effect.
This is the inevitable result of repressive desublimation: It fails to produce a
pleasure not already rooted back into the established reality principle. But this
desublimation, similar to the liberation of sexuality, remains a repressive desublimation
because of its narrow means that do not serve to subvert power relationships, but to
reinforce them through the need for technological, scientific, and media innovation and
invention (Renaud, 2013). The imagination is wrought into a caricature of itself by the
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powers that seek to exploit its potential. The imagination is bound by precisely managed
charges and even more direct goals, which prevent the dialectic tension central to creating
art. In education, and STEM programs specifically, imagination is charged with
increasing student innovation, invention, and creativity, but no policy ever mentions that
imagination can be used to envision alternative realities.
In the next section, I will cover the antagonistic side of this relationship, that of
the pleasure-principle and the domain of phantasy and freedom. It will be in this section
where I begin to identify and fully appreciate the educational implications of Marcuse’s
theory. I will distill four characteristics of the nature of phantasy that educational theory
must account for in sympathetic treatments of phantasy in theory and practice.

Phantasy, Instincts, and Consciousness

By exploring certain counter-arguments that have been waged against Marcuse
around the issue of repressive desublimation, we find a Freudian reflection of the
relationship of the instincts to consciousness. Foucault in particular makes a sweeping
critique against such forms of analysis as too simplistic because they reduce power
relationships to a purely negative form and do not take into account the productive
aspects of power (Foucault, 1978). Upon closer inspection of his counter-arguments,
Foucault may have been too sweeping in his lumping of all of the Frankfurt School or
critical theory together, and in fact not recognizing the productive aspects of power in
Marcuse’s work (Foucault, 1978; Guilbert, 2002; Marcuse, 1964; Renaud, 2013).
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Marcuse himself is relevant here because of his development of thought between Eros
and One-Dimensional. In fact, Foucault’s arguments in History of Sexuality, Volume 1,
and the loosening of sexual pleasure beyond mere reproductive function share a great
deal of similarity with Marcuse’s notion of repressive desublimation, where freedom is
granted (in certain contexts) and power is evenly distributed—but for Marcuse, however,
it still tightly bound within economic frameworks. Marcuse’s argument about the
perpetuation of scarcity, even if illusory, helps to pinpoint the difference between himself
and Foucault, and why economic domination cannot be understood as freedom within the
context of the pleasure-principle because it is a pleasure for the reality principle, not
beyond it. To get beyond would be located in a space of pleasures of the body that
Foucault advocates beyond sexuality (Foucault, 1978, p. 114). In fact, with a framework
of repressive desublimation, Marcuse argues that control is exerted at the level of
consciousness and no longer needs to operate at the level of instinctual pleasure. This is
an essential feature of phantasy and one of the criteria I will explore in the next chapter.
Once we move out of instinctual pleasure, we move out of the domain of
phantasy. This management of consciousness offers different forms of pleasure, and in
an analogous way, imagination is suffering a parallel fate—one where it is removed from
instinctual pleasure, and the ability to present the dialectic, to conscious pleasure, which
is determined by economic principles and undermines the dialectic by rejecting its
possibility. Educationally, this is important in terms of identifying the productive
pedagogical tension between consciousness and instincts. This helps to guide this
research. Since imagination is no longer a sublimated source of artistic creation, but a
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desublimated source of anesthetic reproduction, we cannot find our way back into
phantasy solely through consciousness. Richard Kearny’s work on the postmodern
imagination mentions that “we no longer appear to know who exactly produces or
controls the images which condition our consciousness” (Kearny, 1988, p. 3). This is
problematic because the forces at work are not transparent. We need to reclaim the
dialectical space of the eschatia working backward to the instinctual aesthetic pleasure
where we might find phantasy, as opposed to the imaginative forces of consciousness.

The Slow Spread of Phantasy

Phantasy dwells within the (liminal) space of the pleasure-principle, and it is here
where we seem to shed the confines of a singular reality principle. Phantasy has the
potential to define new forms of production and performance, without which:
where repressive sublimation prevails and determines the culture, non-repressive
sublimation must manifest itself in contradiction to the entire sphere of social
usefulness; viewed from this sphere, it is the negation of all accepted productivity
and performance. (Marcuse, 1955, p. 208)

It lays bare those accepted rituals of the performance-principle. However, it is not an
explosive revolutionary moment; it is instead a directed action against the accepted
constraints of productivity and performance:
It is a spread rather than an explosion of libido—a spread over private and societal
relations which bridges the gap maintained between them by a repressive reality
principle. […] The free development of transformed libido beyond the institutions
of the performance principle differs essentially from the release of constrained
sexuality within the dominion of these institutions” (Marcuse, 1955, p. 202).
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This spread may also explain the slow release of imagination as it relates to creating our
utopia in our daily lives and societal relations. It will also explain the instrumentality of
the education model embedding imagination into the curriculum in accordance to the
performance principle, working within consumer/producer, national competitiveness, and
meritocratic societal structures. Working beyond such models would necessarily entail a
working against their domination and unsustainability as the driving force of civilization.
It is a spread because it happens at the level of the instincts and not consciousness.

Playing With and In Phantasy

For education, it is important to understand how teachers can access the instincts.
It may be through an aesthetic approach to teaching and learning that phantasy can once
again become part of education and society. The “aesthetic value, the non-conceptual
truth of the senses is sanctioned, and freedom from the reality principle is granted to the
‘free play’ of creative imagination” (Marcuse, 1955, p. 185). This free play is an
interesting concept that Marcuse luckily elaborates on to some degree, and will be highly
informative for education. He argues:
The play impulse is the vehicle of this liberation. The impulse does not aim at
playing ‘with’ something; rather it is the play of life itself, beyond want of
external compulsion—the manifestation of and existence without fear and
anxiety, and thus the manifestation of freedom itself. […] Freedom is thus, in a
strict sense, freedom from the established reality: man is free when the ‘reality
loses its seriousness. (1955, p. 187)
This citation clearly situates phantasy within the context of the Eleusinian mysteries and
epic tragedy. From the above we can see how, on the one hand, playing with would
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denote a subject-object relation, a reinforcing of ego/subject and thus repression of
pleasurable fulfillment precisely because this boundary of subjectivity is never broached
or dissolved. On the other hand, playing in would denote a partnership, perhaps an erotic
partnership, which can go beyond subject-object and fulfill pleasure at the instinctual
level. There is a great deal of literature concerning play, but within it, we would be
looking for a very specific type of play, where, the subject is suspended in the moment of
a phantastic event, happening, or specific experience.
Phantasy and reality must enter into a partnership in the human psyche so that we
can recreate the experience of freedom and happiness we experience in our dreams—or
are our dreams too already thoroughly colonized and commercialized? Perhaps not:
Beyond its domain [the performance-principle], productivity has another content
and another relation to the pleasure principle: they are anticipated in the processes
of imagination which preserve freedom from the performance principle while
maintaining the claim of a new reality principle. (Marcuse, 1955, p. 156)
This quote is indicative of the optimism of Eros. One-Dimensional Man, on the other
hand, points out that freedom in a desublimated form could return, but I would argue it is
only a perceived freedom, in the same way that the reality principle is a perceived reality.
But imagination, in the context of instinctual pleasure, is, in the way I have understood
Marcuse and am using these terms, phantasy. The instincts denote a tension beyond
consciousness.
Marcuse was aware of this tension and does admit that “the fate of human
freedom and happiness is fought out and decided in the struggle of the instincts—literally
a struggle of life and death—in which soma and psyche, nature and civilization
participate” (1955, p. 21). The fact that he uses the term “participate” is telling, as it
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signifies an elegant relationship that is not based on the current performance-principle
which overwhelms subjective freedom and establishes as a key feature the use of
domination at all levels. Instead, Marcuse’s use of the term “participate” indicates (in a
very indirect but important way) a relationship built on democratic practices and mutual
trust—a partnership, suggesting a balance of antagonisms, not an either-or, reality or
pleasure, but beyond and together, without the perversion of performance. Through such
participation, we reclaim the dimension of instinctual pleasure.

Finding Productive Tension in Creativity and Receptivity

One final thought before moving on, and here I try to define more precisely what
phantasy is, how it is distinct from imagination, and how the participation with each and
between dimensions will be useful in education. I begin by drawing our attention to a
passage from Eros and Civilization that offers many insights into what I am talking
about. Marcuse tells us regarding phantasy that “the basic experience in this dimension is
sensuous rather than conceptual; the aesthetic perception is essentially intuition, not
notion. The nature of sensuousness is ‘receptivity,’ cognition through being affected by
given objects (1955, p. 176). The first two ideas tell us that the experience of phantasy
will touch the senses and thus be sensual, as opposed to conceptual and purely thoughtbased. The experience will be understood intuitively rather than through logic and
reason. The final sentence—and the one I find incredibly intriguing for our purposes—
also emphasizes receptivity. This description seems much more at home in the language
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of the Eleusinian mysteries or that of tragic poetry that Nietzsche traces, rather than in the
contemporary world of imagination, which emphasizes conscious intentionality and
willful creativity to produce a reality that reflects back to us our concerns and interests.
The nature of phantasy also has its own knowledge system:
As a fundamental, independent mental process, phantasy has a truth value of its
own, which corresponds to an experience of its own—namely, the surmounting of
the antagonistic human reality. Imagination envisions the reconciliation of the
individual with the whole, of desire with realization, of happiness with reason.
While this harmony has been removed into utopia by the established reality
principle, phantasy insists that it must and can become real, that behind the
illusion lies knowledge. The truths of imagination are first realized when
phantasy itself takes form, when it creates a universe of perception and
comprehension—a subjective and at the same time objective universe. This
occurs in art. (Marcuse, 1955, pp. 143-144)
Above, we find some of the ambiguity Marcuse employs in Eros and which I will have to
clarify. Phantasy, when held distinctly from imagination, seems to describe a singular
experience, while imagination is described more as a process. The distinction between
creativity and receptivity may help to explain this further, providing we accept that
phantasy denotes receptivity and imagination denotes creativity. I fixate on this concept
of receptivity because it stands in such clear opposition to creativity and the language of
21st century skills. Creativity is the force in the reality principle; it is partnered with
imagination in an instrumental sense in that it affects objective reality. Receptivity is the
force of the pleasure-principle, is in the sensual domain of phantasy, and is affective in
subjective reality.
The language of imagination, and most of education for that matter, is that of
production; productivity, above all others, comes to define “the existential attitude of
industrial civilization; it permeates the philosophical definition of the subject in terms of
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the ever transcending ego. Man is evaluated according to his ability to make, augment,
and improve socially useful things” (Marcuse, 1955, p. 155). This ability to invent,
innovate, and reconceptualize in the name of the established reality principle is at the
heart of most STEM and 21st century skills discourses, with direct references to
employment, international competitiveness in the global market place, next generation
labor markets, etc. And by extension, the hyper-rationalism of the bureaucratized testing
system becomes increasingly irrational and inefficient. Similarly, this “education for
consent to death introduces an element of surrender into life from the beginning—
surrender and submission. It stifles ‘utopian efforts’” (Marcuse, 1955, p. 236). And
education plays an essential part of this veiling of the dialectic. Educational processes
reduce the antagonism and thus subvert the longing of instinctual pleasure. Marcuse
brings this in focus in the qualities that mask phantasy:
Consciousness, increasingly less burdened by autonomy, tends to be reduced to
the task of regulating the co-ordination of the individual with the whole. […] The
individual does not really know what is going on; the overpowering machine of
education and entertainment unites him with all the others in a state of anesthesia
from which all detrimental ideas tend to be excluded. (Marcuse, 1955, p. 103)
Education plays its role in immunizing the instincts against pleasures by closing down the
space of phantasy and promoting vain attempts at narrow access points for imagination,
aimed at future exploitation in the market place.
Marcuse is not entirely silent on these matters and offers other ideas, beyond play,
that could be useful in informing education. In its least sublimated forms,
the opposition of phantasy to the reality principle is more at home in such sub-real
and surreal processes as dreaming, daydreaming, play, the ‘stream of
consciousness.’ In its most extreme claim for a gratification beyond the reality
principle, phantasy cancels the established principium individuationis itself. Here
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perhaps are the roots of phantasy’s commitment to the primary Eros: sexuality is
‘the only function of a living organism which extends beyond the individual and
secures its connection with its species.’ (Marcuse, 1955, pp. 145-146)

Dreaming, daydreaming, play, stream-of-consciousness, and tragic poetry all evoke the
erotic dimension of the pleasure instinct, and might be part of a pedagogical landscape in
which the eschatia can be reclaimed and a new exopedagogy ignited. Because phantasy
is incapable of being shoehorned into the reality principle, hospitality toward phantasy
will become increasingly important as an educational issue. The final chapter will
explore educational ideas both on the practical side and the mythical side so as to
illustrate the importance and usefulness of phantasy for transformative pedagogical
practice. The next chapter explores primary theorists in imagination and education, arts
and education, arts and society, and creativity and education. I will use the theory of
phantasy and imagination developed here in order to recognize and articulate spaces in
which phantastical imagination might be found in a wide variety of educational theories.
These then can act as launching pads for a new pedagogy that does not merely make
imagination into the midwife of capitalist production.
To conclude, I have offered four main ideas that will be useful in identifying
overlapping theories and practices found in educational literature. First, that receptivity,
not creativity, is the experiential state of phantasy. This can be traced back to Chapter 1,
but can also be seen as the force that Plato sought to censor and the impulse that
Nietzsche readily embraced. Second, educational programs and practices must not
neglect the roles of the instincts in the space of phantasy and its dialectical role with
imagination and consciousness. The instincts factor into the mythical dimension of
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phantasy and will be explored in the final chapter. Third, the change will not be a
singular, explosive moment, at least not in the collective sense of rekindling a cultural
affinity with the pleasure-principle and phantasy, but a wide dispersal of new reality
principles, with an acceptance in a multitude of alternative reality principles. If Marcuse
once emphasized the great refusal, here we must think of great refusals in the plural as
multiple sites where phantastical events can occur. Lastly, the spread of phantasy and
instinctual pleasure will begin and disseminate through a playing with and playing in
forms of freedom and pleasure, aesthetics and phantasy. Play can be traced throughout
the previous research but will see it contextualized in education in the next chapter.
These concepts can provide navigational points in the educational theorist I will explore
in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5: The Return of Phantasy in Education

At the end of the previous chapter, I pinpointed four main ideas that will be useful
in identifying overlapping theories and practices found in educational literature. The first
is situated in the space of the dialectic between receptivity and creativity specifically, and
phantasy and imagination more broadly. This is the space of what I am calling
phantastical-imagination as a dialectical tension. The second concerns the connections
of instincts/pleasure/aesthetics to phantasy and of consciousness/reason/subjectivity to
imagination, and how access to these respective dimensions can inform educational
programs and practices. The third details how such a move back into phantasy will not
be an explosive, global paradigm shift that takes place over a short period of time, but
will instead be a slow revolution that seeps into the unconscious and spreads into culture,
consciousness, and understanding and with it will be new (and a variety of) reality
principles. The fourth and final criteria—and one that is a rich place to begin future
educational projects—is that phantasy will be extended through a playing with and
playing in forms of freedom and pleasure, aesthetics and receptivity. There is an
immense body of literature in philosophy, psychology, and education concerning play.
The literature on play that lends itself most readily to phantasy will be explored, but there
is still much work that needs to be done here (Kritchevsky & Prescott, 1977; Linn, 2008;
Rodari, 1973). This concluding chapter hopes to begin this process by focusing on the
nexus between play, education, and phantastical imagination.
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The analysis that follows covers several of the most prolific educational theorists
in the field of education who have commented on and published a body of work
revolving around the concept of imagination. Other individual theorists were left off this
list so as to isolate this analysis to:


an historical but immensely relevant example (John Dewey);



a transitional figure that builds heavily on Dewey and pushes the dimension
further into ethics with the exposure to works of art (Maxine Greene);



another theorist whose work on imagination in education ranges from both the
deeply theoretical and analytical to the educationally practical (Kieran Egan); and



a figure that is situated somewhat within the economically motivated reasons for
including imagination and creativity in education (Ken Robinson).
This analysis is by no means comprehensive, nor is it meant to be, but is instead

indicative of the evolution of education and imagination in this country. It also follows a
similar trajectory of the dialectic where tension exists between theorists and how they are
conceptualizing, or making/leaving space for, phantasy, even if it is not articulated as
such.
Aside from the four identified criteria above, we should also be on the lookout for
references to poetry as well as myth. Poetry is directly responsible for carrying the
phantastic beyond the reality principle (Nietzsche), while myth is employed to understand
the dialectic and rekindle the (erotic) mystery that could be a path back to phantasy
(Marcuse). I will limit my concern to elementary education. This is in part practical,
since much of my current work is situated in elementary educational settings. But there
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is also the hypothesis that children are not as fully implicated in the performanceprinciple and thus given over to phantasy more readily than young adults or teenagers.

John Dewey
John Dewey’s work Art as Experience is an important point of reference within
educational literature on the topic of the imagination. In this short analysis, I will explore
specific passages from this work in order to compare and contrast his analysis with the
criteria I have developed throughout my own dialectical analysis of phantasticimagination. The parallels that exist between Dewey’s body of work and phantasy will
help to find ways phantasy can be included in the education of the imagination.
Concerning the first category of the dialectic of receptivity and creativity, Dewey
is situated more in the latter. However, he is deeply aware of the qualities of receptivity
in imagination and their origins in ancient Greek poetry and theater. Dewey explains:
More perhaps than any other phase of the human contribution, [imagination] has
been treated as a special and self-contained faculty, differing from others in
possession of mysterious potencies. […] It is a way of seeing and feeling things as
they compose an integral whole. […] When the new is created, the far and strange
become the most natural inevitable things in the world. There is always some
measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, and this adventure is,
in its measure, imagination. (1934, p. 278)
This primarily reinforces creativity, as indicated by the use of the faculty of imagination
to create the new, but it is guided by a receptive way of seeing and feeling. Furthermore,
it can be understood that exposure and engagement with this process of creation brings
closer the possibilities of exploring strange, alternative reality principles. Even though
there will be limits to how individuals or cultures accept the new, creativity may be a
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stepping stone or at least get us turned in the right direction. However, direct experience
of the tension that is embodied in creativity, and the creation of a work of art, is more
promising than mere exposure to works of art. The artist is in a unique position in the
relationship between the object and the message, but the spectator can also see the
tension between the object and the sensually communicated message. We find:
Possibilities are embodied in works of art that are not elsewhere actualized; this
embodiment is the best evidence that can be found of the true nature of
imagination. There is a conflict artists themselves undergo that is instructive as to
the nature of imaginative experience. The conflict has been set forth in many
ways. One way of stating it concerns the opposition between inner and outer
vision. There is a stage in which the inner vision seems much richer and finer
than any outer manifestations. It has a vast and enticing aura of implications that
are lacking in the object of external vision. It seems to grasp much more than the
latter conveys. Then there comes a reaction; the matter of the inner vision seems
wraith-like compared with the solidity and energy of the presented scene. The
object is felt to say something succinctly and forcibly that the inner vision reports
vaguely, in diffuse feeling rather than organically. (Dewey, 1934, p. 279)
The above passage introduces another dialectical tension. Whereas initially the inner
experience is much richer and deeper in meaning than the static object, their relationship
undergoes a reversal of sorts where the object itself more clearly communicates
something that otherwise would have been left unintelligible. This tension is situated
between the art object and the phantastic/sensual experience it is attempting to capture or
invoke (communicate).
This is the same tension that Plato sought to excise from art objects through
censorship, of which Dewey was deeply aware and concerned with the consequences that
would result. Dewey comments on Athens specifically:
We regard [Athens] as the home par excellence of epic and lyric poetry, of the
arts of drama, architecture and sculpture, [and] the idea of art for art’s sake would
not, as I have already remarked, have been understood. Plato’s harshness toward
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Homer and Hesiod seems strained. Plato’s demand of censorship of poetry and
music is a tribute to the social and even political influence exercised by those arts.
(1934, p. 341)
Dewey seeks, in a manner not nearly as radical as Nietzsche, to rekindle this space by
decensoring works of art and encouraging exposure to them, recognizing the political
advantages for democracy. Dewey takes an approach opposite to Plato’s. Whereas Plato
thought the influence of poetry was ill-informed, misguided, and downright dangerous to
political reason, Dewey positions art as integral to human understanding and highly
relevant to a healthy democratic society. Similar to Nietzsche, Dewey argued that this
shift away from poetry resulted in the creation of “[theories] about art and the cultivation
of grammar and rhetoric took the place of creation” (1934, p. 342). Art became an object
of analysis rather than a part of human experience, a dimension that in the ancient world,
carried a significant sensual quality. Prior to this break art, understood in the ancient
Grecian sense, art “manifests the idea of separation, of disharmony, of man and nature”
(Dewey, 1934, p. 346). After the break away from phantasy, away from myth, away
from the process of creation (in the context of the ancient world I have described), art no
longer invokes such tension. Instead, art masks it because art is unaware of and denies
such tension to begin with. Dewey’s final words redeem art from the shadows and
declare the importance of its truth-value. He discusses not only the receptive qualities
that go into creating a work of art, but also the receptive qualities in experiencing a work
of art. Turning his back fully on Plato, Dewey declares that “[art] is a mode of prediction
not found in charts and statistics, and it insinuates possibilities of human relations not to
be found in rule and precept, admonition and administration” (1934, p. 363). It
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introduces ideas containing the possibility of the new that the world of intellect would not
have conceived let alone thought possible.
There is not much that Dewey has directly to say about the instincts. From the
above citations we can ascertain some of his ideas concerning consciousness and
imagination. But concerning instinct and phantasy, I have to delve into his ideas and
think them through with the language of phantasy I have been articulating. The most
interesting space where we find an analogue to instincts and phantasy is in Dewey’s
concept of intuition, which builds on Kant’s concept of intuition and imagination.
Dewey defines it as such:
‘Intuition’ is that meeting of the old and new in which the readjustment involved
in every form of consciousness is effected suddenly by means of a quick and
unexpected harmony which in its bright abruptness is like a flash of revelation;
although in fact it is prepared for by long and slow incubation. Oftentimes the
union of old and new, of foreground and background, is accomplished only by
effort, prolonged perhaps to the point of pain. In any case, the background of
organized meanings can alone convert the new situation from the obscure into
clear and luminous. When old and new jump together, like sparks when the poles
are adjusted, there is intuition. This latter is thus neither an act of pure intellect in
apprehending rational truth nor a Crocean grasp by spirit of its own images and
states. (1934, p. 277)
There are several interesting ideas packed into this passage. The first is that intuition
resides in the space of dialectical tension; it works between opposites, in the polarity of
entrenched and perceived dichotomies. Learning more and more about the background
of such dualisms in all their subtle incarnations, can provide momentary glimpses where
a harmony of sorts if achieved. This harmony or dialectic sublation temporally alleviates
the tension, or makes it a productive tension, and is achieved not through a guided
intellectual or philosophical methodology, nor a divine intervention or daemonic
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possession, but through a dialectical movement. In this way Dewey distances himself
from Nietzsche and Plato. He is not willing to release subjectivity entirely, but he is
unwillingly also to keep such a possibility from happening. His balancing is helpful for
our purposes because we, too, seek to avoid the complete implosion of subjectivity that
results in a Dionysian abandonment of creativity within civilization. But whereas Dewey
sees this sublation as a momentary balancing, I would argue it is instead a maximally
productive tension. It is not about balancing the forces themselves, but rather the
complementary nature of both of these spaces and spending time in both of them. Lastly,
from the above, we can see that Dewey is in some way implying an unconscious process
to fleetingly comprehend the dialectic, and in this way, although maybe closer to Plato,
leans toward phantasy. Intuition, for Dewey, touches the instincts or at least mingles in
the eschatia between phantasy and imagination.
There is a significant amount of secondary literature on Dewey’s moral
imagination, and a great deal with the arts and aesthetic education, but very little about
phantasy. From what I have gathered from Art as Experience, I have found some
instances where art is used as an invocation of alternative possibilities and new reality
principles. For Dewey, “It is a matter of communication and participation in values of
life by means of imagination, and works of art are the most intimate and energetic means
of aiding individuals to share in the arts of living” (1934, p. 350). This also indicates the
situatedness of the dialectic in art and how such exposure brings one closer to intuition
and, as I have argued, phantasy. This situatedness is important for Dewey, and for the
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revitalization of art in respect to reawakening the dimension of phantasy. It is important
because of the space that art currently holds as a commodity. Dewey insists that:
The isolation of art that now exists is not to be viewed as an isolated phenomenon.
It is one manifestation of the incoherence of our civilization produced by new
forces, so new that the attitudes belonging to them and the consequences issuing
from them have not been incorporated and digested into integral elements of
experience. (1934, p. 351)
Here Dewey describes clearly the concept of the established performance-principle, and
how art, understood in a new relationship, is able to rupture this establishment by
reminding the unconscious human dimension of forms of forgotten pleasure and ways to
be in the world. Dewey describes a transition that civilization has been and still seems to
be experiencing: an increasing frustration and discontent in the face of increasing
technological domination. We may in fact be incapable at this point of representing such
frustrations in art—on one hand because of the space that art takes in our culture, and on
the other because of the distance we are from intuition and phantasy—but there is still the
hope that aesthetic play can be a space of exopedagogy.
In this final section I explore the concept of play in Dewey and how play can be
encouraged in education, as well as the forces that seek to censor it (or at least bound it)
outside of education. I’ve already mentioned how imagination is a way of seeing and
feeling the multiple dimensions of the world. Building on this, Dewey describes aspects
of this dialectic relationship that are similar to that of the Eleusinian mysteries, that the
measure of the adventure of dialectical understanding is in fact imagination (1934, p.
278). Aside from finding the phantastic in the dialectic relationship of imagination and
adventure, Dewey describes how consciousness is affected in a Marcusian fashion:
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The psychological conditions resulting from private control of the labor of other
men for the sake of private gain, rather than any fixed psychological or economic
law, are the forces that suppress and limit esthetic quality in the experience that
accompanies processes of production. As long as art is in the beauty parlor of
civilization, neither art nor civilization is secure. (Dewey, 1934, pp. 357-358)
First we see the same argument that it is labor, the market, and now consumerism that
both define and deny freedom. This has the consequence of exploiting an already stunted
imagination but also offers hope that since art does not remain in the function of
civilization it once held, civilization too is in jeopardy, not just art. This dialectic tension
between civilization and works of art as works of art highlights part of the problem: art’s
unsituatedness in advanced industrial/technological civilization. Art may be redemptive,
but only if it escapes the clutches of the market, and phantasy is the ripest dimension to
meet this demand. Through societal discontent, phantasy will first reemerge. Censorship
thus can produce the very thing that is attempts to control and ameliorate: instinctual
dissatisfaction with the status quo. Dewey describes this process. He finds:
Only imaginative vision elicits the possibilities that are interwoven within the
texture of always found in works of art. […] Change in the climate of the
imagination is the precursor of the changes that affect more than the details of
life. (1934, pp. 359-360)
There is no doubt the climate of imagination has changed and is still undergoing
change— change at the expense of the market principles guiding educational policies.
Hope will re-emerge when art is able to resist commodification, and art informed through
phantasy might be best able to meet civilization beyond market dictates.

135

Maxine Greene

Building on much of Dewey’s work, Greene establishes many of the same
theoretical features. There exists a similar dialectic in that their aesthetic education is not
about the creation of, but the engagement with, works of art. Greene also moves much of
this deeper into the field of social justice and uses art to emphasize empathy or the
process entering other subject’s realities. She refers to this as a moral imagination.
Regarding the concept of receptivity, Greene’s theories hint at the dimension of
phantasy that lurks beyond imagination and the reality principle:
Where oppression or exploitation or pollution or even pestilence is perceived as
natural, as a given, there can be no freedom. Where people cannot name
alternatives or imagine a better state of things, they are likely to remain anchored
or submerged. If we teachers are to develop a human and liberating pedagogy, we
must feel ourselves to be engaged in a dialectical relation. We are more likely to
uncover or be able to interrupt what we are experiencing if we can at times
recapture some of our own lost spontaneity and some awareness of our own
backgrounds, either through communication with children, psychotherapy, or
engagement with works of art. Any such engagement may provoke us to recall
that rationality itself is grounded in something prerational, prereflective—perhaps
in a primordial, perceived landscape. (Greene, 1995, p. 53)
First we see that if the imagination is so thoroughly colonized, then we have to accept the
impossibility of a better future. In this way, phantasy is utopic because it points to a
dimension of the imagination that looks for, finds, and experiences alternative forms of
being in the world, of changing the reality principle to suit the instinctual pleasures as
well as collective strivings. The denial of such dialectical relations denies the possibility
of alternatives. Situated within the dialectic of phantasy and imagination, new
possibilities emerge and can be experimented with. Without phantastical imagination, we
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cannot create the new; instead, we only rearrange the old to create a shadow of the new.
Greene also offers three ways that one might recollect the “lost spontaneity” of
subjectivity still in touch with the dialectic of phantasy and imagination; the two that
concern us most for the purposes of this research is working with children and engaging
works of art. Greene goes even further to proclaim that rationality is grounded, in a
sense, in phantasy. This shows similarities with Marcuse in that phantasy is a dimension
of human thought. Both imply that phantasy not only lurks beneath the surface, but it in
fact informs, to a greater extent than we realize, the intelligible world—the reality
principle. Phantasy is able to name the lack in the reality principle because it envisions
and experiences new possibilities, while imagination may not be able to break free from
the reality principle it works to serve and reinforce.
Imagination in isolation cannot provide the tools needed to resist the reality
principle since it offers no alternative; phantasy, and more specifically the dialectic
between phantasy and imagination, represents the liminal space of refusal. In fact:
Such resistance can best be evoked when imagination is released; but, as we all
know, the bombardment of images from the divinity of Technological
Communication frequently has the effect of freezing people’s imaginative
thinking. Instead of freeing audience members to take the initiative in reaching
beyond their own actualities, in looking at things as if they could be otherwise,
today’s media present audiences with predigested concepts and images in fixed
frameworks. Dreams are caught in the meshes of the saleable; possession of
consumer goods is the alternative to gloom or feelings of pointlessness. Ideas of
possibilities are trapped in predictability. But our imagination, as I have been
illustrating, obviously deals in unpredictablilities, in the unexpected. It then
requires reflectiveness on our part to acknowledge the existence of these
unexpected and unpredictable vistas and perspectives in our experience. (Greene,
1995, pp. 124-125)
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In some ways, Greene’s insistence on exposure to works of art implies a certain amount
of receptivity; in the sense that one must repeatedly encounter a work of art until that
work of art is understood on increasingly profound levels, one is receiving aspects that
are communicated through the artwork. In this way, attentiveness to a work of art offers
an excellent practice for invoking a similar or complimentary receptivity for phantasy,
and it also akin to the daemon that Plato describes as a mediating agent. In this case, the
work of art is the mediating agent, opening up the dialectical space of the sensual and the
eschatia.
Although instincts are not directly referenced, Greene does articulate a utopian
theme in her writing. Specifically, she describes: “a mode of utopian thinking: thinking
that refuses mere compliance, that looks down roads not yet taken to the shapes of a more
fulfilling social order, to more vibrant ways of being in the world” (1995, p. 5). This
utopian thinking is, I would argue, informed by phantasy since it partakes in that which
does not yet exist. It re-envisions new ways of being in the world that might provide a
deeper more satisfying fulfillment of the instincts while still maintaining the sublimated
form of consciousness civilization begets. Certainly Greene is correct in indicating the
thoughtful and thus mental dimension of phantasy, yet I would also like to remind the
reader that the structure of phantasy which has been developed in this dissertation focuses
first and foremost on the embodied and sensual level. It would seem that the dialectical
framework Greene advocates needs to be returned to the nature of presenting the
phantastical rather than merely representing it in the mind. Such embodied visioning
itself is a refusal, for it begins with the dissatisfaction of the current gratification of the
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instincts and, in a way, is suspicious of forms of pleasure that would reinforce repressive
desublimation. Utopian instincts that push beyond the performance-principle focus on a
nonrepressive sublimation so that phantasy can be unleashed on civilization, tempered
with imagination so it does not destroy itself. Phantasy might be able to resublimate
imagination; while phantasy undergoes a nonrepressive sublimation, imagination would
likely undergo a nonrepressive resublimation as a consequence.
Greene has much to say about new reality principles and alternative reality that
can be accessed through engagement with works of art. The primary limitation in the
way she applies her work (not to say that it is irrelevant) is merely that phantasy has not
been explored fully. She seeks to makes one’s world larger or richer through
understanding what life would be like in another’s shoes, and she employs art to achieve
this. If we were to return to Chapter 1 and speak about phantasy providing access to the
space of the eschatia, it is not entirely clear that Greene’s method applies. It certainly
does not get beyond the human experience, but it catalogs the great variety and
complexity of human experience. In this way, imagination is reinforced since
subjectivity is muddled with empathetic experience, but not suspended. Experiencing the
beyond of subjectivity is therefore left out of Greene’s aesthetic education. Here I must
creatively appropriate Greene and read beyond her in order to see how aesthetics can not
only be a human venture but also partake in the divine and the alien. For instance, when
specifically describing how imagination leads to empathy, we can clearly see how such a
process or individual experiences approaches the eschatia. Greene acknowledges:
[one] of the reasons I have come to concentrate on imagination as a means
through which we can assemble a coherent world is that imagination is what,
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above all, makes empathy possible. It is what enable us to cross the empty spaces
between ourselves and those we teachers have called ‘other’ over the years.
(1995, p. 3).
Here we have Greene moving between two spaces, that of the human world and empathy,
and the interrelation that such entails, but she also implies a mingling with the “other,” an
other that need not be conceived purely in human terms. We can expand such a crossing
of spaces to the phantastic such as the daemon, Dionysus, and Eros, with the use of art.
Imagination is above all what “permits us to give credence to alternative realities”
(Greene, 1995, 3). Here Greene speaks of imagination as accepting the truth value of
experiences that cannot be rationalized and can only be understood through phantasy.
Phantasy, however, must bring forth these alternate realities from beyond merely human
dimensions of thought, limited to the reality principle of the civilized mind. Greene
recognizes this dialectical space even if her language does not make a distinction between
where a significant amount of the tension exists.
The dialectic space is key for Greene, for although she limits her ideas to
empathy, imagination is the dimension where one can have experiences in a space
beyond performance-based modes of subjectivity. When this dialectical space collapses
and imagination is no longer coupled with phantasy, as in the repressive-desublimated
forms of imagination Marcuse mentions in One-Dimensional Man, its utopian impulse is
lost. It becomes a tool of civilization, one that is made to serve the performanceprinciple; its connections to pleasure, at least at the instinctual level, are severed and it
operates now in desublimated forms. Greene warns that “a general inability to conceive a
better order of things can give rise to a resignation that paralyzes and prevents people
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from acting to bring about change” (1995, p. 19). Imagination in the grips of the
performance-principle denies and devalues alternative realities as inferior. After all, in its
desublimated forms, imagination is thoroughly repressive, in that the illusion of
gratification of pleasure is so strong as to hide the unconscious frustration and discontent
that is the springboard for phantastical receptivity toward the beyond. Tapping into the
dialectic, into the space where imagination is “able to break with what is supposedly
fixed and finished, objectively and independently real [the reality principle]. It is to see
beyond what the imaginer has called normal or ‘common-sensible’ and to carve out new
orders of experience” (Greene, 1995, p. 19). These new orders are those that can only be
introduced through phantasy and the dialectical space of moving between receptivity and
creativity. Greene is so convinced and encouraged by the hope and promise that she
reveals “it may be the recovery of imagination that lessens the social paralysis we see
around us and restores the sense that something can be done in the name of what is
decent and humane” (Greene, 1995, p. 35). If this is to be the case, the imagination that
she references can only be understood in the context of the dialectic with phantasy.
Without the context of phantasy, we turn to the desublimated form of imagination that no
longer understands the experience of phantasy and discovering/experiencing the new;
even if it is radically different and represents an alternative possibility of higher degrees
of fulfillment and satisfying pleasure at the instinctual level and not just the conscious
level. The imagination, in this case, is left in a state where the new cannot be envisioned.
For education, this means we are working against the desublimated forms of
imagination and pleasure. As such, teachers “must make an intensified effort to break
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through the frames of custom and to touch the consciousness of those we teach. It is an
argument stemming from a concern about noxious invisible clouds and cover-ups and
false consciousness and helplessness” (Greene, 1995, p. 56). If we can reach beyond the
desublimated form of imagination, touching consciousness would also mean touching the
instincts. Such receptivity would also be an invitation to return to and play with the
instinctual/conscious animal/human in the space of the eschatia.
This type of engagement with children and students—this exopedagogy of the
eschatia—is extremely helpful in two ways. First, understanding instrumentalized
imagination versus phantastical imagination can be a difficult and tricky task. Second, it
shows that we do not necessarily need to find immediate access to phantasy, and if it does
not come, we cannot assume we have failed. On the contrary, we can see how first
understanding and moving away from the desublimated forms of imagination, finding
sublimated forms of imagination and pleasure, can introduce the dialectic. This is
hopeful because we see some of the first educational practices that will yield an
exopedagogy of phantastical imagination.
This brings us to the final criteria we are considering: that of playing with the
pleasure of freedom in the context of education. As I just stated, resurrecting the
sublimated form of imagination reintroduces the fertile space of the dialectic and will
“help us to think in ways that move beyond schooling to the larger domain of education,
where there are and must be all kinds of openings to possibility” (Greene, 1995, p. 5).
The space itself can be used to reconceptualize education and learning; it suggests a
playing with education, even for teachers. Greene writes:

142

Imagination is as important in the lives of teachers as it is in the lives of their
students, in part because teachers incapable of thinking imaginatively or of
releasing students to encounter works of literature and other forms of art are
probably also unable to communicate to the young what the use of imagination
signifies. If it is the case that imagination feeds one’s capacity to feel one’s way
into another’s vantage point, these teachers may also lacking in empathy. (1995,
p. 37)
This introduces a parallel dialectic that can be used to navigate this space more readily,
since there will be subjects in the classroom community that represent both extremes.
The dialectic of phantasy and imagination in some ways is analogous and parallel to that
of children/students and teacher. Reconfiguring the power dynamic and the degrees of
freedom experienced by all members can reintroduce a space of the dialectic in the
classroom where phantasy may be found. However, as I have previously stated, there
may be a risk with Greene equating imagination with a moral imagination. For our
purposes, her model can be used to go beyond the space empathy and into that of utopia.
But the potential of the space cannot be denied as a space of resistance: “Art offers life; it
offers hope; it offers the prospect of discovery it offers light. Resisting, we may make the
teaching of the aesthetic experience our pedagogic creed” (Greene, 1995, p. 133). Art, as
a source of the dialectic experience, offers insight into play as resistance, alternative
realities as pretend, and new subjectivities as role-play.

Kieran Egan

The next theorist I turn to is Kieran Egan. Since it has an entire section devoted
to the preliterate and developing-literacy mind and can be directly applied to elementary

143

education, I will concentrate on Egan’s text An Imaginative Approach to Teaching
(2005). However, Egan’s The Educated Mind: How Cognitive Tools Shape Our
Understanding (1997) is also worthy of note in that it equally relates to imagination and
phantasy. This latter book speaks directly to the contradictions that arise because of
competing ideologies that are present in schools. These contradictions can be understood
in the argument I have made so far between the instrumental imagination being written
into educational policy and guiding educational pedagogy and practice, and the phantastic
imagination, which has always been misunderstood and is censored without appreciated
what is being given up. However, for Egan, this tension between ideologies is not always
productive, and we must be mindful of using his ideas directly for our purposes.
Egan does not say anything directly about the relation between receptivity and
creativity that I have been developing. However, an intriguing upshot to this is that, in
order to perceive any tension at all, the concepts of (in this case) imagination and
phantasy must first be linguistically (conceptually) divided. Without such division, we
have a unified whole and, thus, we may not even perceive the whole as a dialectical
synthesis. Egan describes this phenomenon as the development of understanding:
We first have to divide things into opposites in order to get an initial grasp on
them; so we easily divide the world into good/bad, high/low, earth/sky, hot/cold,
courage/cowardice, and so endlessly on. Holding onto such opposites instead of
recognizing the complexity of the world can create problems. But we’re unable to
avoid using these forms, so we had better learn how best to use and control this
further important cognitive tool that comes along with oral language. (2005, p.
16)
It is important to take note of how he follows up the necessity of making distinctions at
this stage. Maintaining such distinction can be dangerous and create problems rather than
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deepen one’s understanding of complexity. The role of the dialectic is to intervene and
make contradictions understandable and productive. The tension that emerges is that
which we are looking for between imagination and phantasy—creativity and receptivity.
This space is the eschatia, the dimension of the Eleusinian mysteries, the place where the
phantastic is real—the place of exopedagogy as a pedagogy beyond the performance
principle.
Egan mentions a great deal about the concept of mystery or wonder in the
elementary education classroom. These descriptions contain similarities to some of ideas
that were presented in the first chapter. Mystery is not to be brushed aside or avoided
because of its trivial nature. For Egan, mystery is a tool for understanding:
I think we can see ways in which a sense of the mystery of things is an important
component in the growth of understanding. It is a tool that allows us to recognize
that whatever we learn is at best only a tiny fragment of what is to be known. The
sense of mystery makes this realization not disabling or depressing but exciting
and enticing—drawing the student toward the vast riches of understanding that
remain available. So I don’t simply want to dismiss that sensational aspect of
mystery as it might appear also in the headlines of such publications as the
National Enquirer, but rather to work out how it may be turned to educational
purposes. (Egan, 2005, pp. 32-33)
It is in the above section that we begin to see the glimmer of phantasy emerging in
Egan’s theories; the grasping of the mystery is, underneath all epistemic knowledge, a
sensual experience, an experience of the possibility of phantasy. For this reason,
engaging with the concept and experience of mystery is an excellent precursor for
phantasy since it touches something beyond the intelligible precisely because the
knowledge surrounding mysteries is often incomplete, surprising, and beyond immediate
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rational explanation. In this way mystery guides toward the utopian and to the education
of phantasy. For Egan:
Mystery enables the mind increasingly to recognize that the world around us, the
world we can see and hear and earn how to behave within, is only the immediate
surface under which, or behind which, or beyond which are intellectual riches and
experience barely guesses. Mystery is our sense that there is more that we can see
and hear and experience in our environment. By opening our minds to this wider,
stranger, and less easily accessible world, we create the first tool for its
exploration. I suppose poets have best expressed this drive to go beyond the
routine. (2005, p. 33)
Playing in the space of mystery is in itself a pedagogical tool, as Egan describes it,
because it enables us to gain further access to and explore this dimension of incomplete
understanding, where authentic learning can still take place. The last part of the above
passage, although somewhat of a throwaway for Egan, is entirely at home with what we
have explored thus far. His mention of poetry is profoundly relevant for phantasy given
our trajectory from the Homeric epic poems and Eleusinian rituals of Chapter 1, through
the censorship of poetry in Plato and the return of lyrical poetry in Nietzsche, and finally
to education and our attempting to assemble a pedagogy of phantastical imagination
through a dialectical curriculum. It seems poetry can be a useful tool in the classroom to
introduce mysteries and ideas and understanding that “go beyond the routine.” Egan
argues how in the imaginative classroom, “we will expect to see much greater emphasis
on mysteries. These can indeed involve the more sensational kinds trumpeted by popular
papers, but should also move constantly in the direction of the deeper mysteries beyond
our range of knowledge” (Egan, 2005, p. 34). Engaging students in this process of
mystery will not only introduce them to ideas that are beyond our realm of understanding,
but also protect against situating oneself within a fixed dichotomy and refusing to engage
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the complexity of the dialectic. Mystery commands a moving into the dialectic since
dichotomies cannot always offer clarity and often reduces mystery to an either-or binary.
In a similar thread as poetry, Egan mentions the concept of myth as well, which
can be understood best through my third category of finding new reality principles and
locating alternatives. He makes this connection by referencing the need to record ideas
(history):
[Because] of the importance in oral culture of preserving information in the
memory, all cognitive tools were bent to support this socially vital activity. So we
find myths, for example, full of vivid and bizarre images. As has been evident for
a long time, the more exotic, surprising or strange the image that we form, the
more memorable.
(Egan, 2005, p. 26).
However, as I have argued throughout, it was not just that these myths were
memorable and were full of vivid and bizarre imagery. They were alternative forms of
knowledge that came from the periphery, from the eschatia, where phantasy has
relevance and truth-value. It is important that we make this distinction because Egan
points out the flaws in partaking of myths to a certain extent at both the individual and
cultural level. For this reason, and with phantasy as our beacon, we must be especially
sensitive to the myths we introduce and the interpretation of these myths. Here we can
recall the rituals of the Eleusinian mysteries, which used the Myth of Demeter and
Persephone to facilitate a phantastic experience of the mystery of mortality that took
place in a very literal sense on the eschatia of the polis where the gods were manifest.
Without such specifically designed myths and dialectical interpretation, using such
stories will not mediate phantasy. Egan warns:
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The archetypal hero in the Western tradition has been a male, power-oriented doer
of usually violent deeds. What characterizes the hero is an unusual degree of
what I am calling great human qualities. Our stock of heroes provides a wide
range of qualities with which we can associate. The hero can embody unusual
degrees of such qualities as sanctity, compassion, selflessness, elegance, wit,
ingenuity, patience, or whatever, equally as well as testeronic violence. (2005, p.
88)
The dialectic of these myths is lost when their interpretations are not situated in a
productive tension but rather, as I argued in the first section, situated within a dichotomy.
In the final chapter I will discuss and employ the concepts of myth and interpretation,
honoring the promise of the Eleusinian mysteries, in an effort to better uncover the
human traits that can mediate phantasy and consciousness.
Drawing on Egan but also Greene and Dewey, what I am advocating for is a
playing with myth. Playing with myth is an attempt to make the dialectic manifest (in a
similar ways as the gods in Eleusis). Play is a “tool that develops that meta-level of
thinking; it helps us to think about the world in a way freed from the constraints that the
world’s normal forms, behavior, and everyday purposes impose on us” (Egan, 2005, p.
31). Through play, we find an open receptivity to phantasy as well as the creativity
needed to communicate such phantasy to others. In this sense, play contains some hope
to make the dialectic of phantastical imagination visible as well as a material force for
unveiling the performance-principle for what it is. Without the dimension of play in the
interpretation of myth specifically and the interpretation of freedom and pleasure more
generally, learning becomes nothing more than mere “character education” in the least
dialectical way possible. In fact, Egan illustrates that
Play provides a great experimental situation in which children explore the rules of
their society and culture. Electronic ‘play,’ which is working hard (to some
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people’s profit) to disrupt this immensely valuable negotiated play among
children, has been described as ‘fast food for the imagination.’ Overindulged—
which doesn’t take much—it has similar effects on the arteries of the imagination.
(2005, pp. 31-32)
This last remark is important as I transition to the final theorist, Ken Robinson, who in
many ways, supports the argument for an instrumental imagination and is associated with
both 21st century skills and STEM discourses. To call into question electronic play,
connecting it to the logic of the market at the expense of authentic or creative play, is to
call into questions such entities which are directly associated with such technologies such
as schools. If we apply this inference to 21st century skills and STEM discourses, then
such policies and practices will have little to no effect inciting a phantastic imagination.
In the end, STEM and 21st century skills serve to further desublimate the imagination,
making it useless for purposes of producing and highly useful for political and economic
purposes of sustainability; no change, no innovation, no alternatives offered because
phantasy has not been invited. It is doubtful that phantasy would emerge in the first place
without a space where the dialectic can come into play thus igniting a productive tension
between phantasy and imagination.

Ken Robinson

Because Ken Robinson is so thoroughly identified with the instrumental
imagination, I will focus on his ideas that are taken as reinforcing the economic and
employment paradigms in education. As with my readings of Dewey, Greene, and Egan,
I will read Robinson carefully in order to find moments wherein the phantastical emerges.
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In these moments, I find an opening that will allow me to creatively appropriate
Robinson for my own project.
Nowhere does Robinson directly address the need to mediate receptivity and
creativity. Instead we have to do some digging and make some associations in order to
uncover what he has to say about this dialectic. First, I want to remind readers what I
mentioned in Chapter 5: Marcuse describes a distinction between instinctual and
conscious pleasure which can be understood as the distinction between sublimated
pleasure and desublimated pleasure. Keeping this in mind, Robinson describes how
[There] is a common-sense distinction between mind and consciousness. In one
sense, consciousness is what you lose when you go to sleep and regain when you
wake up. It is a state of being awake and aware of your surroundings. But
consciousness has a second meaning, that of understanding. It is in this sense that
we talk of raising consciousness of an issue. The mind is what is being conscious.
Babies are born with a brain. They develop a mind as they grow, absorb and
reflect on their experiences. (Robinson, 2001, p. 99)
Using what I just said about Marcuse, we can see how Robinson is firmly situated in the
instrumental imagination. With his equating of consciousness with understanding, he
falls victim to the imagination exploited for the performance-principle and cannot see
what is lacking because such a desublimated imagination denies the dialectic and the
possibility for creating the new. He denies the possibility that understanding can come
from an unconscious realm of sensory embodiment and instinctual pleasures. In this
sense phantasy is beyond Robinson’s conception of mind, which has parallels with
Platonic censorship. Furthermore, Robinson adds, “creativity is not just a matter of
letting go: it involves hanging on. What you have to hang on to critically affects the
quality of the results” (2001, p. 113). This fits with what I mentioned about Dewey in the
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creation of the work of art, but it does not recognize the inner vision that may have
initially come from “letting go.” It seems, in Robinson’s insistence on creativity, that
phantasy or receptivity is not even felt at the level of a loss. It has been erased and buried
so thoroughly it is nearly impervious to being stirred. That is a hallmark of the
desublimated imagination. As argued in the introduction, we find ourselves in a current
situation where imagination can be used to fix any current economic, social, or political
problem. Such vague indeterminacy comes directly from desublimation and the severing
of creativity from any relation to receptivity to phantastical otherness. In this sense,
Robinson can be read as the apex of dichotomous thinking rather than dialectical
transformation.
However, although this desublimated and therefore conscious imagination is
central in his writing, Robinson does introduce the dialectic to a certain degree in his
lectures, where he articulates dimensions of the imagination beyond creativity, ways that
understanding is achieved beyond the intellect or intelligible world. It is in this tension
where we find some of the dialectic in Robinson, but we must once again do theoretical
work to tease out how this process works. We see the first traces of this dialectic when
he describes how college professors or scholars are disembodied because they are so
isolated in the realm of the intellect. The intellect is not transcendent in the way that
phantasy is. On the contrary, it is disembodied both from the sensuality of the body and
from the instinctual pleasure of the body, even in their sublimated forms. Although he is
critiquing what can be understood clearly through The Republic, Robinson remains fixed
in the intelligible world but seeks to reintroduce the sensual experiences of the body into
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understanding. In sum, his model seems to embrace the desublimated imagination, but it
does leave some space for a sublimated imagination where receptivity and creativity are
in dialectical tension.
This dialectic is further reinforced in Robinson’s definition of creativity, which, to
a great extent, has much to contribute to our search for new reality principles and
alternative realities with antagonizing truth-value. First and foremost, he recognizes and
advocates for the diversity found within creativity. Robinson goes into detail on
misconceptions about creativity:
Creativity is not a separate faculty that some people have and others do not. It is a
function of intelligence: it takes many forms, it draws from many different
capacities and we all have different creative capabilities. Creativity is possible in
any activity in which human intelligence in actively engaged. The distinctive
feature of human intelligence is imagination and the power of symbolic thought.
Our lives are shaped by the ideas we have and beliefs we hold. New ways of
thinking can transform us. (2001, p. 111)
Just as important as diversity (which is to be celebrated and understood as a tool to work
against the performance-principle by bringing in alternatives) is creativity, which plays a
central role in transforming our thinking, our subjectivity, and the world around us. This
can be an active process and does not necessarily benefit from the entirely passive nature
of phantasy, but instead benefits from the dialectical tension itself that serves to sublimate
higher and higher forms of gratification. Phantasy alone does not transform the world; it
takes imagination and artistic practice to execute a transformation. Conversely,
imagination offers possibilities, but not necessarily new possibilities, since it lacks the
dimension of phantasy that is hospitable to the new. It seems Robinson himself may be
advocating for such a dialectic even if he is not articulating it directly or being interpreted
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and applied in education in this way. Robinson (2001) devises a three-part definition of
creativity: “imaginative processes with outcomes in the public world (p. 115),
imaginative processes that produce outcomes that are original (p. 116), and imaginative
processes with outcomes that are original and of value (p. 118).” (2001). The first criteria
emphasizes that imagination transcends the mere intellect and becomes a material
expression in the world to communicate understanding. Second, the products must be
original. This is the most significant for us since this is the space of phantasy, which
receives ideas and experiences from beyond our intentionally guided, intellectual
projects. Remember Nietzsche’s description of imagination devoid of the poetic
Dionysian impulse: Culture is destined to exhaust its artistic resources until it resorts to
reproducing and pillaging from other cultures in order to create the illusion that
something new has been achieved. For this reason, creativity, at least for Robinson,
includes a subtle nod toward phantasy, even if it does so without knowing why or how.
In this space of originality, we find Robinson advocating, as each theorist thus far
has argued for, the educational value of play. Robinson defends this showing:
[As] Carl Jung puts it, the creation of something new is not accomplished by the
intellect alone but by the play instinct. The creative mind plays with the objects it
loves. Creative activity involves playing with ideas and trying out possibilities.
But creative achievement does not always require freedom from constraints or a
blank page. […] The creative achievement and the aesthetic pleasure lie in using
standard forms to achieve unique effects and original insights” (2001, p. 133).
He clearly understands the disciplined aspect of imagination and creativity that must be
put to both serve and temper phantasy. Robinson adds:
[Creativity] is not only a process of generating ideas. It involves making
judgements [sic] about them. I said earlier that creativity is not just a matter being
original, but of producing outcomes that are of value. Other people may come to

153

their own views about the worth of a new work or idea. But the person creating is
also making judgements [sic] as an integral part of the process of creation. In any
creative process there are likely to be dead ends: ideas and designs that do not
work. Evaluating which ideas do work and which don’t involves judgement [sic]
and critical thinking. Understanding this is an important foundation for creative
development. (2001, pp. 133-134)
This clearly captures the imagination’s role in its dialectical relationship to phantasy.
The final aspect of his definition is that these outcomes have value in the public world.
This value is quite ambiguous but can be understood in the context of practicality. For
Robinson, this concerns mostly the utility of such products; for Greene, art objects are
designed to increase empathy. What I want to emphasize, drawing on Nietzsche as well
as Marcuse, is that “utility” cannot be predefined by status quo definitions of what
counts. Rather, the phantastical imagination has the ability to introduce new values or a
transvaluation of all values. In this sense, its “utility” must be “original” in a much more
radical sense than Robinson describes. Without recognizing the ability of phantasy to
introduce new values into the world of the performance-principle, then the call for utility
all too easily results in mere instrumentalization of imagination in the name of current
standards. Thus, at a crucial moment in Robinson’s argument, his lack of understanding
of phantasy results in a kind of watered-down pragmatism.
The last ideas of Robinson I want to address pinpoint the dialectic that I think
illustrates that his work could very much be understood in a critical lineage, but has been
appropriated by 21st century skills and STEM discourses. He does recognize cultural and
economic forces as opposing creativity. Robinson does an excellent job of summarizing
the crisis:
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There is a crisis of creativity, a war for talent, which is as acute as in Europe and
in other parts of the world. In 1996 a national symposium was held in the United
States entitled American Creativity at Risk. The symposium brought together
artists, scientists, and others to discuss the conditions under which the creative
resources of the United States could be best realized. The symposium was set
against a mounting concern in many areas of education, the economy and the
professions that national policies were deepening the crisis. […] The symposium
concluded that universities and school programmes [sic] are now being run more
like businesses, with an attention to the bottom line that is often detrimental to the
quality of education they provide. (2001, p. 195)
These same business-oriented educational models seek now to include creativity in the
name of STEM and global economic competitiveness. Robinson goes a step further than
identifying the crisis of imagination and creativity at the educational level by directly
attributing the overall cultural misunderstanding and crisis of creativity to the way it is
framed/repressed in schools. This is most evident in the many lectures he gives globally,
but here I draw from a TED talk he gave titled “How Schools Kill Creativity.” In this
lecture, Robinson recounts a story of a kinetic learner misdiagnosed with a learning
disorder. Miraculously, the doctor, whom the mother was advised to see, declared that
her child was not sick, and upon turning on a radio and watching her move unconsciously
and naturally, proclaimed, “She’s a dancer.” Robinson uses this story to describe what
schools do and continue to do to each student’s individual creativity. However, this story
illustrates a deeper, more phantastic dimension to imagination and creativity: that this
child cannot sit still, that she needs to move to think, that to understand something she
must experience it in a sensual way, a way that can be interpreted and communicated
through movement. This introduces the space of phantasy, a dimension where
knowledge is gained beyond intellectual control or intentionality and where the body is
“possessed” by powers that move it. Rather than saying that the girl moves to dance, we
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might say that dance moved the girl! This is the inspirational dimension of phantasy that
more or less instrumentalized models of imagination miss. What is mistaken as a
learning deficit to be corrected is actually the girl’s intuitive receptivity and hospitality
toward the mystery of rhythm, which she then creatively embodies and shares with the
world through dance. In this sense, the girl is playing with dance, and thus embodying
the truly transformative possibilities of phantastic imagination—possibilities that can
transform the teaching and learning process.

Conclusion: Achievements and Limitations of the Study

This dialectic analysis began in the ancient past, at a time when phantasy and
imagination had not yet been dichotomized and separated. Any tension between the two
was nurtured and respected accordingly, but never removed or denied entirely. The
conception of the eschatia is helpful in finding those liminal spaces in education where
phantasy can be reclaimed. If the eschatia were housed in myth and located on the
fringes of civilized culture then, where might we still find it now? And what myths will
be able to give it a phantastic shape for our post-industrial, technologic minds? I hope to
have laid the philosophical groundwork for a theory of the phantastical imagination that
will aid in answering these pressing questions.
The analysis then led directly into Plato and the moment where we find the
pedagogical dichotomizing of phantasy and imagination. This inception was not merely
educational, but, with assigning hierarchies, it was the herald of new power relationships
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that supplanted the old tension with a new authority. The censorship that Plato describes
in The Republic is similar to the pigeonholing of imagination we find in policy
documents that limit its use to “innovation.” In this way, phantasy is denied liminal
possibility, except in the isolated intellectual realm of the Forms, which precludes
alternative phantastic experiences. The urgency of our current crisis can be felt in the
loss of phantasy from the ancient Greece to a more classical Greece.
This loss is one that Nietzsche directly and, almost too wholeheartedly, tried to
disrupt and overturn. Reawakening the long dormant sprit of Dionysus was, for
Nietzsche, a way to balance the Apollonian and Promethean natures of humanity.
However, perhaps because these forces were so long repressed, he lacked the ability to
fully return from forces in the Eleusinian sense; after all, how could he, despite his
constant warnings that too much phantasy was a bad thing? This is central to the
dialectic that we find between Plato and Nietzsche. That, despite a certain value placed
upon the antithesis—phantasy in Plato’s case, and the Apollonian for Nietzsche—each
loses sight of the productive tension between the two and disturbs an equality that can be
achieved, instead devolving into a submission of one kind or another. For Plato
imagination overtakes phantasy, resulting in the entropy of civilization Freud described,
while for Nietzsche phantasy overwhelmed imagination, and with it the fully conscious
or civilized subject. Important here is Nietzsche’s eventual return in his later writings,
which implies, to a certain degree, a desubjectification as a necessary stage, a rite of
passage into a realm where phantasy is possible.
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Finally the dialectic tension is reclaimed in Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization.
Marcuse shows the way back into the dialectic space, the liminal space of the eschatia,
without suffering the implosion that Plato and Nietzsche experienced. For educators, this
represents a vital category to offset the “training” of the imagination, and a chance to
interrupt wrote educational processes by calling for an “inviting” of phantasy.
Maintaining a focus on how these experiences connect to pleasure on the instinctual
sense, further research will be well served by delving deeper into Freud and other
psychological theory which can seek to counter economic drives beyond philosophical
arguments.
The last chapter on educational philosophy and theory was meant to illustrate the
way phantasy can be discovered in educational theory, curriculum, and practice. The
tension has been wrestled with in education and philosophy throughout history, and how
the tension was either overcome or nurtured will be beneficial for educators who seek to
reclaim the dynamic tension experienced in the ancient past. In this chapter, I hope to
have provided a new and innovative interpretation of authors such as Dewey and Greene
in relation to the question of phantasy, demonstrating the usefulness of the category for
discovering new possibilities within this literature for interrupting current trends toward
instrumentalized imagination.
Although I have established a viable philosophical groundwork for phantastical
imagination, there are distinct limitations to the current study. First, there is the
dialectical method itself. As with Hegel’s dialectical system, there is a tendency with this
philosophical methodology to overly simplify and streamline rather dispersed intellectual
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and social phenomena. This might very well be the case with my own analysis of
phantasy and imagination. The next logical move, as the data set expands with additional
texts—historical and contemporary, philosophical and beyond, is to set up the research as
a genealogy. As opposed to the dialectic, a genealogical approach is more decentered,
diffuse, and multidimensional, expanding outward. In framing the dialectic of the
phantastical imagination, I removed parts of the analysis I had begun with Kant, Freud,
Jung, the Romantics, and even other Nietzsche texts. Expanding the dialectic with other
researchers will help to give more shape to the multiple ways imagination has been
treated throughout history and can more fully inform our current situation. Other
contemporary theorists to bring into the analysis include Foucault and Jameson, both of
whom either reject the dialectic or seek to pluralize its meaning beyond even Marcuse.
There are also practical limitations with much of what has been discussed in terms
of the use of time and space in the classroom. In the world of “accountability,” taking the
time to invite phantasy might be seen as frivolous and dangerous to one’s job security.
Beyond not fitting with current schooling practices, it will likely be feared because of its
potential to disrupt, in the same way Plato sought to censor such possibilities. A further
analysis of education would be helpful here to clearly illustrate that these ideas are not
entirely new, have at times been embedded in public education, and can be useful to
resolve some of the concerns the crisis has raised in the first place. Specifically, a deep
review of Dewey’s writings on aesthetics and education would be helpful, as there
already exists a small body of secondary literature on Dewey and Eros (Garrison, 2010).
But also looking at historical manifestations in teachers’ practices in classrooms
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(including alternative educational models) would also concretize phantastic imagination
in ways that this dissertation has failed to do thus far. By illustrating that these concepts
are by no means vanguard, and indeed have been utilized in actual practices, we may
soften the blow of such potentially oppositional theory.
This last comment moves us into the question of specific practices that would be
helpful for a hospitality of phantasy and which can be adapted to educational practices.
Namely, two terms that Marcuse singles out in his list of mental processes partaking of
phantasy and residing between conscious and unconscious thought: day-dreaming and
play. These two terms open up other research possibilities and also give a sense of how
difficult it is to do research on a concept that has no clear contemporary articulation. By
using day-dreaming and play, we find new theorists to include in the analysis. Play itself
has received a great deal of attention historically in philosophy, psychology, and
education (Bateson, 2006; Bruner, Jolly & Sylva, 1976; Piaget, 1999; Vygotsky, 1967;
Ward, 1966; Winnicott, 2005), but also more recently in elementary and early-childhood
settings and as a direct result of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) policies, standardized
testing, and media exposure (Ginsburg, 2007; Linn, 2004, 2008). This research will not
only give new evidence and insight into phantasy, but it also can provide a glimpse as to
how such concepts are treated in education currently.
In terms of daydreaming, there exists an interesting body of research that spans
from clinical psychology studies to content-specific educational practice (Baker, 2006;
Balinisteanu, 2008;; Boske, 2011; Fettes, 2011; Freud, 2003; Gold & Cundiff, 1980a,
1980b; Haldrman, Zelhart & Jackson, 1985; Leafgren, 2011; Smith & Mathur, 2009;
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Teague & Gold, 1981; Trotman, 2006; Wiebe & Snowber, 2011; Wood & Latham,
2011). However, another reason for conducting a more thorough review through
education would be to find instances that suggest not only tools for educational practices,
but also ways that research is trying to instrumentalize such phantastic dimensions. The
effort of some research does suggest that daydreaming could possibly be exploited and
even desublimated for economic purposes (Gold & Cundiff, 1980a, 1980b; Teague &
Gold, 1981). Indicative of this are the titles of some of these studies. A set of studies
published by Stephen Gold and other researchers share similar themes of a consciousawareness of daydream content or daydream occurrences: Increasing Attention to
Daydreaming by Self-Monitoring (1981), Increasing Frequency of Daydreaming (1980),
and A Procedure for Increasing Self-Reported Daydreaming (1980). In terms of the
depth of phantasy, however, daydreaming is perhaps not as dramatic or overwhelming as
the Eleusinian mysteries. The loss of self or desubjectification is not as complete or total
in daydreaming. It might also be that these studies do not touch upon the phantastic
dimension of some of these mental processes and thus would benefit from my
philosophical groundwork on phantastical imagination.
A final note is that this research opens up the possibility to explore the nature of
myth as it relates to phantasy, culture, education, and technology. I began in the first
chapter by understanding the relationship of myth to the Eleusinian mysteries and how
precisely and elegantly it was woven into such phantastic experiences. We saw a new set
of myths take form with Plato, where the Gods were supplanted by the Forms, and the
daemonic came to mean a more pure and intellectual from of neosis. These myths are
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still at work in education and finding the right myth to reclaim the phantastic, without
overturning the dichotomy, will be the work of future research along these lines. New
myths and new interpretations of myth can help to inform the teaching and learning
process in ways that are more hospitable to phantasy, and remove the hostility that the
Promethean veil encourages. On this final note, I offer a brief afterward to this study that
moves us from scholarly and philosophical dialectics toward the unveiling of a new
educational myth for our times.
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Epilogue: The Return of Myth
If no other knowledge deserves to be called useful but that which helps to enlarge
our possessions or to raise our station in society, then Mythology has no claim to
the appellation. But if that which tends to make us happier and better can be
called useful, then we claim that epithet for our subject. For Mythology is the
handmaid of literature; and literature is one of the best allies of virtue and
promoters of happiness. (Bulfinch, 1982, p. v)

In summation, this dissertation has accomplished three tasks. First, the
introduction and subsequent chapters clearly trace the current paradoxes and aporias in
contemporary educational policy related to imagination. The force of imagination that is
championed in current policy is actually cut off at the heels precisely because of the
abandonment of phantasy. The result is an instrumentalized, vague, and contradictory
imagination incapable of the transformations that it is called upon to enact. The next
chapters built an historical map of the philosophical dialectic that helps resolve these
problems by returning to the question of phantasy. The concluding chapters posit
educational alternatives and a return to myth based on an emergent theory of phantastical
imagination. For Marcuse, “myth is felicitous if and only if it has politically
transformative results, helping to conceptualize both the dangerous and the potentially
liberatory possibilities within the present—unleashing new, emancipatory needs against
the performance-principle and surplus-repression” (Kellner, Pierce, and Lewis, 2011, p.
60). The challenge of this dialectical movement has been to identify and create a
theoretically robust model of phantastical imagination and then make this relevant for
teachers by applying it to educational research and theory. In this way, a Pedagogy of
Phantastical Imagination might at least expose the conservative underpinnings of much of
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the current market-driven rhetoric steering the educational policies that appropriate a
notion of imagination circumscribed by economic utility and instrumentality.
As I prepared for this conclusion, I began by outlining first a conclusion that
offered practical and readily applicable strategies, one that would focus on classroom
environment and teaching, curriculum, psychology, and education to nurture a space that
would facilitate the rekindling of phantasy. The second outline followed a starkly
diverging structure: one that followed a mythic/poetic pattern of interpretation in order to
recapture the instinctual pleasure to be found in the interplay of aesthetics, phantasy, and
education. Since I have covered the educational implications of phantasy in the
preceding chapter, it seemed dialectically appropriate to switch domains and enter the
real of myth in the context of phantasy. In the same way that the Apollonian eventually
became a hollow shell of deeper human meaning beyond culture, so too does psychology
only seem to allow for probing, defining, and perhaps informing education. However, it
seems to me, as it has always been, that mythology will still play a role in the experience
of phantasy, in locating and accessing the spaces of liminality where human dimensions
play with nonhuman dimensions. In this way, the dissertation itself dialectically
transforms from critical, to utopian reconstruction, to phantastical myth as the final
threshold of phantastical imagination.
In tracing Marcuse’s method, myth, “in a another set of dialectical
reversals…contains the potential imaginative resources for a further dialectical
overcoming of these destructive potentials [of the enlightenment’s domination of nature],
hence his insistence on rehabilitating Narcissus as well as Orpheus” (Kellner, Pierce, and
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Lewis, 2011, p. 60). In contrast to reason and the performance principle, “Marcuse
importantly articulates the complimentary second half of this rehabilitation process;
saving myth from the jaws of rational instrumentality […] it is through myth that history
can be adequately felt and, dialectically, it is only through history that mythology can be
written as the sublimation of critical reason via the imagination” (Kellner, Pierce, and
Lewis, 2011, p. 61). Mythology as critical reason can also describe the Demeter myth I
explored in the context of the Eleusinian mysteries.

The Mysteries, The Cave, and Phantasy

There is a stunning triangulated tension between the ideas I have proposed about
phantasy and imagination, the mythic hymn of Demeter who journeys into the
underworld to bring back into reality her daughter, and lastly Plato’s “Allegory of the
Cave.” In this instance, my dissertation research dialectically transforms into yet another
retelling of such myths, and conversely, these myths emerge as a kind of educational
research into the transformative powers of phantastic imagination. Demeter’s hymn
represents the phantastic forces that take us away from ourselves, into dark spaces, the
space of the eschatia, in a space where the risk is great enough for Plato to censor since it
is firmly antagonistic to the polis. The journey offers an exopedagogy beyond the self
and its limited conceptualization of what counts or what is possible in the world. The
journey from the cave represents the journey away from such false knowledge claims that
originate in the ill-defined space of the eschatia. Plato recognizes no value that can be
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ascertained from the darkness. Leaving the cave implies a full acceptance of the
civilizing forces of the polis. This dialectic tension is analogous to the movement of
receptive and creative impulses. Plato feared both the extreme freedom and erotic
pleasure that is represented in phantasy. In the same way that I subverted Plato’s Line
analogy, we can make a similar move with a subversive retelling of “The Allegory of the
Cave.” The cave itself, as analogous to the underworld or eschatia, is actually the home
of phantasy, and by leaving the cave, one leaves open education by and through the polis
but loses any connections to the Dionysian. In fact, the cave dweller returns, to the
detriment of him/herself, not to re-experience phantasy, but to save all the prisoners from
their delusory worldview. Plato’s story so thoroughly removed phantasy from the
intelligible world that he does not see the illusory, Apollonian nature of his own worldview, his established reality principle. The allegory of the cave is the illusion of the
illusion of the sensible and intelligible world, and we need a phantastic retelling of the
cave that reveals it as a fiction (not a truth of Forms). There are parallels here between
the Cave, Persephone’s kidnapping to Hades, and Demeter’s journey: All employed in
myth in order to give hope to the cycle of death and rebirth. It is in the cave, in the space
of the eschatia—which Plato feared and rejected—where “whoever entered the liminal
state could never be sure within which category he or she would end up” (Endsjo, 2000,
p. 374). But most important, the real space of the eschatia is not simply the cave but the
liminal space of wandering around after one has been freed from the chains bounding one
to pure phantastical play of images cast upon the wall. What I want to emphasize is the
freedom to play with possibilities that emerges in the transformational zone of
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indistinction between worlds. This is a space of pain and shadows for Plato, but it could
also be seen as a space where phantasy and imagination meet. Only with this
transformation, which comes from playing with the cave, could one re-emerge from the
cave with an entirely transformed subjectivity—transformed by an impulse Plato sought
to curtail.
Revisiting the definition of fantasy in the Concise Encyclopedia of Psychology,
we find that “in its primary form a fantasy appears spontaneously from the unconscious
to the receptive subject” (Wick, 1996, p. 342). And in this, the sense of the unreal is often
not present while the fantasy unfolds: “Normally, in retrospective analysis, the nonreality
status is readily assigned to a fantasy. Fantasies can be absorbing, rendering the
fantasizing individual incapable of adequately attending to the demands of the
environment” (Wick, 1996, p. 342). This implies that the Promethean ethos is in itself
the most successful collective fantasy since it is what gives credence to the sciences and
the destruction of nature, and allows us to remain ignorant to attending to the demands of
nature. In the face of the irrationality of the Promethean, we deny, as we have inherited
from Plato, the truth-value of the irrational, even if in this case, society is shot through
with irrational rationality. However, the Prometheus myth stopped being a phantasy
when it became an ethos, when it became institutionalized and embedded into a cultural
practice: “If a fantasy is assigned a reality status, it stops being a fantasy and by
definition enters the pathological realm, as is the case of delusions, hallucinations,
pseudologia fantasia, and paranoia” (Wick, 1996, p. 342). In this way the Promethean
ethos, without a dialectical mythological reversal, is nothing more than a collective
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delusion that civilization has pulled over its own eyes. But the purpose of phantasy is not
to cover our eyes from the truth we have created ourselves—rather, it is to find a way to
transform such delusions. Phantasy may have a hand to play in finding a new reality
principle and assigning it a reality status.

Myth and Education

In order to best position myth in education, it is first helpful to revisit the
justification for doing so. As we have connected phantasy with the utopian forces of
artistic creation and the Dionysian impulse, understanding how Marcuse envisions the
transformation of culture will help guide the placement of myth in education. Marcuse
reminds us that the “realization of a ‘better future’ involves far more than the elimination
of the bad features of the ‘market,’ of the ‘ruthlessness’ of competition, and so on; it
involves a fundamental change in the instinctual as well as cultural structure” (1955, pp.
272-273). For this reason, myth is poised for education because it can stir the instincts in
their sublimated forms of pleasure (not the desublimated forms of pleasure that have been
removed from instinctual pleasure). For Nietzsche:
A philosophy of wild, naked nature looks with the bold countenance of truth upon
the fitting myths of the Homeric world: they pale and tremble before the lightning
eyes of this goddess, until the mighty fist of the Dionysiac artist forces them into
the service of a new divinity. The Dionysiac truth appropriates the entire realm of
myth as symbolic language for its own insights, which it expresses partly in the
public rite of tragedy and partly in the secret celebrations of dramatic mysteries,
but always under the old mythic veil. (1956, p. 68)
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The force of the Dionysian impulse can be given shape through myth. Without myth, it
remains nothing more than an abstract inner vision lacking the concrete manifestation
that myth allows for. Myth shows us what has been concealed from us by reuniting us
with those lost dimensions that civilization places behind the veil. Education can reclaim
and appropriate myth as a tool, making visible the veil: “It is in the power of ritual
viewing and ritual framing that allows the initiates to see beyond their (certainly beyond
our) culturally imposed identifications and restrictions” (Petridou, 2013, p. 327). That is,
it was just as much in the preparation for the experience as the actual unveiling of the
experience itself that drove both the loss of individual and collective subjectivity. This is
central to myth at the instinctual level because it moves beyond the reinforcing of
individual pleasure and freedom and moves into a space where freedom and pleasure can
be reinterpreted beyond the subjectivity of the current reality principle. Myth can provide
an avenue for freedom. This freedom allegorized in myth must be interpreted at the
instinctual rather than conscious level. In identifying relevant myths for use and critique,
Marcuse proposes:
We look for the ‘cultural-heroes’ who have persisted in imagination as
symbolizing the attitude and the deeds that have determined the fate of mankind.
And here at the outset we are confronted with the fact that the predominant
culture-hero is the trickster and (suffering) rebel against the gods, who creates
culture at the price of perpetual pain. He symbolizes productiveness, the
unceasing effort to master life; but in his productivity, blessing and curse,
progress and toil and inextricably intertwined. Prometheus is the archetype-hero
of the performance principle. And in the world of Prometheus, Pandora, the
female principle, sexuality, and pleasure, appear as curse—disruptive, destructive.
(1955, p. 161)
If Prometheus can be seen to represent the freedom and pleasure in the reality principle,
bent for our purposes around creativity, “then the symbols of another reality principle
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must be sought at the opposite pole” (Marcuse, 1955, p. 161). It is in revisiting the
Pandora myth that we may find the exact sensibility we seek: that of phantasy, or at the
very least a space where the dialectic of phantasy and imagination can be accessed.
Before beginning our analysis of the Pandora myth in light of freedom and
pleasure, it is important to recognize that such an interpretation has been attempted before
in Ivan Illich’s essay “Rebirth of Epimethean Man,” found in Deschooling Society
(1970). While this analysis gets us started on reinterpreting the Pandora myth for
education and imagination, I am critical of Illich’s analysis, which misses a prime
opportunity to use the partnership between Epimetheus and Pandora to represent the
dialectic and to show how the characters, as the embodiments of phantasy and
imagination, provide the dynamic tension we seek.

Pandora, Epimetheus, and Phantasy

The reinterpretation of the Pandora myth provides insights into the dialectical
space where phantasy and imagination can play together. Epimetheus, in addition to
representing a keeper of hope, represents the potential of humanity to overcome
dichotomies. Epimetheus, even though he is warned against it, partners and unites with
Pandora, coupling Masculine and Feminine energies, Paternal and Maternal forces,
Destruction and Creation, in order to generate a sublated tension in the libidinal model
beyond fear of opposites, which Promethean fully embraced. This model might not
necessarily lead to monogamy—in the sense of marriage as we understand it today—but
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rather a metaphorical partnership that represents the union of opposites, thus eliminating
the binary structure of sexuality that reproduces gender relations. Instead, it accepts a
diversity of relationships. This union provides a model beyond domination,
manipulation, guilt, and power associated with repressive sexual gender relations. In this
sense the conceptual/sensual partnering with diversity, with the Other, with the very
antagonistic forces that shape us, helps to overcome binaries.
The Pandora myth can be seen as an allegory for fertility and creation, birth and
life, with the jar representing the earthly womb and the female as the source of mortal
despair. Hope remains in the jar to be nurtured, collectively, so that it can be experienced
in a way that reaches beyond the blind hope of imagination/Apollonian, and touches
instead the sensual hope of phantasy/Dionysian. For education, this matters at both the
individual level, beyond individual consciousness, but also at the cultural level where
hope can be understood and experienced as a sublimated form of pleasure, freedom, and
flourishing. In this interpretation, Zeus represents all human repression. Prometheus at
first seems to represent freedom, but it is a freedom that antagonizes repression and in
doing so strengthens repression. This is the cycle of a strengthening of the performanceprinciple and a weakening of the pleasure-principle to the point where the rational begins
to transform into the irrational.
Epimetheus (as the receiver of Pandora) and Pandora (as the impulse of curiosity
in mystery) introduce the dialectic to counter the Promethean sensibility to dominate and
control through individual force. The strength of the Pandora myth is in the partnering,
the union that exists where reception and curiosity nurture hope together, in spite of the
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earthly woes that define civilization. This partnership is an allegory for the type of play
that I introduced earlier. To restate, as opposed to playing with, playing in would denote
a partnership, perhaps an erotic partnership that can go beyond subject-object
relationships and fulfill pleasure at the instinctual level. Here my mythology of
educational renewal coincides with recent scholarship on play and freedom (Baker, 2006;
Balinisteanu, 2008; Bateson, 2006; Boske, 2011; Fettes, 2011; Gold & Cundiff, 1980a,
1980b; Haldrman, Zelhart & Jackson, 1985; Leafgren, 2011; Smith & Mathur, 2009;
Teague & Gold, 1981; Trotman, 2006; Wiebe & Snowber, 2011; Wood & Latham,
2011). Specifically, Rodari’s (1996) engagement with the Emilio Reggio schools
provides a model of alternative education from Italy that allows for and encourages an
active playing with and playing in freedom and pleasure in the context of education.
Learning is a space of theater, story-telling, and play; a space where reconfiguration can
begin. This argument stands to include a diversity of alternative educational models, all
of which can be understood as increasing the amount of freedom or pleasure available to
the students in the context of their education (A.S.Neill, 1995; Holt & Ferenga, 2003;
Illich, 1970; Llewellyn, 1998 ).
There are two interpretations of the hope that remains sealed in Pandora’s jar. The
first is that, by closing the jar, hope was not able to escape into the world and was kept
safe from the world. Pandora and Epimetheus are the keepers of hope, and in this
relationship we find the allegorical coupling of curiosity and reception: Reception,
because Epimetheus first receives Pandora as a gift from Zeus—a gift that comes from
the liminal space of phantasy—and curiosity, because Pandora opens the jar, letting out
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all of the earthly woes. Reception and curiosity are at home in the liminal experience of
phantasy. The second, more negative reading of the Pandora myth is that hope, since it
was sent with all earthly woes in the first place, is to be included in these earthly woes. It
may be that since it did not escape, we do not have the blind hope to keep us ignorant
from despair. Had hope escaped, we would find ourselves in the predicament of the
performance-principle and desublimated pleasure, where we have the conscious sense of
being fulfilled and gratified—but there would be a bothersome frustration that lurks
beneath at the instinctual level precisely because hope, blind hope, cannot penetrate the
dimension of the instincts. In this case, the keepers of hope prevent humanity from
falling victim to the Platonic hubris of censoring poetry without realizing the
accompanying dangers. Hope, in this sense, becomes Apollonian in that it covers the
traumatic truth of existence with stories that everything is going to be “okay.” But, as
Nietzsche illustrates, without the Dionysian, hope also fades to obscurity, until the
Apollonian stands in solitude, wondering what went wrong and why the world has
become so intolerable and one-dimensional.
Without myth to give a phantastic quality to the increasingly irrational reality
principle, this cycle will be difficult to break. Nietzsche describes with lovely cynicism
the nature of individual consciousness in this state:
Only as an esthetic product can the world be justified to all eternity—although our
consciousness of our own significance does scarcely exceed the consciousness a
painted soldier might have of the battle in which he takes part. Thus our whole
knowledge of art is at bottom illusory, seeing that as mere knowers we can never
be fused with that essential spirit, at the same time creator and spectator, who has
prepared the comedy of art for his own edification. (1956, p. 42)
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It seems we must sacrifice the spectator in ourselves to commune with phantasy and to
find a level of experience beyond that of the painted soldier. Such a consciousness lacks
awareness of the eternal—of the way phantasy dialectically plays with the reality
principle. The Dionysian gives sensuality to experience, while the Apollonian gives it
cultural form. In giving up tragedy, “the Greeks had given up the belief in immortality:
not only the belief in an ideal past, but also the belief in an ideal future” and, in doing so,
turned their back on the utopian drive of phantasy (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 72). For Marcuse,
phantasy can glimpse the promise of utopia. Although it seems that phantasy, as a
product of the unconscious mind, is uncontrollable, it makes one wonder how thoroughly
the ancient Greeks were able to sustain the Eleusinian mysteries and maintain what
seems, from our historical vantage point, a common experience for all initiates. Could a
similar result be achieved in the contemporary era? I do not propose for mythology to
take the place of curriculum in the schools. But mythology does give us a space where
we may reclaim the dialectic and find a space to reawaken phantasy. In this sense,
educational theory could be rethought of as containing two dialectical strands: the
Apollonian study of curriculum and its structures, and the Dionysian study of myth and
its phantastic power. Curriculum and myth, together, form a dialectical pair in tension
with one another—yet this tension could be productive of a new set of values beyond
performance.
In conclusion, phantasy is a force of disruption that can emerge in multiple spaces
and take on a diversity of forms. Its primary function is to counter the permanence and
authenticity of the established reality principle. Phantasy has been wrestled with

174

throughout history in an effort to subdue its radically transformative and potentially
revolutionary impulse. Education can learn from this dialectic disciplining and the ways
that phantasy avoided being co-opted. It may be that it continues to avoid such
techniques, but it may be in civilization’s fully desublimated forms that either phantasy,
too, will become impotent, or that there will be even fewer and narrower spaces for it to
emerge. The hospitality toward phantasy in education that I have been advocating needs
not neglect other forms of learning, imagining, or creating. What needs to be
remembered is the nurturing of liminal space where phantasy can emerge to challenge
existing beliefs, norms, practices, curricular standards, and the cultivation of time to
experiment in these spaces to find new forms of freedom and pleasure. Phantasy is
beyond the concept of rational or irrational since its truth value is not judged according to
the reality principle or performance-principle. To seek phantasy is to hope for change,
disruption, and transformation. This hope can be used in the interpretation of the Pandora
myth to identify the two hallmarks of phantasy: receptivity and curiosity (as in wonder in
the existential mysteries in the first place). Such perplexity exposes the discontentedness
of civilization, moves one out of the content of the desublimated pleasures, and
champions being receptive to/curious about transformative, emancipatory tools that can
be used in classrooms by (and with) students. It is in this partnership that we honor the
allegory of Pandora and seek to reclaim phantasy in a collective space with receptive,
curious students.
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